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PREFACE 
This research report was prepared as part of the ‘research’ component of the catalytic ‘Support for 
land policy formulation’ project, which was funded by the French Development Agency and 
implemented under the auspices of the French Cooperation ‘Land Tenure and Development’ 
Technical Committee. 
The aim of this research component is to deepen knowledge in this field through empirical work 
on two themes undertaken by research teams in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres: 
• Land dynamics and transactions: the different forms of transaction, the concerned 
actors, modes of regulation, economic and social impacts.  
• Land policy formulation processes: the political and economic issues, the involved 
actors , formal and informal lobbying and negotiations, the role of research and expertise, 
etc. 
The reports that came out of this research can be found on the ‘Land tenure and development’ 
portal at:  
http://www.foncier-developpement.org/vie-des-reseaux/le-projet-appui-a-lelaboration-des-
politiques-foncieres/volet-recherche 
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SUMMARY 
One of the peculiarities of the Vietnamese land system is the existence of a ‘zero state’ with 
regard to land institutions: all the country’s existing land institutions were put in place in the last 
25 to 30 years. However, this does not mean that there is no history of such bodies; indeed, those 
that are now emerging carry the traces of each past period. The many local customary institutions 
reflect the principles underpinning previous systems regulating the social and spatial distribution 
of resources, and elements of the French land tenure system can be seen in the decision to register 
land ownership certificates rather than follow the more Anglo Saxon system of using the titles 
themselves as proof of ownership. Nevertheless, there is a clear synchronic dimension to the 
process of putting land institutions in place, which is reflected in the role it has played in the 
profound transformation of the Vietnamese State and society. 
In the first stage of this process, between 1979 and 1993, one of the primary concerns in designing 
land institutions was to respond to the high expectations of a deeply rural society without making 
land an autonomous domain. This period saw the progressive dissolution of the cooperatives 
through the withdrawal of their land prerogatives. Moving in incremental stages, the State first 
recognised individuals and households as potential land users (with Decree 100, Decree 10 and 
the Land Law of 1989), although land use rights were still limited and defined within cooperatives 
through temporary contracts between the cooperatives, which still held delegated management 
rights, and these new users. This stage ended with the Land Law of 1993 which, while not openly 
challenging the cooperatives, paved the way for their disappearance by recognising that 
individuals and households had fundamental derived management rights in addition to the right to 
use agricultural lands (rights to exchange, assign, rent, bequeath and mortgage land) for relatively 
long fixed periods. This gave them significant control over land while dispossessing the 
cooperatives of any real land management capacities. Since these rights are associated with use 
rights, it was not the land that could be transferred or mortgaged, but the right to use it and enjoy 
its produce. However, the very existence of these rights and their fairly long-term allocation to 
households meant that a land market could develop, and that land tenure seemed to function on 
the basis of private ownership, even if it was not characterised as such.  
The second stage was a transition facilitating the ‘smooth’ passage from a land tenure system 
designed to meet the needs of the rural population to one that could support the drive to make 
Vietnam a modern industrial and urban country. This stage roughly corresponded to the decade 
separating the land laws of 1993 and 2003.  In this period, the State did little to the rights assigned 
to individuals and households and hardly changed agricultural land tenure. It did, however, 
endeavour to put in place the land administration, for which it created an independent organ at the 
ministerial level in 1994, the General Department of Land Administration (GDLA). For the first 
time, this brought together its decision-making, operational and technical dimensions (the former 
General department of land management created in 1979, and the former National department of 
surveys and cartography), demonstrating the government’s willingness to make this an 
autonomous domain that carried some weight. The State also progressively regulated modes of 
access to urban, industrial and commercial lands and increased the rights assigned to private 
enterprise, thus paving the way for the changes in the next period (albeit rather haphazardly by 
generating a growing number of texts). 
The third stage started with a reform of the land administration in 2002 and the publication of a 
new Land Law in 2003. Land was now becoming a tool to develop the territory for 
industrialisation and urbanisation. This was made clear by the law of 2003, which incorporated 
regulations from the previous period and barely touched on rural affairs. Little was done to 
modify access to agricultural and forest lands, which had been regulated in 1993, or provide more 
flexible access for rural households. But the other categories of land and land users – some of 
whom appeared in legislation for the first time – occupied a growing and even dominant place in 
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the law. Thus, the new legislation was full of arrangements to facilitate industrial and commercial 
investments by private and foreign enterprises, and allowed for the development of markets for 
land and land use rights. It also specified procedures for cataloguing and planning land use. While 
land use planning remained a top-down procedure steered by the Land Office at different levels, 
the legislation made the planning process much more flexible by extending the provinces’ 
prerogatives and enabling the infra-provincial administrative authorities to change the status of 
lands.  
Since 2002, land issues have both multiplied and intensified on several levels. The partial and 
poorly managed decentralisation of land management increased the shortcomings and tensions 
between the central and provincial levels. On the one hand, the Land Office, which had been 
substantially modernised and was responsible for planning at every level, had never had as much 
potential power. This certainly rattled the central government and probably prompted its demotion 
in 2002 from a ministry to part of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE). 
On the other hand, the provinces have used even greater rifts within the administrative system to 
lessen the constraints of centralised planning and work very broadly with the legislation in order 
to respond to local expectations, and especially those of private interests. The increasing 
privatisation of land has been another point of tension. Since the Constitution of 1959, the State 
has owned all land in the name of the entire population, and while individual land rights have 
constantly been extended, individuals are assigned rights of use and management. However, the 
growing number of recognised users, more flexible conditions of access to land and the 
progressive extension of rights associated with use rights have allowed private national and 
foreign enterprises to become dominant land actors – hence the spectacular growth in the number 
and size of landholdings reserved for industrial, commercial, real-estate and leisure projects, 
especially in peri-urban areas. 
The creation of ‘land fund development organisations’ in 2004 is symptomatic of the problems 
posed by redefing the role of the provinces and private investors. Modes of expropriation are a 
recurrent problem with investments, and especially compensation for those whose use rights have 
been expropriated. This issue was only settled recently, and has been treated on a case-by-case 
basis by the provinces or the Land Office. The Law of 2003 still presents the State as the principal 
actor in land distribution insofar as it is the authority that requisitions land in order to immediately 
reallocate it to investors. However, the State has disengaged from transactions since 2004, 
creating a new, State-mandated body to intervene when lands are repossessed: ‘land fund 
development organisations’ whose task is to simplify procedures for investors by offering them a 
single interface, managing the funds from land recovered by the State in accordance with 
decisions by the competent bodies, and preparing these lands for reallocation to investors. 
However, the exact status of these organisations, which are not commercial but also not totally 
public, is somewhat unclear. They are not financially autonomous, they are not mandatory, and 
their form and level of competence fluctuates as they can operate at the district or the provincial 
level. This lack of clarity, which results in the creation of bodies whose nature varies from 
province to province, suggests that the State is trying to divest itself of the highly sensitive 
problem of expropriations at the expense of their beneficiaries, rather than seeking to resolve it in 
the long term. 
What is the explanation for this disengagement, given that the problems created by the way that 
land is expropriated for investment projects are some of the thorniest and most intractable for the 
authorities in Hanoi? One reason is probably the increasing complexity of land management, and 
the human and financial resources that can be devolved to the administration to carry out the tasks 
it habeen assigned. These are very substantial needs, especially at the lowest echelons 
(communes, districts) where staff usually have little or no training. But the State’s disengagement 
cannot be entirely ascribed to these technical and financial challenges; it is also a manifestation of 
the difficulties of addressing two very different priorities: leading Vietnam towards modernity by 
transforming it into an industrial and urban country, and organising a fragile and numerically 
superior rural population with a long habit of socialist values. One of the factors currently 
execerbating the question of expropriation is the fact that agricultural and forested lands have 
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been kept in a relatively isolated state of suspension for the last 15 years. One would assume that 
the State has a duty to protect these lands (and their users), but it is actually making them more 
vulnerable to the dynamics of urban and/or non-agricultural land use (industrial and commercial, 
leisure, etc.). 
Agricultural land has been subject to various changes since 1993, but access to such land is still 
highly regulated. Maintaining a ceiling on the amount of land and duration of the rights allocated 
limits the process of land accumulation and ensures that the rural population has egalitarian access 
to land. By the same token, households that have been allocated rights to agricultural land by the 
State do not have to pay tax on this land, whose value is set according to the value of its 
agricultural produce rather than the price of adjacent lands (market price). Although this should 
mean that such land remains accessible even to poor rural households, this specific status, and 
especially that of highly protected rice-producing land, works against rural households by 
trapping them in small, low-value farms and weakening their position when private and/or non-
agricultural interests come into play. It seems that rather than being protected, agricultural 
households – along with agriculture itself – are being sacrificed to industrialisation and 
urbanisation. 
However, things are not as simple as the last few lines suggest. On the one hand, rural 
households’ situations vary greatly from region to region, and there are cases where they may be 
protected by modes of access to agricultural and forested land, especially the most vulnerable 
households. Recent events, and the global food crisis in particular, have reminded Vietnam that 
there is still a role for agriculture and rural producers, and once again put the question of rural 
land under the spotlight. In response to this crisis (and soaring rice prices), the government 
decided to freeze more than one million hectares of rice fields and launch a campaign reaffirming 
the value of rural areas in relation to urban areas (the ‘three nong’). It is too early to know whether 
the return to ‘rural values’ in 2008 will have a lasting impact on agricultural land, and exactly 
what this impact will be. But the decisions that have been taken show that agricultural land still 
constitutes a lever that the government will not hesitate to use when the need arises. For certain 
national officials, agricultural land remains a strong symbol of socialism, and its regulation a 
crucial element of social peace in what is still a largely rural society with close attachments to the 
land. Agricultural land is also an issue that raises questions about the State’s role in the move 
towards ‘market socialism’, and the legitimacy of the Communist Party. While the State’s 
indecision (or approximations) with regard to land matters could be interpreted as evidence of a 
certain pragmatism and determination to work with the legacy of the socialist period, recent 
developments in this domain are testing the very foundations of the Communist Party’s 
legitimacy, and it could try to deflect this threat by getting the government to maintain the specific 
status of rural land. So is Vietnam heading towards a two-tier system where some land – the vast 
block of agricultural and forest lands allocated free of charge – continues to be managed by 
central government in the nation’s interest, while other agricultural land can be mobilised at 
leisure and managed under a liberal regime in order to support the country’s economic 
development? 
In order to answer this question we needed to turn to the land actors and seek their opinions. The 
majority of foreign actors (who were historically excluded from this sensitive strategic domain 
and whose involvement is therefore relatively recent) view the reform as incomplete and thus a 
major cause of corruption. They are pushing to divest the law of these ‘socialist archaisms’ and 
make it even more liberal. As recently as March 2008 the World Bank, which some see as the 
global symbol of liberalism, and which had until then deliberately avoided land matters, signed up 
to the highly ambitious Land Administration Project, making it the lead foreign actor in this 
domain and giving a strong indication of the direction in which land affairs are heading. However, 
the positions expressed by various national land actors are much less clear. On the one hand, 
officials in the land administration in particular take a fairly technical approach to land: their main 
concern is the effectiveness of the administration and legislation, and making land an autonomous 
domain. Officials working directly with foreign experts tend to take a ‘top-down’ approach, 
looking at the development of the whole country and seeing the constraints associated with the 
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processes of urbanisation, industrialisation and increasing openness. On the other hand, some of 
the actors we spoke to from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) see land 
as something that cannot be detached from local and sectoral contexts. Therefore, they believe 
that agricultural land should respond to the needs of agriculture and rural populations, while forest 
land should primarily respond to environmental protection objectives. At the moment the first 
group of actors is much more influential because of their strategic position within the land 
administration and support from international cooperation; however, in the current economic 
climate the question of agriculture and rural areas and populations has re-emerged as a priority 
and is slowing the pace of liberalisation. 
So far there is no indication that agricultural land will be able to take account of the specificities 
and great diversity of rural areas, whether or not it is prioritised, planned or liberalised. 
Agricultural land tenure is controlled by the State, and characterised more by the numerous 
constraints that it imposes (categories, temporal and spatial limits, etc.) than its capacity to adapt 
to the problems facing the country’s rural populations, agricultural practices and environment. 
Liberalising agricultural land tenure would bring it closer to a system of individual ownership, 
which would make land legislation more onerous in many settings where local rights of access to 
resources are not managed in this way. The Land Law of 2003 introduced several innovations that 
are helpful in this respect, mainly by creating a new category of users, ‘residential communities’, 
which allows groups to collectively hold use rights to unlimited amounts of agricultural and forest 
land that they are allocated free of charge for unlimited periods. However, this new measure is 
itself very restrictive in terms of what constitutes a ‘community’, the procedures it entails and the 
framework it imposes on collective management. So what place do customary land tenure systems 
have in the emerging land system? Vietnamese land institutions seem to have made little or no 
attempt to plan for this; and the main reason why there are still such diverse local situations 
appears to be the government’s hesitant approach to agricultural land tenure. The co-existence of 
actors with divergent positions on this question and on the role of the State, and the relative 
abandonment of the rural world (especially remote rural areas) because it is not considered 
important as long it doesn’t challenge the objectives of urbanisation and industrialisation have left 
a gap where customary systems can continue to function. The recent resurgence of interest in this 
domain could revive the debate about systems that are considered incompatible with the 
establishment of a modern State, either because of agricultural practices such as slash-and-burn or 
the functioning of longstanding local power systems, but customary systems will continue to 
survive as long as efforts to develop intensive, industrial-type agriculture are not sustained 
effectively across the country. 
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METHODOLOGY 
1. Summary of the issues 
The Vietnamese model of collectivism, which was put in place in the North in the late 1950s and 
then extended across the rest of the country from 1975 onwards, only recognised cooperatives, 
farms and State enterprises as legal users of agricultural lands. In the 1980s, several reforms of the 
collectivist system (including ‘Resolution 100’ and ‘Contract 10’ of 1981 and 1988) progressively 
softened the principle of distributing resources within collective structures and helped (re)create 
links between households and the land (Bergeret, 1995). The first Land Law, which was 
promulgated in 1988, recognised rural households as units of production and guaranteed them the 
right to enjoy the fruits of their labour on land that they could use for a period of 15 years. But, as 
with preceding reforms, collective and state structures remained the sole legal land users and 
retained the power to decide how much land households would be allocated, as well as the 
duration and terms and conditions of its use.   
The foundations for a genuine transformation of land relations were eventually put in place in 
1993, with the promulgation of a new land law. This second version of the land law, which can be 
seen as the basis for current legislation,1 recognises families’ and individuals’ rights to use land in 
the long term (for 20 to 50 years), and allows these use rights to be sold, rented, mortgaged and 
passed down through the family. This marked a de facto – but unacknowledged (Pillot, 1995) – 
break with the precepts on which socialist Vietnam had based its political choices for over 30 
years, and established the conditions for a shift from collectivist-type land tenure to direct 
individual tenure. The State went even further by almost exclusively promoting individual tenure 
and putting in place vast land use rights allocation programmes in order to extend this regime 
across all the country’s agricultural and forest lands.  
However, dividing land and allocating individual use rights was not an easy matter in rural areas 
where a wide range of ethnic groups operated under collective regimes. There have been 
numerous studies on recent changes in rural areas,2 which specifically analyse the effects of the 
land reform (see Mellac and Sikor, for example) and emphasise the very diverse situations 
observed at the local level between plains and mountains, rice-growers and shifting cultivators 
(slashing and burning land for cultivation), and often even within a single village between 
agricultural and forest lands, annual and perennial crops, rice fields and sloping lands … They 
also show the gaps between the different  administrative levels responsible for implementing this 
reform at the local level (mainly communes and districts). In moving away from attempting to 
organise the entire country in a homogenous manner, the land reform and its implementation 
(re)activated local differentiations in land distribution between different groups, and even between 
households within these groups. 
Until now, the effects of the new land policy in North and South Vietnam have only been 
considered in case studies that rarely go beyond the level of the commune or district. When they 
do attempt to explain the diversity of local land situations, they mainly focus on local resistance, 
which is largely ascribed to the variety of local conditions. But local diversity cannot survive 
unless the upper echelons allow the conditions for resistance to emerge, intentionally or 
otherwise. This means that the growing number of local studies are unlikely to make full sense 
without better understanding of why the upper echelons permitted such diverse situations at the 
local level. Because of the lack of knowledge about the land reform at these levels, few studies are 
                                                
1  The Land Law of 1993 has been amended twice (in 1998 and 2001), and was modified before being replaced by a 
new land law in July 2004. 
2  Such as Fforde A., Vylder S., Kerkvliet B., Porter D., Le Trong C., Rambo T. and Bergeret P. 
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able to explain how such diversity could emerge in what is still a highly centralised system with 
no legal provisions for such adaptations. 
Rather than attempting to explain the diversity of situations as necessarily ‘contingent’ on the 
articulation between localities, this project aims to investigate its meaning at the higher levels of 
the province and the State. 
The complex interplay of actors at the central level raises numerous questions in contemporary 
Vietnam. While the land reform as a whole may have furthered economic growth in rural areas, it 
has also helped create new divisions, and the reform itself has led to social tensions within the 
country.3 Each actor’s strategy reflects their response to issues such as overlapping land rights at 
the local level, the unequal distribution of official rights and the existence of an unofficial land 
market, which may or may not be supported by the local authorities. Similarly, the multiplicity of 
social, economic and environmental issues associated with land matters is reflected in the 
differing levels of priority given to rural households, businesses (private and public) or even 
protected areas in each locality. 
All this means that the issue of land tenure and its enforcement raises questions about the State’s 
legitimacy, its capacity to transfer control over land to the public and to organise this transfer – 
especially as the question of land can be seen as one of the principal levers of the socialist 
revolution (Kerkvliet, 1997). What does the land reform tell us about the State? Is the apparent 
contradiction between socialist ideology and privatisation proof of its symbolic weakening? On a 
more practical level, how does the State compensate for its loss of control over land in the context 
of territorial management (population and space)? Are we seeing a hybrid model of land tenure 
being put in place over the economic model of ‘market socialism’? Are the procrastinations and 
delays proof of the State’s pragmatism or its loss of control over internal affairs? And is the State 
acting in response to the international context in which it has evolved since the 1980s, or to local 
changes initiated in the framework of the Doi Moi economic reform? 
Despite the powers wielded at the central level, the province is the only level at which the 
authorities control substantial budgets and have any real decision-making powers over local 
affairs. This means that they are the only authorities with the power to produce their own, more 
refined institutions (which condition those at lower levels), which may explain the variety of local 
land situations from a legal point of view. Located at the interface between the central and the 
local levels, the provincial level is crucial to our exploration of the logics behind land policies that 
view top-down and bottom-up directives as stakeholders in the process itself. How does dialogue 
between the national and provincial authorities occur? What are the concrete mechanisms that 
allow a first level of diversity between the provinces? How do the provinces reflect the diversity 
of local land tenure in relation to the central level, and how do they manage crosscutting 
strategies? 
The provinces’ apparent role as the interface between the State and local levels leads us to 
consider the different actors at these levels, and their place in the political spectrum. Are we 
witnessing the forms of ‘topocracy’ that Terry Canon (2006) identified in China, which are linked 
to the particular characteristics of local government behaviour and the forms and specific goals of 
spatial entities? This room to manoeuvre is particularly evident in land matters because it affects 
the way that territories are organised and the political balances that shape them. The Vietnamese 
press often carries reports of land regulations that have been applied for the benefit of particular 
influential actors by local authorities operating on the margins of legality. Apart from specific 
cases determined by local contexts, the variable application of the land reforms could be 
explained by changes in the relationships between State structures as economic leverage takes 
precedence over the purely political. Exploring how actors use their capacity to influence the 
interpretation of texts generated by the land reform allows us to determine to an unprecedented 
degree what room there is to manoeuvre, and what effect this has at the local local level. 
                                                
3  Particularly over the lack of recognition for minority-managed collective lands, or the pressure on the price of land in 
the central plateaux since the late 1990s. 
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Arrangements introduced since 2004 (the new Land Law) have facilitated the introduction and 
proliferation of numerous local experiments challenging individual land tenure, and reinforced the 
development of capitalist-type modes of management. Both represent a small but very real 
withdrawal by the State, and a possible foretaste of new changes that gradually make the 
legislation more progressive and more complex, giving less weight to official actors (such as the 
government and the Communist Party) and creating more room for new types of actor. Preparing 
the conditions for the participation of these actors, and more especially for projects supporting the 
formulation and implementation of future land policies, is therefore a particularly useful exercise. 
2. Land institutions and players at the national and provincial levels 
This research has three methodological focal points. 
The first takes the central and provincial levels as an entry point. There are several theoretical and 
practical advantages to this. The first is that it generates knowledge on land matters that does not 
exist at these upper levels, or is very fragmentary and lacking in analysis. The second advantage is 
that working at a higher geographic scale supplements the knowledge produced at the local level, 
and could enable us to analyse the observed diversity by taking account of factors that intervene at 
different levels and during the passage from one level to another. Previous case studies could be 
‘recontextualised’ while a comparative analysis is made of them. At the provincial level, our 
study focused on two provinces, one in the North of the country, Lao Cai; and the other in the 
south, Binh Duong. They were chosen because of what was already known about them, and 
because they are representative of regional issues.4 Lao Cai is a very rural, partially forested 
province located far from the centres of power. Bordering Yunnan, on the developing Kunming-
Hai Phong transport corridor, this province is moving towards greater economic openness but on a 
completely different scale to Binh Duong, where much of the south of the province is gradually 
being taken over by industrial zones spreading from the outermost suburbs of Ho Chi Minh City. 
Straddling the highlands and lowlands, Binh Duong province allows us to consider two issues that 
do not figure greatly in Lao Cai: rural lands used for industrial crops, and agricultural lands under 
considerable pressure from industrial and urban encroachment.  
The second focus is describing and analysing, in as much detail as possible, how land institutions 
have been put in place since the end of the 1980s. This was mainly done by: 
• working to establish timelines that would show the different stages of the land reform 
(designing the reform, producing and revising the legislation, creating/transforming the 
administration, enforcement at different levels) and the times when different actors were 
involved in the different types of land specifically covered by this study (agricultural and 
forest lands) at the two levels studied;  
• working to establish flow charts showing the major changes in the institutions and legal 
texts over the course of time. 
Various sources of formal and informal data were used: legal texts, local and national 
publications, statistics, foreign press articles, scientific and grey literature (project documents, 
reports, etc.). However, most of the information came from surveys of actors who had intervened 
in different aspects of the reform (formulating and enforcing the legislation, political advice, etc.). 
The third focal point is analysis of the texts (articles, grey literature, etc.) and testimonies given by 
different actors. Here it was a matter of working on existing materials and the surveys conducted 
                                                
4 In Vietnam, there are very marked physical and social differences between the North/Centre/South. The main 
characteristics of the northern and central highlands (Highlands) are summarised below: 
 – the mountains of the North: spatial, political and cultural proximity with the centre of power (Hanoi); proximity to 
China; long history of considerable ethnic diversity; small-scale family farming characterised by flooded rice on 
wetlands and cleared slopes, ongoing agricultural diversification; residual, relatively stable forested areas; 
 – central highlands: spatial, political and cultural distance from the centre of power; proximity to Cambodia and 
Laos; recent ethnic diversity and agricultural colonisation (massive influx of people from the North); agricultural 
specialisation in cash crops, large but rapidly diminishing forested areas.  
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during several field trips, and comparing these two types of source material. With each actor we 
sought to tease out the trains of thought and/or inconsistencies in their testimony, and highlight 
their possible hidden intentions by comparing their discourse with that of the other actors. This 
helped us identify how the relationships and tensions between actors shaped their relative 
positions. 
3. Strengths and weaknesses of the study 
When this project was designed, it was still unclear whether it would be possible to directly 
address the question of land with institutional actors in Vietnam. Previous experiences in the field 
in Hanoi and various rural and urban localities had shown how difficult it could be to tackle this 
issue openly, and it was still a delicate question in June-July 2007, when certain contacts advised 
us to proceed cautiously with our preliminary field study. 
Things were very different when we made the second field trip less than 10 months later (April 
2008). Everyone in Hanoi was talking about land matters, which were getting extensive media 
coverage and were a subject of daily conversation with taxi drivers, street vendors and so on. 
This new context – which will be explained in the third section of this report – had several 
consequences for our work. Land had become an issue that could be freely addressed at the 
national level. It is still highly controversial (due to expropriations, personal enrichment by high-
ranking Party officials and members of the Government, etc.), but the existence of these 
controversies is accepted at this level and the subject is no longer taboo. This meant that we could 
openly state the nature of our work, and few meetings were turned down on account of their 
subject matter.5 Land has also become a topical issue that is widely covered by the media, which 
enabled us to collect information and test public opinion. 
However, it is still a very sensitive subject at the provincial level. During the surveys in Hanoi, 
several Vietnamese respondents indicated that the government wished to regain control of 
provincial land management because of the widespread abuses observed in certain provinces. This 
kind of problem was also a recurrent theme among foreign observers, and the justification for 
investment aimed at improving governance at this level. There has been particular criticism of 
provincial management since Hanoi and certain provinces were singled out during the surveys 
(Dak Lak and Son La, for example); and it should be noted that the priority now given to rural 
areas (the ‘three nông’ and accompanying programme) is reinforcing the pressure that Hanoi is 
exerting on rural provinces. Given the climate of suspicion and the pressures that we identified at 
the central level, it is fairly logical that land is generally a more sensitive issue in the provinces 
than in Hanoi. 
The situation in Binh Duong and Lao Cai showed that this was still a delicate issue. In fact, we 
were unable to collect much information in Lao Cai because the research had not been authorised, 
and it was impossible to broach the subject of land directly without the official paperwork – hence 
the imbalance in the information collected in these two provinces. In Binh Duong, we could 
address the subject directly and people initially seemed happy to discuss it.  But 10 days into our 
work the police suddenly became suspicious about the surveys, and from then on doors remained 
firmly shut. 
Another constraint was the very strong focus on questions relating to urbanisation and peri-
urbanisation. These help symbolically distance the problem of agricultural lands (including forest 
land), especially in the highlands where most marginal regions lie. Although the question of rights 
to use agricultural and forest lands was a major concern not long ago – despite the lack of media 
attention – the transformation of agricultural lands into industrial and commercial zones in peri-
urban areas has become such an urgent question that it now overshadows events occurring further 
away, far from the media and most of the population. The current hot topic in land matters is thus 
                                                
5  Nevertheless, in the interests of confidentiality we never name our oral sources as some of our interviews could 
make life difficult for the people we spoke to. Similarly, we do not always indicate the position occupied by our 
sources in order to protect their identity. 
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no longer rights to agricultural and forest lands, but the changing status of land, especially 
agricultural land near cities in the major deltas, which is being transformed into urban and 
industrial areas, leisure and business parks. While it was not a major element of our initial 
research question, the transformation of peri-urban areas did emerge as a very important issue. 
Nevertheless, the focus of this research remained, as stated, on agricultural and forested lands as a 
whole. 
In the three sections that present the results of this study (III, IV and V), we follow a logic that 
moves from the general to the particular. The first section (III) provides an overview of the main 
issues associated with land today, and emphasises the importance of non-agricultural dynamics in 
understanding these issues in rural areas. This section helps contextualise the most recent changes 
in land institutions described in part IV, and explain the reactions of the land actors we questioned 
about the evolution of these institutions (part V). Therefore, part III is necessary in order to 
understand parts IV and V, which concentrate almost exclusively on land institutions and actors.6 
The conclusion in the final section of this document (Part VI) proposes a new reading of rural 
land issues in light of our research into the creation of Vietnam’s land institutions and the actors 
directly involved in their creation. 
                                                
6  In order to help the reader understand the logics and issues associated with land, an essay on the pre-collectivist and 
collectivist history of land institutions in Vietnam is presented in the Annex (Document B, Annex A.5). 
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II. RURAL LAND ISSUES TODAY: HAS AGRICULTURE BEEN FORGOTTEN?  
In the mid-1980s Vietnam followed the path taken by all socialist countries recently converted to 
the market economy, and embarked upon a radical reform of its institutions. One of the most 
momentous reforms was that of land, which lies at the heart of questions regarding access to and 
distribution of resources. The fundamental role played by land has a particular resonance in 
Vietnam because of the rural nature of the country and the very important place that agriculture 
still occupies within its economy. Land is therefore a major issue at every level, from local groups 
engaged in agricultural production right up to the highest echelons of government responsible for 
territorial management. In rural societies, changes that affect land not only directly relate to 
modes of agricultural production, but also extend well beyond this domain into social and political 
arenas. The conflicts and claims associated with new modes of access to land make land a 
strategic issue that affects most of Vietnamese society. 
However, rural land issues today cannot simply be understood in terms of rural areas. Urban 
pressure and industrialisation are major elements in rural dynamics, and important factors in the 
transformation of rural land. Because the country has opened up to the world and changed 
fundamentally as a result of this, its land can no longer be considered in a purely national 
framework. Having shown how land and agricultural activities are giving way to industrial 
activities and urbanisation in two different types of rural area (delta and coastal plains undergoing 
urbanisation and rural peripheries), the third part of this document returns to a recent aspect of the 
economic environment, the global food crisis, which has changed the way that the central 
government views agriculture and put it back on the political agenda. 
1. Urban and industrial growth in the major deltas  
1.1 Peri-urbanisation, privatisation, expropriation  
The privatisation of land is a recent but very rapid phenomenon in Vietnam, which has developed 
in parallel with greater economic openness and resulted in the progressive takeover of urban lands 
by private actors, businesses and individuals (Grard, 2004). This process of privatisation is 
accompanied by massive peri-urbanisation around major cities, especially Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City, which is rapidly accelerating around secondary and tertiary hubs. Apart from 
extending the urban fabric by progressively encroaching upon the agricultural lands attached to 
cities, especially along major transport corridors, it has resulted in the proliferation of scattered 
and sometimes (as in Hanoi) huge non-agricultural zones around cities that are used for housing 
(closed residential areas), industrial, commercial or leisure purposes. These two types of process 
obviously have an impact on agricultural land, and the rate and scale of their progress has made 
this the most important – or at least the most debated and visible – rural land issue issue today. 
Peri-urbanisation is also a relatively recent process. The Atlas infographique de la province de 
Hanoï (Rossi et al., 2002) describes the restrictions on this phenomenon up to the mid-1990s, 
with the ban on changes to the status of agricultural lands (strengthened in 1992) and very tightly 
controlled urban growth. As a result, Hanoi became denser but its urban fabric did not spread 
much and remained within the ordained administrative boundaries.7 Much of the investment 
during this period was direct foreign investment (DFI) focused on the city centre, which meant 
                                                
7  Here we are referring to the city in the administrative sense. Hanoi ranks as a provincial-level city (Thanh Pho), 
which means that it has the same status as a province and is directly dependent on the government in terms of 
development. The city of Hanoi is divided into units whose specific status determines how they are managed. It 
includes rural districts that are subdivided into communes, and urban districts (arrondissements) subdivided into 
neighbourhoods. 
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that it was Hanoi’s physiognomy that changed rather than its size. Nevertheless, rural peri-urban 
areas were already being affected by several phenomena. 
On the one hand, rural villages that had been incorporated into the administrative city were 
changing rapidly in response to urban demand, as well their inhabitants’ rising living standards 
and the new socio-economic conditions. Housing changed, becoming denser, higher and 
increasingly urban; while linear urbanisation along various axes gradually linked villages to the 
city, forming a continuous urban fabric. The expansion of residential areas was still limited by the 
restrictions imposed by the People’s Committee of Hanoi City, which set the boundaries for 
residential expansion every three years and encouraged communes to build on former ‘10%’ lands 
(ibid.). 
But the new residential areas created by the communes in response to demand from those wanting 
to escape the insalubrious and over-populated city centres prompted a new phenomenon: land 
speculation by city dwellers in peri-urban areas. It should be noted that land transfers were 
completely illegal until 1993, in that only buildings could be legally appropriated. Land was thus 
‘bought’ and ‘sold’ with no guarantees, and transactions were not registered. 
On the other hand, while DFIs mainly focused on city centres, they also started extending into 
peri-urban areas, especially investments in industry (which accounted for 8 per cent of DFIs 
between 1988 and 1997; ibid.). The first investments corresponded with the government decree of 
1991 regarding the creation of export processing zones (EPZ), rising from 1994 onwards with the 
creation of industrial parks and zones. The initial plan was for five industrial zones covering 975 
hectares (ibid.). As these were not particularly large areas the impacts of industrialisation at this 
stage were much more social and economic  (reinforcing social disparities) than spatial. But apart 
from the fact that this process was a completely new aspect of industrialisation in Hanoi, it was a 
foretaste of coming changes that would affect much larger spaces and subsequently outstrip urban 
areas (in 2000, industrial zones occupied 2,060 hectares of Hanoi, ibid). It also created tensions 
over land in the rural areas concerned, especially over compensation for households whose land 
was requisitioned for industrial purposes, and contributed to new differentiations within rural 
areas (depending on their proximity to industrial areas) without mitigating the much greater 
rural/urban differentiation caused by the concentration of investment in urban areas and the land 
controls put in place by the ruling authority. 
These phenomena were relatively contained until the mid-1990s, but then gained increasing 
momentum and developed extremely rapidly in the 2000s: between 2001 and 2007 some 500,000 
hectares of agricultural land was converted into urban or industrial land (Manilla Times, 7th May 
2008, Food crisis bites in Vietnam despite economic boom). 
This acceleration was initially driven by the exodus of increasingly wealthy urbanites from city 
centres and the inflow of new arrivals heading for peri-urban areas, often close to industrial zones 
where they could find work. Both were making the most of the opportunities created by the Land 
Law of 1993, which included the possibility of buying and selling land. Although it was not easy 
to change agricultural land into residential land, it was possible, thanks to two factors: 
• progressive use of the ‘10% lands’ and communal lands for housing, which raised the 
stakes for these kinds of land in peri-urban rural communes (Rossi et al., 2002) and also 
led to their gradual disappearance, leaving communes with less spatial room to manoeuvre; 
• the effect of the change in the communes’ status from rural to urban, which made it easier 
to switch from agricultural land use and allowed the urban fabric to expand rapidly. It is 
this phenomenon in particular that has facilitated today’s swift urban growth. 
This second factor started to take effect some time ago, and really gathered pace after the Land 
Law of 2003 with the decentralisation of development planning. Although provincial-level 
development plans still had to be approved by the government, the provinces could now change 
them substantially and decide to create industrial, commercial and/or leisure areas on the basis of 
their local economic usefulness. 
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However, the new legal arrangements are not the only causes of today’s current extraordinary 
peri-urban growth, which has been accelerated by several other factors. 
The State has moved away from the principle of ‘anti-urbanisation’ that dominated public 
management until the Doi Moi economic reform, in favour of developing existing urban hubs and 
implementing policies designed to attract capital to these hubs. So it could be said that the 
authorities are initiating land dynamics and changes in the market; on the one hand by 
encouraging certain activities that are in line with national guidelines, and on the other by meeting 
private actors’ (individuals and businesses) need for urban land (Grard, 2004). As noted above, 
the political leadership’s prioritisation of foreign investment and industrialisation is evident in the 
most recent land texts, particularly the 2003 Land Law. These texts regulate yet soften – and 
facilitate – the conditions for access to land by mixed or foreign enterprises, opening the door to 
numerous new initatives, such as the Korean project approved by the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment in early 2006. The new ‘Tay Ho Tay’ urban complex will cover 207 hectares of land 
west of the West Lake and include buildings, commercial centres and hotels (Le blog immobilier, 
2008). 
Peri-urbanisation is also driven by the quest for less expensive land, and can be likened to an 
‘endless growth’ constantly feeding off new land. Land prices in the centre of Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City are so high that it has become extremely difficult for the city to put in place new 
infrastructures or carry out building projects. According to Karl D. John (2006, Asia Time), one 
square metre of land along the main arteries of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City reached $5,000 in 
2006, boosting the price of apartments to $300 - $1,000 or more per square metre. Referring to 
research undertaken by local experts, John claimed that land and property speculation had pushed 
prices so high that only 5 per cent of Vietnamese households could gain access to land or housing 
in urban areas at the time. Judging by the scale of land and property transactions, there must be a 
considerable number of very wealthy Vietnamese who have opted to invest in this sector rather 
than put their money in the bank or productive assets. This has contributed to a huge increase in 
urban land prices, starting in the centre of agglomerations, spreading out to peripheral areas and 
pushing projects and individuals further away from the centre, creating a ripple effect as pressure 
on the inner suburbs then impacts on the outer suburbs, and so on … 
This drive to gain access to land as cheaply as possible reflects the desire of provinces and 
districts near major agglomerations to benefit from industrial and commercial zones that can 
provide work for their inhabitants and generate revenue for their governments (and officials). 
There is considerable competition between the different administrative units at various levels, to 
attract investment that can bring wealth and prestige as well as employment. Such competition is 
also evident between the country’s two major agglomerations. For example, Hanoi recently (7th 
May 2008) chose to extend the boundaries of its urban envelope (thanh pho Ha Noi) by 
incorporating the entire province of Ha Tay and several districts and communes of neighbouring 
provinces.8 This trebled the surface area of the capital, which now covers 334,470 hectares, 
including 190,000 ha of agricultural and forested land (Thu Trang, CVN, 2008), making Hanoi 
the largest city in Southeast Asia thanks to the vast swathes of rural land that are included in the 
urban envelope!  
This ‘miraculous’ operation did not immediately change the status of agricultural lands in urban 
areas, but did facilitate the development of industrial, residential and commercial zones, which are 
prioritised in the development of new urban spaces. In anticipation of the decision to extend 
Hanoi’s footpint, numerous private investors, administrations and public enterprises invested 
hugely in Ha Tay province, prompting a spate of land operations on various scales long before the 
change in the province’s status. Several sources also mentioned that there was a surge in 
purchases of individual agricultural land use rights by city dwellers and local officials in Hanoi 
who were aware of the forthcoming changes. They were able to buy the use rights cheaply and 
then build on and/or sell the land for much more than the initial purchase price, partly because of 
                                                
8 The province of Ha Tay, the district of Me Linh in Vinh Phuc province, and the four communes of Dong Xuan, Tien 
Xuan, Yen Trung and Yen Binh in the district of Luong Son, province of Hoa Binh (Thu Trang, CVN, 2008). 
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its changed status, but also because of the heightened demand for housing prompted by the 
administrations relocating to Ha Tay and the construction of industrial parks and zones.  
The various administrative headquarters were to be moved to different sites so that central 
management bodies could remain in central Hanoi, while the other services were moved out 
towards the city of Ha Dong, formerly located in the province of Ha Tay. In addition to this, 13 
investment projects in tourist infrastructures and craft villages were planned in the former Ha Tay, 
at a total cost of 125 billion dongs. One of the largest was ‘Bao Son Paradise Park’, to be built 12 
kilometres from the city centre as ‘a recreation and tourist complex that meets international 
standards. It will be a showcase for Vietnamese culture, with traditional houses and original 
craftworks selected from the three regions of the country. Highlights will include reconstructions 
of the old quarters of Hanoi, traditional craft villages, a theatre with the capacity to seat 10,000, 
and a garden of butterflies and flowers …’ (Thu Trang, CVN, 2008). Ha Tay province also 
intends to cater for golf enthusiasts,9 with the public Tuan Chau Group recently investing in a 
leisure centre that includes a golf course running 254 hectares along the future Hoa Lac motorway 
(Vietnam Business News, 2008). 
There have also been projects to establish industrial and residential zones in the province, 
including huge initiatives like the Phung Xa industrial zone, which attracted capital from Japan 
and elsewhere and in 2006 became the third largest industrial zone in Vietnam in terms of foreign 
investment. In April 2004, the People’s Committee of Ha Tay gave the company Cavico Corp. the 
green light to to construct the Ngo Sai residential area along 30 kilometres of the future Hoa Lac 
motorway.  
These projects sparked huge increases in the price of land in the province. In the commune of Yen 
Nghia, for example, one square metre of rural residential land in Hoai Duc district, five kilometres 
from the city of Ha Dong, cost $157 in 2002 compared with an estimated price of between $376 
and $439 dollars in 2007. In urban areas, such as the new zone of Van Phu, prices even exceeded 
$1,250 dollars per square metre in 2007 (ibid.). 
Ha Tay is a very clear example of another factor that can explain the speed of peri-urbanisation: 
land speculation. Some of the people we spoke to said that this was more specific to Hanoi than 
Ho Chi Minh City, partly because of its proximity to the centre of power, but also because there is 
a tradition of investing in property rather than production (which helps explain the very high price 
of land in Hanoi – in 2006, the city ranked 32nd out of the 144 most expensive cities in the world, 
while Ho Chi Minh City was 36th). This speculation developed as the banking sector opened up to 
foreign banks, which can now set up in Vietnam (London-based HSBC was the first to do so), and 
the volume of credit increased. Credit approvals rose by 53 per cent in 2007, well over the 28 per 
cent ceiling that one source told us the State was seeking. Another factor driving the pace of peri-
urbanisation is the State’s close relations with business through State enterprises. These are set up 
as joint ventures in order to create large-scale projects that local and national authorities are much 
more ready to agree to because they have direct or indirect interests in national enterprises. The 
type of huge concessions available to these mixed capital ventures can be seen in Bac An Khan 
new town and a stretch of the Hao Lac motorway in Ha Tay province, which led to an association 
between Vinaconex and the South Korean company Posco E&C (Vietnam News, 2006). The law 
allows projects to obtain cheap concessions to large sites that they can use for construction, 
provided they put in place the necessary infrastructures. When the project is completed, the 
enterprises can then rent or sell the buildings and hand the infrastructures over to the State. 
1.2 The impacts of peri-urbanisation on agricultural spaces  
Urban sprawl and the expansion of urban envelopes have a profound effect on the remaining 
agricultural spaces in the vicinity. Half of the agricultural land (4,000 ha) in certain districts of Ha 
Tay province, such as Quoc Oai, will soon be allocated for urban development. This raises 
                                                
9 At the time of writing, Vietnam had 123 golf courses that were operational or under construction in 64 of the 
country’s 51 cities and provinces, including 34 in eastern Nam Bô alone (national record). In total, they cover 38,445 
ha, of which 15,264 ha is former agricultural land (Hoang Minh, 2008, CVN, 2008). 
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various problems, from changing the status of agricultural households (some 2.5 million people 
make their living from agriculture in the city of Hanoi, which has been enlarged to accommodate 
a total population of 6.2 million), to the risk of flooding associated with distributing and 
evacuating water for what is left of the local agricultural sector (Thê Linh, CVN, 2008). 
Agricultural areas will also be reclassified according to their function. It is anticipated that future 
agricultural production in the enlarged Hanoi will shift from the current rice production to the 
cultivation of trees, organic vegetables and horticulture (Thê Linh, CVN, 2008). 
Urban sprawl obviously leads to the loss of agricultural land. In certain districts of Vinh Phuc 
province, 70 per cent of the area has been turned over to industrial use, and according to the 
Courrier du Viêt Nam of 28th April 2008, agricultural lands have been hugely diminished in the 
Red River delta (where 300,000 agricultural households lost their parcels), eastern Nam Bo 
(100,000 households) and Ho Chi Minh City (52,094 households). And it is not just that 
agricultural land is disappearing: our sources also mentioned that the ‘de-intensification’ of 
production is a problem in the remaining agricultural areas.10 This is partly due to members of the 
workforce (often the youngest) leaving for urban areas, drawn by the prospect of salaried work (as 
labourers) or less formal activities that are better paid than agriculture, such as piece-work. On the 
ground, producers are not helped by the disorganised irrigation/drainage networks in zones close 
to new non-agricultural areas, which have very different water needs, and the fact that the weight 
of construction has raised water levels. People also spoke of other problems, such as pollution, 
dumping of solid waste on parcel perimeters, and unregulated dumping of toxic liquids and all 
kinds of refuse … In certain areas close to Hanoi, rice-growers have resumed the practice of 
harvesting twice a year, cultivating traditional old varieties that produce less but also need less 
care; and some producers have to hire labour for their agricultural activities, which considerably 
reduces their income. But many households choose to keep their agricultural lands (which then 
have to be put to productive use) so that they have some capital that can provide a minimum 
income when times are hard. This enables them to retain their status as agricultural households,11 
and exempts them from land taxes. If these households engage in non-agricultural production 
activities, they do so informally in order to maintain the advantages associated with being 
involved in agriculture. 
We were also told that some people illegally transform part of their agricultural land into rented 
space. The development of industrial zones is changing the composition of the rural population, as 
the growing number of migrant workers increases the demand for cheap housing and encourages 
farmers to construct and rent out illegal housing on their land.  
§ Expropriations and conflicts 
Converting agricultural land to non-agricultural land creates many economic, social and 
environmental problems. The most acute and visible of these is currently the conditions in which 
agricultural land is expropriated.  
As noted elsewhere in this report (section 4.1 B.5), the method for calculating land prices varies 
according to the type of land. It is also disadvantageous to agricultural land, which is assessed 
according to the value of its annual production, without taking account of the value of 
neighbouring lands, ongoing or future investment projects or plans to change the status of the 
land. This means that well-informed buyers can expropriate agricultural use rights at very little 
cost and then assign or rent the land at its new market value. On top of this, there is the problem 
                                                
10  According to calculations by the Department for Cooperatives and Rural Development in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the expropriation of one hectare of land affects the lives of 10 agricultural 
households. Thus, in the period from 2001 to 2005, some 2.5 million people were affected by land expropriations 
(Courrier du Viêt Nam, 28th April 2008). 
11  Vietnam households have different residence permits (hộ khẩu) depending on their urban or rural status. A household 
with an urban home cannot own agricultural land, and a rural household cannot live in town (although there is a 
temporary residence permit). They may be able to buy a house, but will not have access to urban services such as 
healthcare, schooling, water, electricity, vehicle registration, etc. In order to obtain these services, they have to 
change status, which means losing the opportunity to access agricultural land. Many households use their children’s 
urban status to set up in town while retaining their agricultural land. 
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of corruption and the innumerable charges that the administration levies on the compensation 
allocated to farmers, who are thus swindled on two fronts – by being paid agricultural prices for 
land whose status will be changed, and by not receiving the full compensation due from the 
enterprises or individuals who bought their use rights. 
These processes naturally differ according to the provinces and projects concerned, with varying 
levels of compensation for the farmers whose land have been expropriated. They often create 
severe tensions between farmers and the local authorities, which are accused of doing little or 
nothing to defend the interests of their constituents. In Vinh Phuc province, for example, 
expropriated farmers complain that they receive less for expropriated land (13 to 20 million dongs 
per sao12) than their counterparts in the neighbouring provinces of Hanoi and former Ha Tay. The 
price of agricultural land is set at the provincial level, which can result in significant variations in 
the price of parcels that are located close to each other. 
In certain cases the tension turns to conflict and the administration becomes involved at the 
provincial or even national level. This often leads to long and highly visible but silent non-violent 
demonstrations in front of buildings representing the authority concerned. Most people are aware 
of such demonstrations, which occur on an almost daily basis in Hanoi (before the National 
Assembly) and Ho Chi Minh City, and are usually covered by the press. More periodic and 
violent conflicts get little mention in the local press, although news of such events does travel 
abroad through brief reports in foreign despatches. 
  
For example, according to the FPA, on 8th November 2002 “there were violent clashes between 
the police and peasants in a district close to Hanoi, as thousands of peasants assembled to 
protest about efforts by local officials from Hoai Duc district in Ha Tay province, 30 kilometres 
south west of Hanoi, to force them off their land in order to expropriate it. One policeman 
reported that certain ‘extremists’ had held two police officers and an official for two hours. 
Eight police officers were hospitalised due to their injuries. Mme Phan Thuy Thanh, the 
spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, acknowledged that ‘certain peasant families are opposed to 
the government’s decision, and that there had been slight clashes between local residents and 
public officials’ ”. 
 
Such foreign despatches or paragraphs in the local press are extremely common nowadays. But 
these events are rarely covered in any depth, and it is most unusual to get any follow-up on these 
matters. It is highly likely that most protests are ‘resolved’ through a combination of loss of 
interest among the demonstrators and strong pressure from the political authorities at various 
levels (some short articles tell of households returning home accompanied by army trucks). But 
matters are sometimes resolved in the farmers’ favour. Thus, in September 2006, Viêt Nam Infos13 
reported that, “After several days of demonstrations in Hanoi, several hundred peasants from 
North Vietnam succeeded in stopping a huge building project that had been planned on their 
land. Between 200 and 300 demonstrators spent several days in front of the offices of the National 
Assembly, protesting at the confiscation of 500 hectares of land in Van Giang district in the 
province of Hung Yen, south of Hanoi, for the planned construction of a huge, $250-million 
residential area by the private Viet Hung company. A government spokesperson indicated that 
Vice Prime Minister Truong Vinh Trong had signed a circular ‘temporarily suspending’ the 
project”.  
But this example of an apparently (and temporarily) ‘happy’ outcome for the farmers cannot hide 
the tangle of tensions and conflicts that land-related problems are now causing; rather, it shows 
that the government is very cautious about extreme or emblematic cases that arise on a regular 
basis. Expropriations remain an acute problem, and are the primary cause of conflict in the 
country. In Ho Chi Minh City, for example, 85 per cent of the complaints lodged against the 
                                                
12 1 sao = 360 m². 
13 FPA information taken from Viêt Nam Infos n°38 of 15th September 2006. 
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directorate for operations in South Vietnam’s National Assembly relate to land problems in 
general, and the amount paid for expropriations in particular (Tuoi Tre, 16th July 2007, p. 2). 
1.3 The problem of land conversions in Binh Duong province 
The factors shaping land use in Binh Duong province are determined by its position. Situated just 
30 kilometres or so from the southern ‘capital’, the province is sandwiched between the fertile red 
agricultural lands to the north where rubber has flourished since colonial times, and Ho Chi Minh 
City to the south, with its expanding industrial and commercial activities.  
To get an idea of the extent of this expansion, it is worth noting that in 2006 Binh Duong was 
second only to Ho Chi Minh City in terms of having the most foreign projects in the country 
(1,315 projects), and fourth in terms of the value of industrial exports (accounting for 8 per cent of 
total national exports). Nationally lauded for its ‘modernist’ dimension and industrial 
achievements, the province’s agricultural land use was somewhat sidelined, especially its 
substantial rubber output. 
This duality between agriculture and industrial exports is reflected in the spatial organisation of 
the province and its relationship with Ho Chi Minh City: the districts closest to the metropolis 
have been turned over to housing, industry and services, while the northern districts are clearly 
agricultural. These two main activities have contributed to substantial growth in the province’s 
GDP: in 2005 agriculture and forestry (primary sector) accounted for 8 per cent of its GDP (20.9 
per cent of national GDP); industry and construction (secondary sector) accounted for 64 per cent 
(41 per cent of national GDP); and services (tertiary sector) up to 28 per cent of its GDP 
(compared with 38.1 per cent of national GDP).14 The provincial forecasts for 2010, 2015 and 
2020 are respectively 4.5 per cent, 3.4 per cent and 2.3 per cent for the primary sector; 65.5 per 
cent, 63 per cent and 55.5 per cent for the secondary sector; and 30 per cent, 33.6 per cent and 
42.2 per cent for the tertiary sector. According to these hypotheses, average individual incomes 
calculated according to 2005 prices would be $2,000 in 2010, $4,000 in 2015, and $5,800 in 2020 
(QĐ 81/2007/QĐ-TTg). 
These dynamics not only make Binh Duong one of the models to be followed in terms of 
nationwide industrialisation, but also illustrate the land-related problems associated with 
converting predominantly agricultural areas to industrial and residential use.  
The information on the main forms of land use between 2000 and 2006 provided by the Office of 
Statistics (Table 12, Annex A.3.7) clearly shows how they have changed, with a large increase in 
the amount of land used for construction and a significant decrease in unused land. However, 
although the growth of residential and industrial areas shown by these data reflects one of the 
realities of the province, we need to look again at the spectacular retention of agricultural lands, as 
interviewees from this province stressed that residential and industrial zones are mainly 
established at the expense of agricultural areas. The provincial authorities maintain that Binh 
Duong is not good for rice production, which would explain why they were not completely in line 
with orders to retain rice-growing areas for national production, especially after the ‘food crisis’ 
and soaring price of raw materials in 2007-2008. However, it seems that they only had limited 
room to manœuvre, given the emphasis on the fact that areas for agricultural use – and especially 
those destined for rice growing – had to be and were maintained in Binh Duong. 
According to current and projected statistics for the province in documents validated at the 
national level, the overall amount of agricultural land has been maintained. However, this has 
been at the cost of some major adjustments to other categories, especially ‘unused’ lands, which 
have dwindled to the extent that they no longer feature in the official figures.  These data could be 
seen as illustrating the contradictory position in which the authorities find themselves. They have 
to fulfil three requirements: first, they have to attract foreign investment; second, they have to 
                                                
14 Cục thống kê Bình Dương, 2007 ; Đinh Hien Minh, 2007. 
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extend residential areas – largely to meet the need for workers in the food industry;15 and third, 
they have to achieve the political goal of maintaining their rice- and rubber-producing areas.16 
There is no more land available for major industrial zones, largely because of the competition 
with other provinces in the Ho Chi Minh City agglomeration (including Dong Nai). 
While land occupancy between 2000 and 2006 is characterised by a large increase in the amount 
of land for construction and a signification decrease in unused and irrigated lands, the trends 
indicated by the plan for 2006 to 2010 (57/2007/NQ-CP) leave even less room to manoeuvre. In 
addition to making appropriate pronouncements about agricultural areas, the authorities have 
acknowledged that the overriding concern in Binh Duong is to house the workforce living and 
working in the southern metropolis, especially by encouraging housing and construction to the 
detriment of agricultural lands on the one hand, and ‘unused’ lands on the other.17  
2. Changing peripheral rural areas 
2.1 Multiple and diffuse land issues  
Rural areas far from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City have not undergone such profound changes, 
and social tensions in these areas are less systematic and visible than they are in urban and peri-
urban areas. But the dynamics at play here are are still significant, even if they are not as well 
documented. Several types of dynamic were identified during our interviews. 
The first reflects a profound change in rural spaces that have shifted from a state of relative 
isolation to a much more intense and permanent relationship with urban areas and greater 
participation in the dynamics of the market. These spaces are usually situated in the inner 
peripheries of large cities, close to secondary cities (provincial capitals) and/or along the axes of 
main roads; the dynamics are the result of their relative accessibility. In terms of land, there are 
two new phenomena: 
• The institutional creation  of specialised non-agricultural zones (industrial, commercial, 
residential, leisure), usually on a large scale  on the outskirts of secondary cities, and more 
rarely in very small towns or isolated areas (such as tourist projects). These ongoing 
processes mirror what is happening in the heart of the deltas, especially the problems posed 
by modes of expropriation and compensation. Nevertheless, tensions are attenuated, 
subjectively by the relative distance, and more objectively by less demographic pressure 
and the fact that households have the opportunity to move to other rural areas nearby; 
• the progressive erosion of rural spaces by city dwellers investing in second homes, 
agricultural holdings (such as fruit plantations) and/or small businesses (food stalls, 
restaurants and cafes along main roads). 
These investments can be quite substantial in certain regions or specific areas, altering the 
demographic and agricultural balance of the locality: 
• For example, on the southern uplands of Tam Dao in Vinh Phuc province, people from 
Hanoi have invested heavily in farms and secondary homes. This is partly a way of 
investing in rural households, but also speculative investment to develop tourist activities 
in Tam Dao and rapid industrialisation in Vinh Phuc (Grard, 2004). Thus, areas with poor 
                                                
15  Most of the workers in these industrial zones are migrants from other provinces: up to 92% of employees in the 
zones under provincial control. This is a large labour force, representing 38% of the workers in the province. It is 
hard to recruit labour, largely because of the low wages (33,000 dong/day, compared with 50,000 dong/day; or the 
equivalent of €1.3 compared with €2), the low levels of technical expertise and the age range for recruitment (18 to 35 
year-olds only). Chu Viết Soạn, 2003, pp. 317-318. 
16  In addition to this, there are also leisure infrastructures such as golf courses, which are particularly numerous 
around Ho Chi Minh City (Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Vung Tau, Lam Dong – the city of Dalat – and Ha Tay). It 
should also be remembered that that land law anticipates that certain changes in land use will need to be authorised 
(Article 36 and Section 4 of the 2003 Land Law). 
17 The planning process is considered later in this section. 
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sloping land (reserved for cassava and eucalyptus) that were of little value a short while 
ago because they were expensive to cultivate are now sought after, and have seen their 
value increase thanks to the introduction of orchards; 
• Residents of Hanoi are investing in small businesses along transport corridors around Son 
La. Apart from the classic phenomenon of rural people being dispossessed of their land by 
city dwellers (losing land on the best sites, often because they are unaware of construction 
or infrastructure improvement projects), the processes of demographic and economic 
change favouring the Kinh from the delta also pose the problem of political equilibrium, as 
the urban, non-resident Kinh are better informed than local people. 
The second type of dynamic is found in even more remote areas, where four major phenomena 
can be identified: 
• The development of agricultural farms. As described below (section 4.1. B.4), Article 82 of 
the 2003 Land Law authorises the creation of a new type of large-scale farm (tran tai) in 
order to ‘improve the efficiency of agricultural land use’, allowing 5ha for annual crops 
and 10ha for perennial crops in the plains and 10ha to 30ha in mountainous areas. 
Households working these farms have the opportunity to change the land allocations at 
their own initiative, provided they are backed up by production plans approved by the 
district People’s Committee. This arrangement is particularly interesting in that the change 
of status means that the allocation can be extended from 20 years (for annual crops) to 50 
years (for perennial crops, ponds and gardens). The introduction of these farms also 
facilitates access to more credit than can be obtained with smaller farms, without needing a 
mortgage (up to 30 million dong). Although such farms are supposed to be owned and 
cultivated by a single owner, there are numerous illegal groupings operated by several 
farmers who only declare one owner. There are also many cases of urban households that 
set up farms by buying land and using landless farmers to cultivate it; 
• Slash-and-burn cultivation on slopes is being disrupted by the introduction of annual 
commercial crops: one case that was cited several times is agri-food companies (such as 
the Thai company Sun) that encourage maize production and then sell the produce to pig 
farmers in the major deltas. A recent study by GRET in the provinces of Thanh Hoa and 
Son La (Lamballe et al., 2008) shows that producer incomes rose over several years as a 
result of increased efforts to open up cleared lands for commercial crops like maize, 
cassava and bamboo. For example, maize, which is not locally consumed in large 
quantities, accounts for over 25 per cent of productively used land, and the overall volume 
of foodstuffs produced is three times that of the local population’s needs. While traditional 
land clearance practices were aimed at food self-sufficiency and managing land and forest 
resources over the long term, the growing amount of land under maize and cassava 
represents a shift to productivist agriculture concerned with immediate individual incomes, 
and raises the question of the social and environmental sustainability of these practices 
(sharing and transferring resources within and between generations). These crops generate 
no returns at the local level (as there are no land taxes and marketing is taken care of by 
agro-industrial companies based in large agglomerations) and compete with more 
sustainable development projects (including government initatives) such as bamboo and 
rubber plantations, and agro-forestry projects in general;  
• In addition to annual crops that disrupt slash-and-burn practices, perennial crops such as 
coffee, tea and rubber are developing at industrial levels, not only in the former pioneer 
fronts of the uplands, but increasingly in the mountainous provinces of the north, which are 
more densely populated and less ‘traditionally’ involved with these crops. For example, 
rubber is grown in rapidly increasing volumes in the northwest, in the provinces of Son La 
and Dien Bien Phu. And while it is not a perennial crop, it is also worth noting the 
development of bamboo production in certain young forest stands, in association with 
processing industries that make bamboo flooring and goods; 
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• Displacements and expropriations associated with the implementation of large 
infrastructure projects, such as the hydro-electric dam in Truong Son, are also fairly 
widespread in marginal rural areas. Much of the tension caused by these projects is due to 
the way that compensation is handled – as in the major deltas, where there have been 
disputes over the amount of financial compensation (which has been deemed too high, and 
varies from one province to the next), the type of replacement housing in reception areas, 
and the reallocation of agricultural lands on what is often considered to be inferior land in 
areas where households are not directly affected by the infrastructures. One source told us 
“In theory, the government recommends that resettlement should improve people’s living 
conditions, but this is not possible because there’s not enough available land. Land has 
had to be confiscated from some people so that it can be allocated to others, and the 
compensation never fully covers what has been lost.” This process, which is tantamount to 
a sudden huge increase in demographic pressure, raises the question of whether the 
population has the capacity to react to such a rapid increase in pressure, and whether the 
environment can support its response. 
These four processes raise the more general question of what becomes of forested areas, which 
rarely benefit from the various measures that are supposed to protect them through the allocation 
of land use rights (3.2 million hectares of land were allocated to households in the space of 15 
years; Dinh Huu Hoang and Dang Kim Son, 2008). We will discuss certain phenomena relating to 
the land legislation later in this paper, although it is hard to get a clear picture of the dynamics in 
forested areas due to the lack of precise data on most of their economic activities (timber 
extraction, harvesting, etc.). However, it does seem that there are contradictory dynamics at work 
in forested areas. 
• As in neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia (Dery et al., 2005), the network of 
protected areas in Vietnam has increased considerably in recent years, rising from 12 in the 
mid-1970s to 126 in 2004 (doubling between 1995 and 2004) and now covering over 2.5 
million hectares of land (World Bank et al., 2005). In 2006, there were about 1.9 million 
hectares of classified forest (accounting for 76 per cent of all protected areas), or nearly 16 
per cent of forests and just under 6 per cent of the national territory. These protected areas 
are unpopulated, since all human activity is banned and residents have moved elsewhere. 
However, the new zoning introduced by the Forestry Law of 2004 represented a significant 
development for ‘national ‘parks’ and ‘natural reserves’.18 This law effectively creates 
buffer zones around existing spaces and stipulates that populations living in these areas 
before the zones were created retain the right to engage in different economic activities 
(including agriculture), provided they do not have an impact on the expansion and quality 
of the zones already covered with forest, and that they respect the management plans put in 
place by the park manager. This means that neighbouring communities in buffer zones 
around ‘classified forests’ can benefit from land use certificates. However, this is not to say 
that the new ways of taking account of local populations in parks and reserves gives them 
more space or greater flexibility. The way that buffer zones are defined actually further 
restricts activities within protected areas, thereby limiting possible activities within the 
whole buffer zone. Furthermore, the buffer zones were defined around existing spaces, and 
thus constitute an extension of the protected areas, reinforcing and extending the 
mechanism rather than making it more flexible; 
• While forests are increasingly kept within closed protected areas, the highly ambitious 
plantation programmes implemented and funded by the government have run into major 
problems. The main case in point is the Five Million Hectares Reforestation Programme 
(5MHRP) launched by Prime Ministerial Decision n° 661/QD-TTg in July 1998.  This 
                                                
18  The new zoning includes a reinforced protection zone, an ecological restoration zone, an adminstrative services 
zone and a buffer zone. These zones correspond to an increasing gradient of tolerance for housing and individual 
resource use. There is a total ban on housing and activities in the first two types of protection zone; they are 
tolerated but highly regulated by the management committee in the buffer zone; and ‘administrative service zones’ 
are rented for employees of parks and reserves to gather dead wood. 
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programme has had considerable difficulty in delimiting the areas that can be planted, 
partly for technical reasons (demarcation), and partly because so-called ‘empty’ spaces are 
being used for agriculture and farming households are claiming rights to these lands.  
• Another significant phenomenon is the recent appearance of land speculation along major 
roadways and in the most accessible parts of forested areas. These investments are 
sometimes linked with large projects, as well-informed city dwellers and locals buy forest 
land that they know will be affected by large plantation programmes, and can then use it to 
take advantage of very generous aid packages. Forested land earmarked for farming is also 
bought in order to develop eco-tourism ‘resorts’ (hotel complexes) or produce cash crops. 
Sometimes the investments have no immediate goal, and are a painless way of putting 
capital into areas whose value will hopefully increase in the long term (there is no 
obligation to use forested areas, unlike agricultural lands, which have to be cultivated). 
• Of the 8.1 million hectares of forested land allocated in the last 15 years, 4.9 million 
hectares have been allocated to organisations – in other words, businesses. However, this 
allocation has not revitalised forest production, either by individuals, who have hardly 
invested in forest plantations, or by state and private forestry enterprises. No land market 
has been created either, which is a sign of the weakness of this sector: in 2003, there were 
only 841 registered land transfers, just 51 per cent of which were based on financial 
transactions (sale/purchases; Dinh Huu Hoang and Dang Kim Son, 2008).  
Overall, forest lands are developed as protected areas or transformed into agricultural lands; little 
use is made of the forest itself – legally, at least. 
2.2 Lao Cai, an exemplary province 
La Cai province lies in the Tay Bac (North West) region, with Lai Chau province to its west, Ha 
Giang province to its east and Yen Bai province to its south. It faces the Chinese province of 
Yunnan, with which it shares 200 kilometres of the border. Its main city is Lao Cai, which has 
ranked as a national-level city (Thanh Pho) since 2005, and is twinned with Hekou (Ha Khau), a 
secondary city in Yunnan.  
This very rural province (78 per cent of the population were still employed in the agricultural and 
forestry sectors in 2004) is far from Hanoi (296 km by rail and 330 km by road), but enjoys an 
advantageous position on the eastern foothills of the Hoang Lien Son mountain chain, which 
makes the city of Lao Cai the sole crossing point between Yunnan and Vietnam. 
Situated at the junction of the Red River and the Nam Ti River, the city of Lao Cai has long been 
an important crossing point between China and Vietnam. The Red River itself is not a transport 
corridor, but can be crossed at two bridges that have provided road and rail links between Hanoi 
and Kunming (capital of Yunnan) and connected the two countries’ transport routes since colonial 
times. 
Although two decades of tension with China in the 1970s and 1980s prevented the province from 
taking full advantage of its location, it has made up for this since the two countries started 
opening up in the mid-1980s and rapidly entered the global economy. Less trade passes through 
Lao Cai province (evaluated at US$ 740,000 in 2007) than the two more eastern border towns of 
Lang Son and Mong Cai, which open onto the rich Guang Xi region,19 but the province is still 
very dynamic, showing 12 per cent annual average growth in GDP between 2001 and 2005 for the 
province, and 16 per cent for the city of Lao Cai in 2005 (Cuc Thong Ke Lào Cai, 2006). 
This advantage has been strengthened by the establishment of the ‘Hai Phong-Hanoi-Kunming’ 
development corridor, as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) project supported by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB).  The province and city of Lao Cai are directly affected by the 
development of this corridor, both benefiting from investment designed to facilitate the movement 
                                                
19  Exports through the border ports of Mong Cai (Quang Ninh province), Huu Nghi and Dong Dang (Lang Son 
province) currently represent 75 per cent of Vietnam’s cross-border trade with China (Courrier du Viêt Nam, 2008). 
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of people and goods, as well as routine investments by Vietnam, the province and other donors. 
Such investments include the planned construction of an international airport, repairs to the road 
and rail links between Hanoi and Lao Cai, and large-scale cross-border infrastructure initiatives. 
In the context of the GMS, the two countries also have an understanding to put in place a single 
customs point on the border crossing. The current window has had its opening hours extended for 
road crossings, and is permanently open for trains. The procedures for obtaining visas, which are 
very straightforward for residents of both countries, have been simplified for those from third 
countries, and now take less than 72 hours on either side of the border (Lao Cao Provincial 
People’s Committee, 2008).  
In 2005, in order to increase economic exchanges along the Hai Phong-Kunming corridor, the 
ADB supported the provinces of Lao Cai and Yunnan in signing up to a project for an ‘economic 
collaboration zone’ that would add to the different national economic zones already existing along 
the border. Vietnam has three economic zones around Lao Cai: the Kim Thanh Trading Zone 
(152 ha), the Bac Duyen Industrial Zone (80 ha) and the Dong Pho Moi Industrial Zone (80 ha). 
All offer favourable investment conditions, such as lower income taxes and exemptions on land 
rent while projects are being set up, and for 7 to 11 years after construction is completed. These 
incentives are not available in a third industrial zone 30 km south of the province’s main city, 
Tang Loong (650 ha), which is reserved for heavy industry (Lao Cai Provincial People’s 
Committee, 2008). In addition to these new industrial and commercial areas, there is the new 
town of Lao Cai - Cam Duong, which will be built further south to accommodate all the 
provincial administrations and provide new housing and commercial areas. The aim is to free up 
the old city centre and offer the two centres new spaces dedicated to investment. Once it is 
completed in 2010, this project will result in a three- to fourfold increase in the Lao Cai urban 
envelope.  
Lao Cai province enjoys another advantage due to its location at the foot of the Hoang Lien Son 
mountain range, which stretches 200 km to the west of the Red River and is the highest in 
Vietnam (Phan Xi Pang: 3,143 metres). This location ensures that national and international 
tourists can savour the spectacular mountain views in a cooler climate than the plains offer during 
the summer months. The region’s great ethnic diversity (Tày, Dao, Thái, Nùng, Giao, Giáy, Phù 
Lá, Mường, Hà Nhì, La Chí, etc.) also attracts tourists, enlivens the mountain markets and is the 
source of its renowned crafts (especially fabrics). Lao Cai province has several famous tourist 
spots (Bat Xat, Bac Ha, Ban Den), especially the very popular small town of Sapa (1,200m - 
1,800m), a former local market for the Hmong and the Yao (cf. Michaud) and subsequently a 
garrison town and mountain resort for French colonials living in Hanoi. The province of Lao Cai 
and the French region of Aquitaine are involved in a major joint project to develop this town, 
which attracts several thousand tourists each year, drawn by the site and/or walking trips to 
nearby ‘ethnic’ villages in which the province has also invested. Revenues from the hotels and 
catering industry in the province increased sevenfold between 1995 and 2003 (ibid.), reaching 
35,000 million dongs in 2003, and rising from 0.6 per cent to 1.6 per cent of the province’s GDP. 
The exponential growth in tourism saw the number of people spending at least one night in the 
province rise from 38,000 in 1995 to 180,000 in 2003 (including 96,000 foreigners).  
Finally, the province of Lao Cai is becoming more oriented towards trade and tourism. This is 
reflected in the structure of its GDP, as the tertiary sector is taking a small but (in terms of the 
population) significant lead over the primary and secondary sectors: in 2007, it accounted for 37 
per cent of GDP, compared with 31 per cent for primary sector and 32 per cent for the secondary 
sector (ibid., 2008).  
This trend is partly historical, but looks set to continue in the future. Thus, of the 46 priority 
projects retained for the province for 2006-2010, 20 were in the trade, tourism and services 
sectors (investment in certain tourist projects exceeded 100 billion dongs), while industry and 
agriculture (and forestry) only had 11 projects each (ibid., 2008). However, that is about the only 
point of comparison between these two sectors.  
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While planned investments in industry are higher than those for agriculture (over 500 billion 
dongs, compared with 180 billon dongs for agriculture), the industrial sector is of average 
importance in generating revenue for Lao Ci. It accounted for less than 3 per cent of revenues in 
2003, compared with 7 per cent for the mining sector, but accounted for over 30 per cent of GDP 
in 2007, and roughly the same percentage of exports (29 per cent of exports in 2003, according to 
Cuc Thong Ke Lao Cai, 2004). Unlike the province of Binh Duong, which exports large quantities 
of industrial products, Lao Cai is no different to North Vietnam’s other mountainous provinces in 
this respect. As shown on Map1 (Annex A.3.1), they form a ring of low-level export provinces 
that contrast sharply with the export-generating provinces of the Red River delta. This map also 
shows Lao Cai’s low ranking in terms of foreign projects: it only attracted about 40 foreign 
projects between 1988 and 2005, putting it in 20th place in Vietnam along with Lang Son and 
Quang Nam, but well below Binh Duong. These projects, which are often small scale, tend to 
focus on trade and tourism, and Lao Cai can barely fill the three industrial zones created around 
its provincial capital. 
Agriculture and forestry are still important sectors, accounting for 39 per cent of GDP and 49 per 
cent of exports in 2003 (Cuc Thong Ke Lào Cai, 2004). It is true that these revenues have to be 
shared between nearly 80 per cent of the population of the province, and that exports are often on 
a very small scale, but these sectors are still vital for the majority of the province’s inhabitants. 
Furthermore, the investments approved in this domain are not only at the family level, and there 
has been a slight but visible increase in investments in industrial plantations (tea, fruit trees, 
flowers) and traditional family crops (like high quality rice), both for export outside the province, 
often to China, and for local markets linked with tourism. These investments do not generally 
represent very large sums compared with the amount invested in tourism or industry, but they are 
being put in place over several hundred hectares of land and can thus affect hundreds of families. 
There is growing demand from China for this type of investment.  
These characteristics have a direct impact on land matters in the province of Lao Cai.  
In terms of land, industry is not a major issue as it does not take up much space and is mainly 
located around the city of Lao Cai (two industrial zones) and in the Tan Loong industrial zone 
south of the city. Commerce does not take up much land either, and as far as one can tell from 
official sources, levels of urbanisation across the province as a whole remain very low. The total 
population of Lao Cai was only 82,000 people in 2003 (Cuc Thong Ke Lào Cai, 2003), with over 
one third of its residents classified as rural. In 2004, the combined areas allocated for residential 
and special purposes (industry, commerce, infrastructure) represented less than 3 per cent of the 
total area of the province (see tables in Annex A.3.8). In spatial and economic terms, this means 
that the industrial, residential and commercial stakes that are so high elsewhere – as in Binh 
Duong – and create competition over land with agriculture, are much lower in Lao Cai. Urban and 
industrial pressures are limited to the peripheries of the city of Lao Cai, and judging by the 
number of vacant lots in the industrial and commercial zones established over the last five years, 
they are still not particularly strong even there (Lao Cao Provincial People’s Committee, 2008). 
Tourism occupies a particular place in this picture. As we have noted, this is a flourishing sector 
whose exponential growth is strongly supported by the provincial People’s Committee. Most 
unusually, it is also developing beyond the city of Lao Cai in the area around Sapa in Bac Ha 
district, as well as certain surrounding villages designated as centres for the development of eco-
tourism. In the document presenting the planned investments for 2006-2010 (ibid. 2008), some of 
the 18 areas set aside for tourism covered nearly 1,000 hectares, such as projects to extend the 
tourist areas of Sa Pa and Bac Ha. While tourism cannot currently be seen as a sector that 
competes with agricultural and forestry activities or has a directly perceptible impact on land 
tenure, it is having a diffuse spatial impact (not concentrated around Lao Cai) and creating needs 
for both ‘natural’ and agricultural spaces that are profoundly changing rural areas.    
Not surprisingly for a province that is still very rural and whose revenue from agriculture accounts 
for a relatively high proportion of total revenues, the most important land issues today relate to 
these domains.  
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There seem to be two kinds of land issues in forested areas: pressure caused by setting aside 
certain portions of the forest (or natural areas), and the allocation of forest land use rights to 
individuals on family farms. 
In 2000, there were 13,500 hectares of classified land, which represented (even before the 
classification of Hoang Lien Son) 6 per cent of the spaces categorised as classified forests (more 
specifically, special use forests – rung dac dung), as well as areas where local people were not 
allowed to grow crops or gather produce. In 2002, this area was increased by the creation of the 
Hoàng Liên national park in Hoàng Liên natural reserve (Prime Ministerial decision n° 90/2002 
QD-TTg). Not long afterwards, the Hoang Lien natural reserve in Sa Pa also became part of the 
national park, taking its total area to 29,845 ha, of which 11,800 ha were strictly protected, 17,900 
ha were ecological regeneration areas, and several hectares were set aside for tourism and service 
areas. In addition to this, 38,724 ha of buffer zones were created in three districts of Lai Chau 
province (Van Ban, Than Uyen and Phong Tho). 
Protected forests, which are less strictly protected, account for 75 per cent of the land in this 
category, and productive forests, where ligneous resources can be used relatively freely, only 
account for 19 per cent of these spaces. This means that households cultivating land in classified 
and protected areas stand to lose income if they do not have land certificates, because they cannot 
benefit from investment or compensation initiatives (for plantations or forest protection) such as 
the Five Million Hectares Reforestation Programme, launched in 1998 by the MARD to replant 
wood species in vast areas designated as denuded spaces.  
We do not have precise data on the areas where use rights have been allocated to households. 
Land use certificates theoretically offer the households concerned access to these spaces, but are 
accompanied by very strict and restrictive conditions and allocate land on a permanent basis, 
which means that households cannot use the land according to their needs or practice slash-and-
burn, which is forbidden everywhere. 
Forests are also under pressure from investors who want to establish industrial and/or export 
plantations in the region. For example, in the district of Van Ban, the Bao Yen forestry centre 
gave a Vietnamese company the right to use forest lands (rung kinh doanh or productive forest) 
for 10 years in order to produce tea. This company also bought the timber produced on forest 
parcels whose use rights had been allocated to households (rung trong de kinh doanh: commercial 
reforestation), and produces sawdust destined for China. Between 1990 and 2003, the fixed value 
of forest products increased almost 14-fold, going from 15 billion to 219 billion dongs (Cuc 
Thong Ke Lào Cai, 2004). 
Although we do not have any detailed analysis of the main current agricultural trends in the 
province, the provincial statistics (ibid.) suggest that between 1991 and 2003 there was a 40 per 
cent increase in the amount of cultivated land, and that industrial annual crops doubled and 
industrial perennial crops trebled. This meant that they accounted for 17 per cent of cultivated 
land in 2003, compared with 8.5 per cent in 1991; and that not only has the cultivated area 
increased (in conjunction with the practice of double- or triple cropping annual crops), but so has 
the relative share of industrial crops – presumably increasing pressure on land and thus 
expectations for agricultural lands. 
At first sight, the land issues in Lao Cai seem less sensitive than those in Binh Duong. The 
expansion of urbanised and industrial spaces is much less dramatic, and the province has no large-
scale projects such as the construction of hydroelectric dams. Nevertheless, small hydroelectric 
projects are starting to develop, the city of Lao Cai has undertaken some impressive extension 
works, and tourism projects are proliferating around Sa Pa – raising the question of how land is 
expropriated from the households affected by these projects, especially when they represent a 
smaller opposition force than their counterparts in low-lying provinces. This means that the 
problem could be even more sensitive in Lao Cai as the affected communities are often members 
of minority ethnic groups whose agricultural and social practices are traditionally (and officially) 
under-valued. A significant example of the fate awaiting these communities is that of the labour 
force in the industrial and commercial zones. Several sources told us that this includes very few if 
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any members of minority groups as they do not want to work in these areas, indicating a de facto 
exclusion of these populations from ongoing projects. Therefore, it is very likely that the land 
problems that these communities may experience will be particularly difficult for them, even if 
they are relatively small in the overall scheme of things. 
3. The global food crisis and inflation: return to the rural agenda 
As recent developments in land legislation have shown (Part IV), agriculture has not been a 
priority for the Vietnamese government for about the last 15 years. Vietnam has set itself the 
challenge of becoming an industrial country by 2020, and completely changing the structure of its 
population from nearly 80 per cent agricultural in 1995 (79.25 per cent, to be precise20) to 23 per 
cent in agriculture, 47 per cent in industry and 30 per cent in services (Hoang Minh, CVN, 2008). 
The government’s focus on achieving this objective meant that it invested little in agriculture, and 
investment in this sector fell sharply from 10 per cent in the 1990s to 8 per cent between 2000 and 
2005, and 5 per cent since 2005. Expenditure on this sector is also marginal: in 2007, the 
government spent less than 5 per cent  (4.8 per cent) of the State budget on agriculture – half of 
what was invested in the 1990s.  
This disinvestment was made possible by the formidable growth in agricultural production in 
Vietnam. Its agricultural sector grew at an annual rate of 3.7 per cent between 2000 and 2007, 
despite the loss of 500,000 hectares of agricultural land and various climatic uncertainties. In 
2007, 5.5 million tonnes more cereal was produced than in 2000. On average, the country went 
from 420kg of foodcrops per inhabitant in 2001 to 470kg in 2007. This not only ensured the 
country’s food security, but also allowed Vietnam to export over 4 million tonnes of rice each 
year (Hoang Minh, CVN, 2008). 
In a sense, 2008 can be seen as the year that marked a return to agriculture. The ‘food crisis’ first 
affected Vietnam at the end of 2007, prompting massive increases in the price of rice in the first 
half of 2008.  Although food price inflation varied depending on the period and sources concerned 
(according the Manilla Times of 7th May 2008, inflation ran at over 38 per cent for foodstuffs 
alone in April 2008), there was at least a doubling in the price of rice from 8,000 dongs per kilo at 
the end of the 2007 summer harvest to 16,000 dongs in April 2008. There are several indications 
suggesting that the government became increasingly preoccupied with agriculture over the course 
of 2008, and the possibility of taking action in this domain.  
3.1 The freeze on rice-growing land 
The decision to freeze some of the land used for rice production in July 2008 was a direct 
consequence of the global food crisis and its inflationary effects on rice prices in the preceding 
months, and was one of the key points of that year. 
The government responded to this problem in two stages:  
• First, taking measures to control the rise in rice prices at the end of April 2008, by making 
traders sell their stocks and organising the sale of State stocks (Courrier du Viêt Nam, 29th 
April 2008); 
• Second, in July 2008, by following China’s example (China had decided to freeze several 
millions of hectares of rice-growing land) and opting to freeze a fixed quantity of rice 
fields in order to maintain rice production. The idea was to keep 4 million hectares under 
rice in 2010, 3.8 million hectares in 2015, and 3.6 million hectares in 2020. After 2020, 3.5 
million hectares would remain under rice until 2050 to enable the country to remain self-
sufficient in rice (Hoang Minh, CVN, 2008). This programme was accompanied by funding 
for the urgently needed task of surveying rice fields, since statistics were extremely 
unreliable due to various technical problems and figures that had been fiddled to hide 
                                                
20  TONG CUC THONG KE, 2007. 
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illegal changes in land use. An ambitious series of land consolidation programmes was also 
planned in order to modernise rice production. 
3.2 The ‘three nong’ policy 
The second key sign of a likely return to agriculture was the publication by the Central Committee 
of Resolution nghị quyết TW7-X in July 2008. One of the three axes of this resolution is known as 
the ‘three nông’ (nghị quyết về vấn đề nông nghiệp, nông thôn và nông dân) since it refers to nông 
thôn (rural), nông nghiệp (agriculture) and nông dân (farmer). The objective of this resolution – 
which looks like an overarching agricultural development project – was to redevelop rural areas 
by investigating the differences between urban and rural living standards, and improving living 
conditions in rural areas by investing in rural infrastructures (health, education) and agriculture, 
which, it was officially recognised, had been abandoned some years before. One approach to 
increasing rural incomes was to reaffirm the principle of using agricultural land free of charge. 
There would be no land tax and no income tax for an indeterminate period that would extend 
beyond the planned term of 2010. Several respondents to our surveys described the dynamic that 
had prompted this resolution in the MARD, with meetings to organise reflection on the specific 
status of agricultural lands within the whole land system.  
As an indication of the government’s renewed interest in agriculture, it is also worth noting that 
various conferences were held on agriculture and rural affairs, such as the conference in Hanoi in 
mid-June 2008 to prepare the aforementioned policy,21 and increased press coverage of this topic.  
It is still too soon to know whether agriculture will become and remain a major priority for the 
government. However, it seems that certain policy choices made in the last 15 years are starting to 
be questioned and that old themes, such as food self-sufficiency, are coming to the fore again at 
the national level. It will be interesting to see if this has an impact on land legislation. What is 
certain is that this context is important in understanding our subjects’ state of mind at the time of 
the surveys (April and July 2008). 
 
                                                
21 This conference, which was organised by the MARD and the World Bank, was an opportunity to gather together 
Vietnamese decision-makers, specialists from different organisations and NGOs (such as FAO and Oxfam) and 
donors. 
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III. LAND INSTITUTIONS PUT IN PLACE SINCE THE LATE 1970S 
This section describes how land institutions have been put in place in Vietnam since the end of the 
1970s. The Vietnamese State showed little clear interest in the land law until 1986, when the Doi 
Moi economic reform opened the way for market socialism. But we need to go back a bit further 
to the very end of the 1970s, to see how the gradual desertion of the collectivist system naturally 
brought the focus back to land. The objective of this study is not only to provide information 
about this process, but also to note any inconsistencies, repetitions and stops and starts in the 
creation of land institutions. By doing so we can identify hesitations and detours that give us an 
idea of how public policies are formulated in more general terms, and how policy choices have 
been taken forward or dropped since Doi Moi (particularly ‘market socialism). 
1. Increasingly complex legislation 
The time from the end of the 1970s until the present day can be divided into two periods: 
• The first period, from 1979 to 1993, was one of hesitation. Land tenure gradually became 
more individualised although cooperatives retained control over land and remained the 
principal actors. The State also put in place the first elements of the land administration, 
but did not focus on the question of land per se;  
• From 1993 onwards the privatisation of land accelerated and land institutions became 
increasingly autonomous. Cooperatives lost all control over land, the land law clearly 
turned towards a system close to private ownership, and a specific land administration was 
put in place. This second phase is described in more detail than the first. 
1.1 1979 to 1993: the revival of land as an issue, assumptions and experimentation  
In order to explain the changes that came about in the 1980s, we need to look at the history of the 
socialist bloc as a whole, and the tremors that started to run through the USSR, China and East 
Germany during this period. It is also customary to mention the serious crisis that shook rural 
Vietnam, the fall in agricultural production and the counter-productive effects of large-scale 
socialist agriculture, whose excesses turned peasants away from collectivist structures. In the 
delta, certain cooperatives reacted by distributing land to households and agreeing illegal 
contracts with them, which increased production (Gironde, 2001). Similar phenomena were 
observed in the mountains, where collectivisation was generally less established, and in certain 
cooperatives in Tay regions, households started to regain stable control over land that had 
belonged to their forebears (Mellac, 2000). The events that took place from the early 1980s 
onwards can be seen as a reaction to the strong pressures from the cooperative bases. 
During this period the State was still hesitating between ‘liberalisation’ and increasing its control 
over land. It regularly reaffirmed the principal of centralised land management and ownership by 
the people as a whole, but put in place the first authorities in the administration that would allow 
the individualisation of land management, and made arrangements that would allow individuals to 
re-establish a relationship with the land. 
Two events in 1979 are particularly noteworthy. The government established a national land 
management body (probably the General Department for Land Management), which was placed 
under the direct stewardship of the government, and later became the General Department of Land 
Administration (GDLA). Two sources also told us that the very first land law was put in place that 
year, although we were unable to find any written traces of it (see summary table of land texts in 
Annex A.2.1), and it is possible that this has been confused with the creation of the land 
administration.  
The government continued to work on land following year, reaffirming the uniformity of 
centralised land management over the whole territory in 1980, in the Council of Ministers’ Decree 
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201. But the Prime Minister also issued another decree (Decree 299) authorising a cadastral 
survey accompanied by individual allocations of agricultural use rights. Land remained the 
property of the people as a whole under the direct control of the State, but households were 
allocated land use rights by cooperatives and enterprises. A little later, in 1982, the authorisation 
to allocate use rights was extended to different types of forested land (and more generally to non-
agricultural land) in order to establish plantations (Decree 184 of the Council of Ministers), 
confirming Decree 29 issued by the Policy Bureau in 1983 by encouraging the individual 
allocation of rights to use forests and woodlands. 
§ ‘Directive 100’ 
The most important text of this period, in the sense that it prompted moves to allocate lands to 
households, was ‘Directive 100’ of 13th January 1981 (chỉ thị 100 – CT/TU/100, sometimes also 
wrongly known as ‘Contract 100’). This directive introduced production contracts between 
cooperatives and groups of workers in order to remedy the system of remuneration based solely 
on work points, which was thought to discourage production. These contracts related to the land, 
which was divided between groups of individual workers who agreed a contract with the 
cooperative determining the delivery date for a set amount of produce, to be paid in work points. 
Land was allocated for a limited but unspecified period, and the crop was chosen by the 
cooperative, not the contractor. The producers could keep any produce exceeding the five-year 
standard. Certain links in the production chain had to be overseen by specialist brigades: 
nurseries, labour, planting out, irrigation and phyto-sanitary treatments (Yvon, 1994). Directive 
100 thus redefined the role of cooperatives and their relations with peasants or producer groups 
through fixed-price production contracts (khoán sản phẩm).  
In principle, this was an egalitarian system for distributing agricultural lands that took account of 
land quality, the number of active household members, and was based on a lottery system. But in 
reality this model of distribution was not followed particularly scrupulously. Methods of land 
classification varied and arrangements could be made between beneficiaries before or after the 
lots were allocated. In many cases, efforts to strike a balance between households resulted in 
considerable land fragmentation, with parcels divided out so that every household had a parcel of 
each category of land. D. Pillot (1995a) notes that central planning did little or nothing about the 
distribution system, and that any solutions that were developed came at the local level. In hilly 
and mountainous regions use rights were only allocated for wetlands; sloping land was ignored, 
including areas that were always used to grow industrial and perennial crops (Mellac, 2000).  
This distribution system functioned for several years (often fairly haphazardly) before it it was 
decided that a new policy was needed (Doi Moi). Efforts to overhaul the land tenure system really 
got under way two years later, in 1988. 
§ The first land law 
Vietnam’s first land law was published in January 1988. Based on Decree 201, which went to the 
vote in 1980 and was completed in March 1989 with enforcement orders 30/HDBT and 67/CT, it 
reaffirmed the principle that land is owned by the people and managed by the State (Article 1),22 
but also enshrined the principle of allocating land use rights to individuals.23 Land was divided 
into five categories (agricultural land, forest land, land for housing,24 land set aside for specific 
purposes, and unused land); and users into seven categories (cf. annex A.2.3): farms, State 
enterprises and institutions, army units, cooperatives, producer groups, social organisations and 
individuals (cá nhân). Most of the law was devoted to agricultural and forest lands, which could 
be allocated to agricultural households in two different ways and for two types of use. One 
                                                
22  “Đất đai thuộc sở hữu toàn dân, do Nhà nước thống nhất quản lý”.  
23  Article 1 stipulates that “Nhà nước giao đất cho các nông trường, lâm trường, hợp tác xã, tập đoàn sản xuất nông nghiệp, lâm nghiệp, xí 
nghiệp, đơn vị vũ trang nhân dân, cơ quan nhà nước, tổ chức xã hội và cá nhân -dưới đây gọi là người sử dụng đất-để sử dụng ổn định, 
lâu dài.” “The State allocates land to State agricultural and forestry farms, cooperatives, agricultural and forestry production groups, State 
enterprises, units of the People’s Army, State services, social organisations and individuals – who will henceforth be known as land users 
– in order to use the land in a stable manner over the long term.”(Translated from the author’s French translation). 
24  Đất khu dân cư: this term actually signifies ‘land for residential community groups’. 
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category, ‘land for families’ economic activities’ (đất làm kinh tế gia đình), could be allocated for 
an unspecified period (but for stable use) by cooperatives and agricultural and forestry producer 
groups. This type of land was not supposed to occupy more than 10 per cent of the communes’ 
agricultural land, with a maximum of 200 m² per household in the central and northern plains and 
delta, 500 m² in the southern plains and delta, and 1,000 m² in the mountains and highlands. The 
other category was ‘land for individual farm households’ (Đất sản xuất của nông dân cá thể). 
People’s Committees in the provinces and cities allocated these lands on behalf of the State, 
within limits that were not clearly defined but which were supposed to take account of the amount 
of available land and number of households in the locality (Article 28). The law also encouraged 
the provinces, districts and communes to allocate unused land to different categories of user, 
including households, for agricultural or forestry activities. The duration for each category was 
outlined a little later in Article 3 of Decree 30 (the law simply stipulates that the land should be 
allocated on a temporary basis or within specific periods). Land set aside for production and 
housing was assigned for long (unspecified) periods, land for economic activities was assigned for 
a minimum period of five years, and land whose use had not yet been defined had to be allocated 
for a maximum of five years. Although it was very short and imprecise, this law was the first to 
address outstanding matters such as the ownership of constructions, the results of investment and 
work undertaken by land users. However, it clearly forbids the purchase and sale of land (Article 
50), and any form of transfer other than allocation on behalf of the State, which meant that 
households and individuals still had no control over their parcels. The law’s expected effects on 
agricultural investments were partly negated by its lack of clarity regarding the duration of land 
allocations.  
§ ‘Khoan 10’ 
This shortcoming was quickly remedied by Policy Bureau Directive CT/TW 10 of 5th April 1988, 
known as ‘khoán 10’ (or Contract 10). Contract 10 marked an important stage in the reform of the 
collectivist system as it abolished State subsidies for agriculture and instituted a market-oriented 
system. It confirmed family farms as the basic unit of production, indicating that land should be 
divided according to the number of people in the household rather than the number of active 
household members, and thus questioning the link between the capacity to work and the amount 
of land allocated. There was some clarification of the period for which use rights were to be 
allocated, with the suggestion that the minimum periods should be 5-10 years for annual crops 
(often 5 years for rice fields), and 15-30 years for forest lands and perennial crops. The methods 
for enforcing these measures (especially the division of land) were established over time. 
This directive was particularly important because it defined the duration of the proposed 
allocations and thus introduced a degree of tenure security – although this was limited by the fact 
that households did not always have rights enabling them to transfer, assign or acquire land use 
rights. They were also dependent on the State-led reallocation of land rights, organised by the 
commune’s People’s Committees or the relevant collectivist structure (cooperatives, farms or 
businesses). However, it was not long before further changes had to be made to the way that 
households gained access to land, due to the large number of transfers between households in both 
the Red River delta and mountainous areas (Mellac, 2000).25 
1.2 Legislation since 1992: the move towards privatisation 
§ The Constitution of 1992 
These new modes of access to land first appeared in the Constitution of 1992, barely four years 
after the promulgation of the 1998 Land Law. This Constitution (which was amended in 2001) put 
in place elements that were subsequently revisited in the law of 1993. 
                                                
25 It is now widely recognised that the directives and laws put in place since 1981 tended to ratify more or less 
widespread existing illegal land tenure situations (Bergeret, 1995; Kerkvliet,1995 and 1997; Herland, 1999 ; 
Gironde, 2001). 
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With regard to eminent land ownership, there was no notable change between the Constitutions of 
1980 and 1992 (see Annex A.2.2). Article 17 of the Constitution of 1992 virtually repeats that of 
the 1980 version, stating that “lands, forests, mountains, rivers, lakes, water sources, etc. are the 
property of the people as a whole” (sở hữu toàn dân). However, while the Constitution of 1980 
only mentions State and socialist ownership, Article 15 of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that 
“The economic structure […] is built on regimes of ownership by the entire people, collective 
ownership and individual ownership, which are based on ownership by the people as a whole and 
collective ownership” [Article 15].26 Article 18 also specifies that land is allocated to groups and 
individuals who may transfer use rights to others.27 
The Constitution of 1992 also protects individual ownership, adding that “Goods legally 
belonging to any natural or legal body cannot be nationalised. In the case of urgent needs 
relating to national defence, national security or national interest, the State may expropriate or 
requisition the goods of natural or legal bodies, provided they are compensated at the going 
market rate [Article 23]; also “ Every citizen owns their legally earned income, goods that they 
have set aside, their housing, means of daily life, production tools, contributions in cash and kind 
invested in enterprises or economic organisations. For lands whose use they have been allocated 
by the State, Articles 17 and 18 apply. The State protects citizens’ rights to legally acquired 
ownership and inheritance rights” [Article 58].  
The State now has a constitutional duty to protect individual ownership (sở hữu tư nhân), allocate 
land (giao đất) to households and groups, and ensure that use rights can be transferred to them 
(chuyển quyền sử dụng đất). It still owns all land in the name of the entire people (toàn dân), but 
does not have absolute rights over this land as it is a public good and not the State’s private 
property. Although land is a public good, the State allocates it (giao đ ất) to households and 
groups as an individual means of production, and they then have rights that allow them to transfer 
the right to use this land. Therefore, households can be allocated land that they have the right to 
use, and to transfer these use rights. This Constitution did not resolve the problem of urban or 
residential land insofar as land use rights are allocated for limited periods, while people or bodies 
who build, buy or receive buildings own them for an unspecified period. 
§ The 1993 Land Law 
This contradiction was replicated in the Land Law of 1993, which reaffirms the State’s public 
ownership of land and the principle that individuals may be allocated temporary use rights for 
agricultural and forested lands. These rights are allocated to any user who belongs to a commune 
that can certify that the parcels have been put to stable use (Article 2) – provided the land was not 
previously allocated – and are provided free of charge in accordance with the principle that every 
individual has the right to access agricultural land. 
This law also contains some important new elements. On the one hand, it extends the period for 
which land use rights are allocated to 20 years for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops 
and forests, with a ceiling of three hectares on agricultural areas whose use rights have been 
allocated. Several months later, Decree 64 determined the amount of land to be allocated 
according to the region concerned: use rights for annual crops are limited to two hectares in the 
North and three in the South; while the limit for perennial crops is 10 hectares on the plains and 
30 hectares in the mountains and hills. Enshrining these timescales in the law gave households 
much greater security of tenure, for periods that theoretically allowed them to invest in the land 
                                                
26 “Cơ cấu kinh tế nhiều thành phần với các hình thức tổ chức sản xuất, kinh doanh đa dạng dựa trên chế độ sở hữu 
toàn dân, sở hữu tập thể, sở hữu tư nhân, trong đó sở hữu toàn dân và sở hữu tập thể là nền tảng.”   
27 Article 18 – “The State allocates land to groups and individuals for stable and sustainable use. All groups and 
individuals are expected to protect and make productive use of the land allocated to them by the State, to use it 
wisely, for economic purposes. They may transfer the right to use the land to a third party in accordance with the 
law.”  « Nhà nước giao đất cho các tổ chức và cá nhân sử dụng ổn định lâu dài. Tổ chức và cá nhân có trách 
nhiệm bảo vệ, bồi bổ, khai thác hợp lý, sử dụng tiết kiệm đất, được chuyển quyền sử dụng đất được Nhà nước giao 
theo quy định của pháp luật » 
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allocated to them. Although the maximum area was determined by the law, the provincial and 
district People’s Committees were responsible for allocating use rights and setting local limits for 
land allocations based on the ratio between the population and the land available. Article 20 of the 
law of 1993 indicates that households that are allocated land so that they can build their own 
homes can hold this land for a long but unspecified period – thus sidestepping the problem of the 
dissociation between the land and housing owned by households by postponing it indefinitely 
rather than resolving it.  
One very important change in this law is the introduction of five sub-rights to the right to use 
land: rights to exchange, assign, rent, bequeath and mortgage land. As land is allocated for limited 
periods, these rights are time-bound, which means that the right to use a rice field purchased 
halfway through the 20-year period period will only be valid for the remaining 10 years. As these 
rights apply to use rights, ownership is not always private. Nevertheless, their very existence and 
the fact that the allocation lasts for a fairly long time means that a land market can develop and 
function much like a market based on private ownership, despite the different nature of the 
holdings. 
While previous texts made very little mention of the modalities for land allocation, the law of 
1993 did attempt (however imperfectly) to tackle this issue with the famous red booklets that we 
will call land use certificates (LUCs). These guaranteed their land use rights (LUR) and sub-
rights. The law specifically states that rural districts are responsible for allocating agricultural land 
use rights to households and individuals, and for giving them their land use certificates, which are 
issued at the national level by the General Department for Land Administration. This is what 
Dang Hung Vo calls a title system, where the land administration systematically registers any 
changes made to these certificates, rather than a deed system where land is transferred through 
contracts agreed between the users. Under the new system, households were given a red booklet 
(certificate) recording all the parcels to which a household member had been assigned use rights. 
This meant that if a parcel belonged to several people from different households, it would appear 
in several red booklets. We also discovered during our surveys that household members did not 
have personal use rights, but were designated as ‘single-person households’! 
The extent of the changes made by this law and the obligation to issue land use rights certificates, 
which meant that households now had the right to these red booklets (Article 73), resulted in the 
redistribution of agricultural lands in many localities. But according to Article 2 of the law, these 
localities were not allowed to allocate rights to land that had already been legally assigned, and 
were supposed to grant land use rights (within the limits set by the State) to those who had made 
consistent and productive use of the land. Unlike the land allocations following the ‘khoan 10’, 
those made after the 1993 land law were readjustments intended to help clarify the situation 
before certificates for agricultural lands were issued over the next two or three years (rights to 
forested lands were distributed much more slowly), rather than a general redistribution of land. 
1993 can be seen as the new starting point for agricultural land tenure because households are 
considered to have held their agricultural land use certificates since then, meaning that use rights 
for perennial crops will expire in 2013.  
§ The amendements of 1998 and 2001 
The fact that agricultural land use rights are assigned for a limited period severely limits the rights 
allocated to agricultural households and individuals. No changes were made to these timeframes 
in the years after the law of 1993 was passed, but the law of 1998 amending the 1993 Land Law 
stipulates (Article 4 amending Article 20 of the 1993 law) that the State should reallocate land to 
users who have expressed a wish to retain it at the end of the legal period, provided they have 
used it productively and in accordance with current regulations. So while LURs remain limited for 
agricultural lands, the principle of reallocation generally agreed in the years after 1993 is 
enshrined in the law, giving households greater security. 
Apart from this, most of the law of 1998 is dedicated to the modalities for renting land. For 
example, agricultural land left over from the quotas for land use rights allocated free of charge 
could be rented. This law mainly focuses on regulating the rental and allocation of urban, 
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industrial and commercial lands, and is not particularly concerned with agricultural and forested 
areas. But one point that indirectly affected the agricultural sector is worth noting: private 
Vietnamese enterprises could be allocated permanent rights to use land (not just to rent it) if it was 
obtained to construct housing. Furthermore, enterprises that were exempt from tax during the 
construction period were made responsible for all the infrastructures needed for the new 
buildings, and could make a return on their investments by renting or selling the housing (and 
mortgaging the land use rights). This method of financing new infrastructures in exchange for 
assigning permanent land use rights became widespread, and would greatly accelerate the 
reclassification of agricultural lands in peri-urban areas. 
The amendment of 2001 clarifies two important points. First, rural households can rent land 
located within the territorial boundaries of their commune that is reserved in the public interest 
(this theoretically accounts for 5 per cent of communal lands). The second point concerns the 
modalities for changing the categorisation of land. Rural communes are responsible for dealing 
with households’ requests to change the status of rice-growing land, and must do so in accordance 
with previously approved plans; while districts are responsible for changing the status of 
agricultural or forested land. These points are important because although the political and 
administrative authorities still held the power to make these changes, it became much easier for 
households to determine how they could use the land to which they had been allocated stable use 
rights, especially for rice, and to legalise de facto changes made since 1993. 
One final point indirectly related to rural land tenure is that provinces now had the opportunity to 
convert agricultural land to industrial sites covering 1 to 200 hectares. This meant that they could 
develop much larger industrial projects than was previously possible, and could do so more 
quickly and with fewer formalities as they no longer had to go through the central authorities. 
This would be an important factor in accelerating the expropriation of land from households. 
§ The law of 2003 
The Land Law of 2003 is three times longer than the previous law, containing 147 articles rather 
than the 89 in the 1993 law (and 31 in the law of 1988). It is a much more developed piece of 
legislation, and represented an important qualitative and quantitative step forward.  
Quantitatively, it clarifies numerous aspects of the 1993 law and describes others in much more 
detail. 
Qualitatively, it clarifies many points and provides a much more solid framework for land 
management. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this clarity is relative (as we were repeatedly 
reminded during the surveys), and while it does address certain issues, others remain unresolved. 
It is possible to read and grasp the key points of the other texts fairly quickly, but this one is less 
accessible because it is much more technical, and anticipates many more situations and cases than 
previous texts, as shown in the analytical tables in the annexes to this paper. 
The main points of this law are summarised below. 
• Article 5 attempts to clarify the concept of ‘ownership by the people as a whole’. It is 
difficult to translate the original Vietnamese phrasing,28 but according to the French 
translation by the Maison du droit Vietnamo-française, this signifies in English that “The 
land belongs to the people as a whole. The State represents the people as the owners of the 
land”. However, this could also be translated more literally as: “The land belongs to the 
people as a whole represented by the State as the owner”.  
Article 5 continues as follows: 
“ The State exercises the right to dispose of land in the following manner: 
a) Determining the allocation of land (objective of the land use) by approving plans to 
develop and use the land; 
b) Regulating the maximum area that can be allocated and the duration of land use; 
                                                
28 Điều 5 : ‘Dất đai thuộc sở hữu toàn dân do Nhà nước đại diện chủ sở hữu’.  
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c) Deciding on the allocation of lands, their location, reallocation to the State and 
changes in their allocation; 
d) Regulating land prices”. 
• More users are recognised, and the new users mentioned in the law have extended rights. 
More specifically, the law tends to bring the regime for foreign nationals in line with that 
of Vietnamese nationals. In addition to the right of lien already available to foreign users, it 
anticipates a series of new rights that vary according to whether rent is paid annually or for 
the whole rental period. Renting gives foreigners access to use many categories of land, but 
they cannot be assigned land use rights or rent land to households or individuals, while 
domestic organisations can.  
• The law also clarifies the fundamental differences between allocation and rental. 
Furthermore, Article 4 states that: 
 
“1. The expression "allocation of land by the State” should be understood in the sense that the 
State allocates the right to use land to persons who wish to use it through an administrative 
decision. 
2. The expression "rental of land by the State" should be understood in in the sense that the 
State allocates the right to use land to persons who wish to use it through a contract”.  
Thus, the difference lies in the nature of the instrument recording the attribution: allocation 
is an administrative decision, while rental is a contract. These definitions show in passing 
that what is described as an allocation or rental is actually an attribution of land use rights, 
confirming the idea that the rights accorded are strictly rights of use. 
• Land classifications no longer refer to the location of the land. The law of 1993 
distinguished between urban and rural residential areas, while the new law anticipates no 
more than three classifications: agricultural land, non-agricultural land, and land whose use 
has yet to be determined. This new classification is only based on the purpose of the land 
and no longer takes account of its location (this also applies to the sub-categories), which 
should facilitate land management. In this new classification, forested lands no longer 
appear as a separate category and are considered as agricultural lands, which, symbolically 
at least, reduces the previous distinction (which posed a particular problem for agroforestry 
practices and crops rotated with forest use). It should be noted that the terms used to define 
the classes show the agricultural tropism of Vietnam, as the second category (non-
agricultural lands – đất phi nông nghiệp) was automatically defined as a whole as land 
used for purposes other than agriculture.  
• A new type of farm is defined: large-scale farms (tran trai). According to Article 82, these 
farms should be created in order to “develop agricultural production, enlarge farms and 
improve the effectiveness of agricultural land use”. The land for these farms is allocated 
free of charge by the State within the maximum limits allowed by the law, which are 5 ha 
for annual crops and 10 ha for perennial crops, and 10 ha and 30 ha respectively in 
mountainous areas. They should be farmed by the rights holder, but the households that 
farm them may change the land use themselves provided this is in accordance with the 
production plans approved by the district People’s Committees. Article 82 ends by stating 
that land that is not cultivated by the owner should be rented out, and forbids farming as a 
means of accumulating land or for unproductive land speculation. 
• There is considerable emphasis on arrangements to facilitate industrial and commercial 
investments and the property market. Much less attention is paid to the fate of agricultural 
land and forests. 
• The law creates a new category of ‘residential community’, which is defined as 
‘communities of Vietnamese people living in the same hamlets, villages and 
agglomerations and sharing the same habits and customs or belonging to a single family, 
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to which the State rents land or allocates land use rights”.29 They are allocated unlimited 
amounts of agricultural and forested land for unlimited periods, free of charge. 
• The amount of land allocated to individuals and households is still regulated: 3 hectares for 
annual crops, aquaculture and salt production (with a ceiling of 5 hectares for all three 
categories); and a maximum of 10 hectares on the plains and 30 hectares in the mountains 
for perennial crops and all other crops combined.  
• A good deal of attention is also paid to the modalities for planning and cataloguing land 
(see diagram in Annex A.1.1). Planning remains highly vertical and centralised, as local 
plans have to conform to plans at higher levels.  
 
Article 21 - 2. Global plans are a necessary pre-requisite for detailed [communal-level] plans. 
Development plans and land use plans at lower levels must be in accordance with those at 
higher levels. Land use plans should respect the territorial development plans approved by the 
competent State organ. 
The ‘bottom-up’ annual census and five-yearly inventories are established by aggregating 
data gathered at the communal level. These inventories are supposed to record changes in 
land use made in accordance with the five- and 10-year plans, and therefore do not 
constitute the basis for modifying plans. 
• The law defines new, more flexible modalities for the administrative authorities to change 
the status of land (thus making changes possible): in simple terms, the provinces are 
authorised to decide on land allocations and rentals, and authorise changes in land 
allocations in favour of groups; districts are authorised to do this for family households and 
individuals, and to decide on land allocations for local communities (Article 37). Changes 
that affect rice-growing areas, protected and special use forests require prior authorisation, 
as do those involving a change from an agricultural category to a non-agricultural category. 
• New ways of setting land prices are defined: these modalities, whose main characteristic is 
that they differ between agricultural and non-agricultural lands, were subsequently clarified 
in Decree n° 188/2004/ND-CP, which is described below.  
• New rights for users: agricultural land users now have the right to sub-let use rights, give 
them away, assign them for a deposit, contribute them as business capital, and receive 
compensation if they are reallocated by the State. This means that there are now 10 sub-
rights associated with use rights (with the right to exchange, assign in exchange for 
payment, rent, and leave to heirs, and mortgage land use rights). 
• Re-affirmation that the right to use agricultural land will be granted free of charge to 
individuals, households and ‘public communities’ for an indefinite period. This also 
applies to groups using land to build homes to rehouse residents in the context of State 
projects (in the case of expropriation, Article 33). 
• New mechanisms are put in place for compensation for land requisitioned by the State. 
• Mechanisms are put in place to facilitate the resolution of conflicts caused by successive 
land allocations.  
The law of 2003 is thus highly complex and consistent. However, it soon became clear that it also 
had certain limitations … 
                                                
29 “Công đồng dân cu gồm công đòng ngời Viêt Nam sinh sống trên cùng địa bàn thôn, làng, ấp, bản, buôn, phum, sóc 
và các điểm dân ở tơng tự có cùng phong tục, tập quán hoặc có chung dòng họ đợc Nhà nước giạo đất hoặc công 
nhân quyền sử dụng đất.”   
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§ Modifications after 2003 
Many modifications were made to this law, starting in 2004 when at least six major changes were 
made (Annex A.2.1) – thus partly cancelling out efforts to clarify the legislation in the law of 
2003 by assembling all the texts preceding this law.  
Two of the most important texts were produced in 2004, and the third in 2007.  
Decree n° 181/2004/ND/CP of 2004, implementing the land law of 2003.  This decree 
invalidated or replaced 39 previous decrees enacted since 1993, in what could be seen as an 
attempt to unify land legislation and facilitate the rapid application of the new land law. 
This desire for standardisation can also be seen in the introduction of a national model for 
mandatory land use rights certificates. The Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment 
(MoNRE) was responsible for developing this model. Each certificate was to be filed at the Land 
Use Rights Registry, a new body operating under the auspices of the central authority, which 
should have had branches in every province and city by 1st July 2007. 
This decree also clarifies certain disputes over previous land allocations, and lists cases where the 
State will not deal will complaints and claims rising from land use rights reallocated before 1993. 
It states that land users can now post comments while the cadastral register is being established, 
and that the MoNRE and its local departments should inform the public about the formulation of 
this register and ensure that all documents describing approved investment projects are made 
available for it. 
The decree also covers cases where the State can requisition land for reasons of security, in the 
public interest or for economic development. This means that the State can recover land in order 
to promote economic development by constructing industrial parks, establishing high-technology 
zones or economic zones. This includes projects funded by development organisations or fully 
funded with foreign capital, which cannot be set up in existing zones. 
The State is withdrawing from transactions associated with the requisitioning of land (use rights). 
Under the law of 2003, the State could retake land and immediately reallocate it to investors. This 
formality no longer exists, giving investors greater autonomy during land use rights operations. 
This decree also mentions a new body that can be mandated by the State to manage land 
transfers: Land fund development organisations (tổ chức phát triển quỹ đất), which are non-
commercial bodies answerable firstly to the MoNRE and secondly to the Ministry of the Interior. 
Their task is to manage funds generated by land that has been recovered by the State as a result of 
decisions by competent organs. Article 10 stipulates that these organisations are responsible for 
making compensation and preparing land (bồi thường, giải phóng mặt bằng) in cases where it has 
been requisitioned before the investments are available. They should also receive sums 
corresponding to the transfer of use rights in zones where land needs to be requisitioned but its 
users want to move before it is recovered by the State, manage the reclaimed land and organise 
the auctioning of use rights.  
Decree n° 188/2004/ND-CP sets out the methods for determining land prices and the relevant 
price ranges. 
Article 2 of this decree indicates certain cases where the price of land should be set according to 
specific methods:  
• Calculating land taxes and the taxes levied on transfers,  
• Calculating the land rent to be paid to the State 
• Determining the value of land assigned by the State to organisations, individuals or 
Businesses, free of charge or in return for payment 
•  Calculating the cost of registering land when it is assigned or when use rights are 
transferred,  
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• Evaluating the amount of compensation to be paid to users whose land has been 
expropriated by the State, and the amount of damages and interest owed to the State by 
persons who have not complied with the legislation.  
These methods are used to determine the minimum price of land that is to be auctioned (reserve 
price), but the decree does not apply to agreements between users transferring, renting or sub-
letting use rights. Therefore, the State influences the price of certain land operations and 
transactions by determining how they should be calculated, and allows prices to find their own 
level in other situations. Taxes and duties do not seem to be calculated on the basis of the actual 
cost of land transactions between individuals. 
This disconnection is reinforced by the fact that there are two methods of calculation: one 
(Method 1) that partly takes account of prices on the land market by comparing the cost of 
transactions involving similar land; and the other (Method 2) that determines the price of land 
according to the revenue generated by its use or its value as collateral. 
 
 “Article 4. – Methods for determining the price of land 
1. Method of direct comparison means the method of determining the price levels through 
analysis of actual land use rights transfer market price levels of similar land categories (in 
terms of land categories, land acreage, land plots, land grade, urban center grades, street 
grades and position) for comparison and determination of prices of the land plots, land 
categories which need to be priced. 
2. The income-based method means the method of determining the price level being the quotient 
between the annual net income level earned on a land acreage unit and the annual average 
savings interest rate (up to the time of land pricing) of VND deposits with one-year (12 months) 
term at the State-run commercial bank having the highest savings interest rate in the locality.” 
 
The first method is applied when there is an active land market, which means that comparisons 
can be made for categories of land that change hands fairly frequently. The second method is only 
used when the value of the land can determined solely on the basis of annual income. Prices 
determined according to the procedures set out in the decree should fall within the range it sets for 
each category of land (annual or perennial crops, forest, residential, urban, etc.) and the region 
concerned: delta, middle region and mountain, which are themselves defined according to rather 
vague and whimsical criteria – for example, “Midland is the land region of medium height, lower 
than the mountain region but higher than the delta”.  
Although this is not specified in the decree, the second method of setting prices mainly applies to 
agricultural and forest lands, since internal land transfers within the category are still fairly rare, 
and it is relatively easy to determine the annual income generated by the land – for agricultural 
lands at least.  
As stipulated in the law of 2003, this decree also divides land into three categories. The price 
categories are set by the State every 10 years, as follows:  
• Category 1: three types of agricultural land (plains, watersheds, mountains) and five 
groups (annual crops, perennial crops, productive forests, aquaculture, salt production); 
• Category 2: three types of non-agricultural land (plains, watersheds, mountains) and four 
groups (rural housing, urban housing, rural commercial production, urban commercial 
production); 
• Category 3: unused land.  
Provincial prices should not exceed the national ceiling, but a 20 per cent difference is acceptable. 
By setting the price range according to the category of land, the decree puts agricultural land in a 
price-setting system that is disconnected from the market, because the price of neighbouring 
commercial, residential or industrial land cannot be taken into consideration when determining the 
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price of agricultural land, even if these lands were very recently converted from longstanding 
agricultural use. 
Decree n° 84/2007/ND-CP of 2007 makes certain arrangements regarding the issue and exercise 
of land use rights, LURs requisitioned by the government, procedures for compensation, 
assistance and rehousing following these requisitions, and complaints regarding the exercise of 
LURs. 
This decree is one of many attempts to regulate the numerous disputes over land caused by the 
allocation of use rights and relocations. It covers certain matters in particular detail, such as how 
households that have never received land use certificates can claim them, and what the law means 
by ‘consistent long-term use’ so that users who can claim certificates can be identified. There are 
also numerous articles regarding the regulation of disputes relating to contradictions in previous 
successive allocations, and the procedures to be followed when LUCs have not been issued in 
accordance with the law. Finally, this decree specifies the circumstances in which households can 
have their land expropriated (major economic and residential projects) and the projects’ 
obligations with regard to compensation for these households. It also provides important 
guarantees for corporations wishing to invest foreign capital in housing construction projects in 
Vietnam. 
1.3 Implementation of legislation at the provincial level: the example of Binh Duong 
province 
Diachronic analysis of the implementation of the 1993 Land Law in the provinces provided some 
valuable insights into how Binh Duong has positioned itself with regard to this law. Thanks in 
large part to the work done by the Justice Department and the People’s Committee, we were able 
to retrace most of the dynamics behind the creation of the land law at both the provincial and 
national levels. This information is presented in a diagram in Annex A.2.4 showing the year, 
hierarchical level and bodies concerned, and the subject of the decisions. It should also be noted 
that the People’s Committee compiled the texts relating to land, collating all the regulations, 
decisions and modifications relating to land and every People’s Committee office in the province 
in three thick volumes. The fact that this crosscutting compilation of the respective competences 
was undertaken at all indicates the level of interest that the authorities in Binh Duong take in land 
matters. 
Reading this body of legislation better enabled us to determine how the land regulations were 
produced and amended. The summary table in the annex highlights three main points: 
• There is significant increase in the amount of legislation produced at the end of the land 
law’s life cycle.30 Looking at each legislative entity, we can see that the number of texts 
increased considerably in 1999, 2000 and 2001 (by 21, 29 and 25 texts respectively) as 
numerous arrangements were also made for modifications, corrections and additions. This 
temporal dynamic continued in 2002, when most activities were focused on preparations 
for the second land law of 2003, hence the sharp fall in the number of texts produced (12); 
• The way that specific problems are addressed over time. Certain problems that have 
emerged were partially anticipated in the initial arrangements of the 1993 land law, such as 
foreign investments (by both enterprises and individuals), which first appeared in 1997 – 
before the law encouraging investment was passed in 1998. The process leading to the 
adoption of the law (which emanates from the government) is clearly illustrated in the way 
that the legislation was executed and corrected: the order of 1997 regulating industrial 
zones was not executed until 1999, after the vote on the law itself, and was corrected the 
same year (Order 51/1999, thong tu 02/1999 and Order 20/1998). This point regarding the 
appearance and subsequent correction, modification and additions to the different texts is 
important: our interviews at the provincial level suggest that the lack of coherence in the 
legislative arsenal is partly due to the profusion of regulations, and partly to their 
                                                
30  Here, the term ‘life cycle’ refers to the fact that the Vietnamese authorites produce a new land law each year. 
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incorporation into a structured and homogenous body. Thus, the example cited above 
suggests that texts are modified without reference to any subsequent laws, and that with 
little idea of what is being decided at the national level, the provinces have tended to sit on 
their hands while waiting for corrections to be published;  
• Decisions made at the provincial level have relatively little effect on legislation as a whole. 
The People’s Committee of Binh Duong made very few announcements in the period 
between 1993 and 2002, and its decisions represented just 12 per cent of the legislative 
arsenal mobilised over these nine years. The lack of legislation emanating from the 
province is somewhat surprising and such reticence is hard to analyse, although our 
reading of the texts suggests that it was a matter of determining the elements within the 
regulatory margins left by the State. 
This ‘wait-and-see’ attitude is reflected in the fact that Binh Duong had a stronger presence at the 
end of the legislative cycle than at the beginning, which is consistent with our interviews. One 
area where this can be seen is land pricing.  
We should remember that the land law does not set the price of land in the strict sense, as the 
State remains the sole landowner in the name of the people. Therefore, the prices set in the 
framework of the 2003 Land Law only relate to transactions involving land use rights and 
compensation for the loss of allocated land use rights (Article 4, paragraphs 23 and 24, except in 
circumstances described in Article 43). There are also regulations regarding compensation for 
installations on land, which are unrelated to land prices. 
Prices are set by the State according to current use, which is linked to pre-determined plans. 
National debates over land prices led to proposals to change the way that they were set, so that 
they would relate to planned use rather than current use, as was then the case. However, the State 
refused to make this change on the grounds that it would create distortions between the planned 
and actual prices. This shift from actual current land use prices to potential future prices created 
considerable speculation over land whose use was most likely to be changed, especially 
unproductive agricultural land slated for housing. The press also carried reports on another 
proposal by MoNRE representatives in Ho Chi Minh City to adjust the price to market prices – a 
proposal that has yet to receive a favourable response. 
The State wanted to maintain its hold over land (use and prices), but had to contend with the 
reality of setting land prices. Part of the problem seemed to be the modest levels of compensation 
it offered those whose land was currently used for agriculture but earmarked for conversion to 
housing, which were compensated at agricultural rates. If the State was unable to procure the 
same category of land for resettlement, former users received 50 per cent more than the price of 
the land concerned.  
The problem with setting regulated prices for land use is that taxes are deemed to be too high and 
compensation too low. It all depends whether one is on the side of the land user or the person 
receiving compensation. In the latter case, the value claimed is generally higher than the real 
price, especially in urban areas that are being developed – just as when rights are transferred. 
A provincial official involved in price setting described the dual problem of doing this at the 
provincial level: one the one hand, the State determines the general framework within which 
prices must remain, and on the other hand, provincial prices have to be based on observed 
realities. The greater the gap between the two, the greater speculation is likely to be. In addition to 
this distortion between real and regulated prices, there is often quite a lengthy delay between the 
change of user and payment of compensation (a minimum of three to six months, Phúc Huy, 
2008), which has prompted much debate about the dates that should be taken into account for 
compensation, actual change of use and payment.  
The gap between real and regulated prices is partly due to the legal process of establishing 
regulated prices. In order to analyse this process at the provincial level, several texts from both 
levels were collected and compared in a flowchart, which is presented in Annex A.2.5 of this 
document (texts regulating land prices in Binh Duong province, 1994-2004). 
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On 21st March 1998, the government issued Directive NĐ 17/1998/NĐ-CP, correcting Order 
87/CP of August 1994 on the price framework for different types of land. This directive retains 
the direct price-setting system and respects the district administrative boundaries set according to 
categories, and groups according to proximity. However, the ratios (percentage of the price of the 
category concerned) are determined according to main roads, secondary roads, etc.  
The categories established by the State (which are identical to those of 1994) are divided into 
rural and urban areas. Categories in rural areas are distinguished by soil quality (ranked from 1 to 
5 or 6) and subdivided into types according to their location (plains, watersheds and mountains for 
agriculture; and three types for industrial lands). Categories in urban areas are divided into three 
levels of quality (according to the quality of the road and wealth generated by activities on the 
site) and subdivided into types (situation and ease of access to the road), with a maximum and 
minimum price for each type within these two categories. This mechanism for distinguishing 
between land values can result in a single category having 30 to 36 different price levels. 
In 1994 prices ranged from 50 dongs/m² (quality 5 mountain land under annual crops) to 
11,500,000 dongs/m² (type 1, group 1, central urban lands). 
In 1994, Song Be province (which was divided in 1999 to create Binh Duong in the south and 
Binh Phuoc in the north) set its own price levels and presented them directly to the districts, 
which were divided into groups. The important difference was that the province did not set the 
upper or lower limit for the group; prices were set by district without taking account of the 
divisions according to proximity recommended by the national order.  
This was not taken into consideration until 2004, with Directive QĐ 182/2004/QĐ-UB (Binh 
Duong People’s Committee) regarding price setting, which followed the government’s Decree 
NĐ 188/2004/NĐ-CP of 16th November 2004 on price-setting methods. By respecting the general 
schedule, the province distinguished between different categories and qualities of land, and used 
these main groups to set a ratio according to the land’s location in relation to main traffic routes. 
Certain avenues or boulevards were selected in each district and given the maximum rating (1) or 
a lower rate such as 0.5. 
In 2007, the authorities at the national level decided that the districts and provinces needed to 
communicate with each other (NĐ 123/2007 of 27th July 2007 correcting articles in Order 
188/2004/ND-CP). As the Department of Finance is responsible for setting prices, this meant that 
its services had to conduct more consultations to determine actual land prices in each part of the 
province, while taking account of any legislative changes at the national level. Consultations had 
to start in the middle of the year in order to meet the January 1st deadline set by the law of 1997, 
when each province had to be ready to publish tables showing their land prices. 
At the beginning of the following year, Binh Duong People’s Committee took Decision 
03/2008/QĐ-UBND of 22nd January 2008, determining the minimum sizes of parcels. This 
decision is interesting because it shows how the provincial authorities had to deal with the 
limitations of national legislation – in this case, the fact that the law prescribed maximum land 
quotas but did not set the minimum area that could be considered as a parcel. One of the problems 
in Binh Duong is the division of certain agricultural parcels into smaller and smaller units, which 
contributes to the fragmentation of communal territory. The authorities in Binh Duong report 
numerous cases where what was originally agricultural land has been divided into small lots of 20 
or 30 square metres that are then assigned to several families on the black market  (phân lô). This 
division into small plots leads to the proliferation of housing that effectively shifts the main land 
use from agricultural to rural residential (remembering that agriculture is marginal in the southern 
part of the province), while creating parcels that were not originally planned on the register. Apart 
from the fiscal consequences of bypassing legislation in this way, these areas make it particularly 
difficult for the authorities to manage residential infrastructures like water supply, roads, etc. The 
provincial authorities indicate that they have noted this gap in the current land law and will ensure 
that it is taken into account in the next one. The reading of the next text for the land law at the 
national level will show whether the province and others who may have raised the same problem 
can make their voices heard. 
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1.4 Intense and chaotic legislative activity 
A quick description of the legal texts relating to land, and a (far from exhaustive) list of these 
texts shows the intensity of legislative activity in this domain (Document B, Annex A.2.1 for the 
national level, and A.2.4 for the provincial level). The annual bursts of activity at the national 
level after the promulgation of a new law shows how incomplete these texts are and/or how 
quickly they become obsolete. At the end of 1997, some 70 documents and decrees 
supplementing the new land law of 1993 were produced solely in relation to forest lands and their 
management and distribution.31 This was one of the reasons used to justify plans to revise the law 
in 1998. In 2004, as noted above, Decree n° 181/2004/ND/CP enforcing the land law of 2003 
rescinded or replaced 19 decrees promulgated since 1993, and modified 10 others. We also 
identified 13 texts promulgated after the 2003 Land Law in 2004 alone, and there are doubtless 
more. Conversely, activity at the provincial level is most intense at the end of the legislature 
(when laws reach the end of their validity), which could be indicative of a prudent reaction to 
hesitancy at the national level, or a relatively slow response time. The obvious problem with this 
response time, which was mentioned by actors at every level, is that it means the legislation is 
usually obsolete at the provincial level. 
Such activity at the national level does not always correspond with better land legislation. Far 
from it, in fact, as can be seen from the number of texts promulgated in order to correct earlier 
legislation, and the contradictions that progressively emerge between these texts. New texts are 
also enacted to correct practices by institutions that have not followed the legal procedures, and 
decisions or orders issued to supplement particular points in general texts, such as those relating 
to forest lands. These lands are still covered by separate legislation, which is often driven by the 
MARD as the body with specific responsibility for this type of land. A directive dating from 
1996, stating that enforcement orders and decrees should not contradict the law, has reduced the 
confusion between these texts, but this directive is not always respected and the laws are 
sufficiently vague and incomplete for the surrounding texts – which may be contradictory – to 
create considerable confusion over important questions that are dealt with singly, with no global 
vision of the changes that are affecting other domains. 
On this point, it is interesting to note that the law of 1993 mainly focused on agricultural lands 
and the rights of rural households, while that of 2003 included numerous articles designed to 
facilitate industrial and commercial investments. This reflects the country’s main concerns in the 
period before the laws were passed, and suggest that they were prepared without planning for 
future developments. It also means that the law has had to be readjusted to accommodate socio-
economic developments in Vietnam: the influx of investments and booming property market after 
1993, and the refocus on rural issues prompted by demonstrations by expropriated households and 
the subsequent food crisis after 2003. 
Although the different land actors we spoke to had various explanations for this legislative 
hesitancy (which is sometimes presented as a technical problem, as we will show later), all said 
that it poses real problems for the enforcement of the texts.  
As with the law of 1993, the law of 2003 was scheduled for a complete review at the end of 
2008/beginning of 2009. Certain sources told us that the review was supposed to be accompanied 
by the formulation of a land code (planned for 2010) that would cover every aspect of all types of 
land in detail. A new land law is also planned for 2013, when the LURs for agricultural lands 
under perennial crops are due to expire. But can the new modalities for preparing legal texts 
resolve these problems? 
 
                                                
31  Short speech by the representative of the General Cadastral Department at the National Workshop on Land Use 
Planning and Forest Land Allocation held in Hanoi, 4-6 December 1997. 
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2. The land administration since 1993: from centralised control to greater 
autonomy for the provinces  
The reform of the land administration since 1993 has taken place in two stages, whose start dates 
(1994 and 2002) bear little relation to the two main laws of this period. There was no policy or 
specific plan for this reform, and an overall programme was not put in place until the second 
wide-ranging reform began in 2002. When the first full land administration was created in 1994, 
the State was still considering a somewhat experimental system rather than aiming to build and 
modernise the administration over the long term. 
2.1 The first land administration system 
In 1994 the government of Vietnam decided to create a general cadastral department – better 
known as the General Department of Land Administration (GDLA) – which brought together and 
reorganised two state organs, the General Department of Land Management (GDLM) and the 
National Department of Surveying and Mapping (NDSM). 
This new administration was an organ of the State, organised at four levels:  
• At the national level: the General Department of Land Administration (GDLA), which was 
directly accountable to the National Assembly. This was not part of any ministry, and 
therefore ranked alongside the ministries; 
• At the provincial level, a Provincial Department of Land Administration (PDLA), which 
was accountable to the provincial People’s Committee; 
• At the district level: the District Bureau of Land Administration (DBLA), which was 
accountable to the district People’s Committee; 
• At the communal  level, a Land Officer. 
According to Dang Hung Vo (1997), the former Director of the GDLA, the tasks of this 
administration included: 
• Preparing land legislation and land policies to be submitted to the government for approval 
(it was thus the GDLA which was responsible for writing the 2003 Land Law); 
• Responsibility for the cadastral system: preparing cadastral maps, establishing land 
registers, registering land and issuing land certificates (historically, the GDLA was 
responsible for issuing land certificates in rural areas and the Ministry for Construction was 
supposed to issue certificates for urban areas; in 1994 it was agreed that both bodies would 
issue urban certificates); 
• Measuring and cataloguing land in order to classify it and evaluate and estimate land 
prices; 
• Compiling land-related statistics and land use maps; 
• Long-term and annual planning; 
• Land management; 
• Resolving land-related conflicts, 
• Baseline studies and mapping to define a reference system and establish coordinates and 
levels; 
• Nationwide aerial photographic coverage and topographic mapping, 
• Mapping the hydrographic network and coastline. 
So this administration had numerous tasks, ranging from the most political to the most technical; 
some resulting from the absence of competent technical services that could provide the necessary 
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data for a cadastral register. These tasks were even more daunting due to the fact that the country 
had no land administration until 1979, and this was largely inactive until the law of 1993. 
Therefore, the land administration had to be built from scratch, function everywhere and work for 
each citizen. It was also faced with the massive task of issuing land use certificates when land was 
the most important and widespread means of production in what was still a rural and agricultural 
society. Those who knew it at the time describe the GDLA as a powerful and impenetrable 
administration, which had been given substantial resources and a more or less free rein from the 
outset. Created with the rank of ministry, it was both independent of the other administrative 
services and in direct contact with the highest levels of government, giving it the capacity to react 
quickly and act relatively autonomously 
2.2 The modernisation of the administration  
All this changed in 2002, when the GDLA was incorporated into the MoNRE, a new body that 
drew together various departments and agencies:  
• The former Enviromental Agency for Vietnam, which was part of the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and the Environment,  
• The General Department for Land Administration,  
• The General Department for Hydrology and Meteorology,  
• The Department for Geology and Minerals and the institute of the same name, which were 
both subsequently transferred from the Minstry of Industry 
• The ‘Water resource management’ section, which had previously belonged to the 
Department for Water resources and management of dykes, which was itself part of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.  
Through its incorporation into a ministry, the Cadastral Department (now officially known as 
Tong cuc quan ly dat dai – the Central Office for Land Management, but still often called the 
General Department of Land Administration) lost some of the administrative autonomy it had 
enjoyed as a national-level organ with the rank of ministry. The GDLA was now one of three 
departments within the MoNRE, along with the Department for the Environment and the 
Department of Sea and Islands. It could call upon different types of services provided by 
specialist departments and institutes (see Annex A.1.4) directly overseen by the ministry or 
managed by several departments, and also provided commercial services through ‘commercial 
enterprises’ attached to the ministry, which weakened its capacity to generate revenue. 
Nevertheless, it is still sometimes described as a ‘ministry within a ministry’, a status clearly 
reflected in its large new premises set apart from other MoNRE buildings. 
The structure of the MoNRE meant that this ministry now accounted to the government for all 
land management matters. Despite the rather vague general MoNRE flowchart shown in Annex 
A.1.4, this clarified the organisation of land management by bringing the following functions 
together within a single ministry: 
• Cadastral register and registration of LURs, 
• Land use planning, 
• Cataloguing and surveying land use, 
• Mapping, 
• Managing and planning the use of all resources. 
As a result of this new organisation, the MoNRE acquired certain prerogatives from other 
ministries. For example, the MARD lost a good deal of control over the management of 
agricultural and forest lands, to the extent that it had to prioritise environmental questions over 
agricultural and forestry matters – which cannot be considered an insignificant decision by the 
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government. The GDLA had also previously held important prerogatives, but was not part of a 
ministry. 
In addition to the restructuring of the land administration, 2002 also saw the launch of two 15-
year programmes: the Program for the Development and Modernization of the Land 
Administration (PDMLA), and the Strategy for the application and development of information 
technologies in natural resources and the environment approved by the Prime Minister 
(supplemented by a 20-year vision). The aim of this strategy, one of whose main components was 
land, was to complete the modernisation of the land administration by 2010. Both programmes 
had the same overall priorities, to automate and standardise the land databases and registration 
procedures; and the second programme planned to create a Land Information Clearing House 
(World Bank, 2002) to facilitate the management and dissemination of this information at the 
national level. Land registration, issuing certificates and establishing the cadastral system are all 
tasks that have been beset by substantial technical and organisational difficulties.  
For example, the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) indicates that only 76 
per cent of the agricultural parcels and 68 per cent of the urban parcels in use in 2004 were 
covered by land use certificates. The situation was even worse with regard to forest lands, as land 
use certificates had only been issued for 34 per cent of the parcels in use. The 24 million 
certificates issued in 2004 only represented about half of those that should have been issued, and 
the report adds that the land registration documents and cadastral maps were largely incomplete, 
inaccurate and not up to date. 
Despite the significant efforts invested in issuing land certificates (an average of 2.5 million were 
issued each year between 1993 and 2006; Tran Nhu et al., 2006) and producing new cadastral 
maps, the objectives set at the launch of the two modernisation programmes in 2002 (presented in 
the tables in Annex A.3.3; Dang and Palmkvist, 2001) were not achieved nationwide.  
It is not easy to find or verify figures relating to the number of certificates issued. The 
explanations for the differences between the regions and land categories presented in an article 
whose authors include former and current members of the GDLA (Than Nhu et al., 2006) 
illustrate some of the difficulties encountered by the land administration. 
 
Main findings from analysis of LTC from practices (Tran Nhu et al, 2006, pp. 10-12) 
Main findings regarding 7 socio-economic regions 
•  7 regions have the same trend of land registration. Very distinctive to each other on the 
condition of social, natural and economic conditions but actually they are only two main 
groups regarding the land registration.  
•  The first advanced group in land registration contains Mekong river delta, the East South 
and Red river delta regions. The second group with less advanced in land registration 
progress contains the rest of four regions. 
•  However, from the percentages of LTC issued point of view, Mekong river delta and the 
East South region are on the top with above 84% and 64% of land with LTC respectively. 
All other regions are in between of 34%-48% of land with LTC issued.  
•  Concerning the high percentage of land with LTC for Mekong river delta and the East 
South region, one main reason could be those land are flat & large area. It also could the 
different in history and cultural of land use since the Nguyen Dynasty (1804-1945) with 
the land reclaim program (Phuc, 1979). 
• For the less advance group, Highland and the Central Coast are always in bottom line for 
both number of LTC issued and the percentages of area with LTC. Highland is a large and 
fertile area but somehow still is constrained with the customary land use system (ethnic 
people); many re-settlement programs might cause the slow speed in land registration 
process. However, this less advanced in Highland was recovered since the year 1999, 
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2000. • The percentages of land with LTC in Highland are the same (39% of land with 
LTC) as the North Mountain and North Centre regions. 
•  Statistic data seems has some inconsistency for Red river delta between year 1999 and 
2002 for the total number of LTC in year 2002 is less than 1999. The same issue for the 
Central Coast in year 2002 and 2005. However, the main reason for reducing number of 
LTC is caused by land consolidation program and some changes land users. Land 
consolidation, in Vietnamese is “dồn điền đổi thửa”, is actually a program to support and 
encourage land users to exchange land parcels to each other to increase the extent of land 
parcels and to reduce number of land parcels per land user, (Trung, 2006). Changes in 
land users also might reduce the number of LTC. For example, one investor buy land from 
many land user (many LTC) and re-register with only one LTC. 
Main findings regarding three kinds of land use: 
•  Very different land registration progress for three kinds of land use. Agricultural land is 
on top of registration, second is for forestry land and the bottom is residential land. [...] 
•  Concerning agricultural land, the number of LTC and area of land with LTC is increasing 
gradually since year 1998, but the percentages of land with LTC increased from 68% 
(1998) to 81% (1999), reduced quickly to 75% (2002) then increased steadily up to 81% 
(2006). The main reason is the total area of agricultural land is increased annually from 
about 7 to 9 million ha from 1993 to 2006 by land reclaim program, converting more un-
used land to other land use purpose. 
•  Concerning forestry land, the number of LTC is not much in compared to agricultural and 
residential land but the area and percentages of land with LTC is very significant results. 
It is about 50% of forestry land with LTC. This also shows that the extent of forestry land 
registration on each LTC is much larger than the one of agricultural and residential land. 
•  Residential land with a huge number of LTC, just behind the agricultural land, but only 
has very limited percentages of land with LTC (only 25%). It is worth to remind that the 
total residential land area is data from 1995, which is must be very different for recent 
years with high urbanization process. That means that the real percentages of residential 
land with LTC must be lower to 25%. 
Although the explanations that the authors of this article give for the variations in the number of 
certificates issued according to region and land category are not always convincing, they do show 
the complexity of this work and the wide range of geographic, historical and even cultural 
constraints that have to be overcome. The constant changes imposed on rural areas, such as 
resettlement programmes in mountainous areas and the land consolidation programme in the Red 
River delta, also cause problems. The authors also note that the work is made more complex by 
the constantly changing administrative boundaries and profusion of legal texts and types of 
certificate that have to be issued (five types in urban areas). Another problem is the land use plans 
on which land allocations are supposed to be based, as only 55 per cent of the country’s 
communes had land use plans for their territory in 2005. 
Coming back to the modernisation of the registration system, it should also be remembered that a 
decree was passed in 2004 making it a legal obligation to issue land use certificates according to a 
standard model for the entire country (Decree n° 181/2004/ND/CP of 2004 promulgating the Land 
Law of 2003). Even now, the systems that are in place vary from province to province, as do the 
different categories of land – even within each province. This can be explained by the fact that the 
provincial technical services needed to make the land allocations within a very short time frame 
(land injunction) when there was still no centralised and standardised allocation system, or 
sufficient human and financial resources for the task. The provinces had to call in various 
competences and received financial and human aid from different projects, which will be 
described later in more detail. Various different allocation techniques were tested – participatory 
and automated, computerised and manual, completely revised and taking account of previous 
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allocations – and the land administration now has to deal with very disparate situations while 
continuing to deliver the missing certificates and registering ongoing changes. 
It is also worth noting that the modernisation of the land administration underlines the importance 
of the tasks of cataloguing and planning (which should be standardised and regularly undertaken 
nationwide), and involves the new task of determining the price of land (valuation) in addition to 
classifying and evaluating it (Dang and Palmvisk, 2001). The Land Office is still the central actor 
in land use planning – and thus territorial development – and has become a key player in the land 
market.  
Finally, it should be remembered that the Land Office reports back to the MoNRE on land 
legislation and more generally on the preparation of land policies. Between 2003 and 2008 it was 
assigned the task (and necessary resources) of completing the legislation and putting in place a 
land code that had to be submitted to the National Assembly (ibid.). As legislation becomes a 
genuine tool for land management (and especially for managing access to land), the Land Office 
acquires additional power. 
2.3 Putting in place provincial land institutions 
In recent years the provinces have also made significant efforts to create structures that are 
capable of responding to the mounting demands associated with land matters: increasingly 
complex legislation, new users, new categories of land, and changes in the processes for 
recovering State lands, etc. 
§ The provincial structures involved in land matters: comparison of Lao Cai 
and Binh Duong 
Although the provinces of Lao Cai and Binh Duong organise their administrative services in 
accordance with the national system,32 their structure varies in several ways.   
At the provincial level, the departments of the different ministries are answerable to both the 
provincial People’s Committee and the ministries. This means that they have greater power to 
propose and make decisions than the provinces. There are 16 of these departments in the two 
provinces in question, four of which have substantial competences relating to land matters:33 
• Sở Nội vụ: Department of internal affairs, 
• Sở Kế hoạch - Đầu tư: Department of planning and investment, 
• Sở Tài nguyên - Môi trường: Department of natural resources and the environment, 
• Sở Tài chính: Department of finance. 
Lao Cai has had a Department of Natural Resources and Environemnt (DRNE)34 since 2003, 
which was put in place following the creation of the MoNRE in 2002. Like the ministry from 
which it emanates, it contains specialist sections dealing with land and the environment. In the 
past, the province had an independent cadastral service (the Department of Land Administration), 
                                                
32 See http://làocai.gov.vn – the official site of the Lao Cai province – consulted in July 2008; interviews with Binh 
Duong People’s Committee, July 2008. 
33  The others are the Department of Science and Technology (Sở Khoa học - Công nghệ), the Department of Culture, 
Sport and Tourism (Sở Văn hóa, Thể thao và Du lịch), the Department of Trade and Industry (Sở Công thương), the 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Sở Nông nghiệp & PTNT), the Department of Justice (Sở Tư 
pháp), the Department of Education and Training (Sở Giáo dục và Đào tạo), the Department of Information and 
Traditions (Sở Thông tin và Truyền thông), the Department of Health (Sở Y tế), the Department of  Construction (Sở 
Xây dựng),  the Department of External Relations (Sở Ngoại vụ), the Department of Communications and Transport 
(Sở Giao thông Vận tải), the Department of Work, Disability and Social Affairs (Sở Lào động – TBXH). 
34 It includes five services (Phòng), the Service for plans and planning (Phòng Quy hoạch kế hoạch), the Service for 
the technical management of the land registry and mapping (Phòng Quản lý kỹ thuật đo đạc bản đồ), the Service for 
environmental management (Phòng Quản lý Môi trường), the Service for the management of mining resources 
(Phòng Quản lý Tài nguyên khoáng sản nước), and the Service for the management of land resources (Phòng Quản 
lý Tài nguyên đất). 
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and matters relating to the environment were managed at the provincial level by the Service for 
science, technology and the environment within the ministry of that name.  
The creation of this service made it possible to bring together in an official and visible form of all 
activities linked with the allocation or expropriation of land. Its action was also strengthened by 
the new modalities for putting in place and accrediting plans at the national level through 
governmental Decree 391/CP, which authorises and protects the development plan for Lao Cai. 
In order to respond to the growing demands of land management, officials in this service have 
followed training courses since 1995. These are usually delivered by foreign institutions, either in-
country, as with the training offered by SIDA and OXFAM-GB, or abroad in Malaysia or 
Sweden. This enables officials who have sometimes not received training on land registration (but 
have received some kind of training on agriculture or forestry) to acquire skills in land use and 
management. OXFAM-GB also set up a project on the management and distribution of land use 
rights in Ho Quy O, which helped establish a methodological model for managing and allocating 
land in forested areas that is now used throughout the province. 
As in Lao Cai, the DNRE in Binh Duong is largely responsible for land management. It is 
subdivided into offices that are linked with the national level (Administrative Office, Land Office 
– formerly the Planning Office, the Environment Office, the Office for Mineral and Water 
Resources, Departmental Control), and into two service offices (the land rights registry Office, 
Văn phòng đăng ký quyền sử dụng đẩt, which is associated with the districts, and the Centre for 
the observation of resources and the environment). 
Since 2007, the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) has acted as an intermediary 
between investors and the province. Beforehand, entrepreneurs had to deal with each of the 
services concerned, and often ended up losing time and money because they didn’t know which 
services had to be consulted. The DPI’s role is to manage investment applications and follow 
procedures with key services (such as the DRNE) and those relevant to specific projects 
(construction, agriculture etc.). 
In this procedure, the DNRE is consulted to evaluate the project’s compatibility with the 
development plan, or possibly to prepare for the modification of this plan. When a request is made 
to modify the plan, the DPI and DRNE look into the socio-economic aspects of the project in 
order to determine the validity of the requested modification. A project is deemed viable if it is 
useful to the local population, in which case a request to modify the plan is attached to the final 
synthesis report and sent to the provincial People’s Committee. One source told us that the 
specialist technical services for each domain are always mobilised in such cases, and that the final 
(political) decision is made by the provincial People’s Committee. 
Until 2004, this committee’s backing was sufficient for any investment under US$5 million, or 
around 85 billion VND. This ceiling has since been raised to 300 billion VND (about US$17 
million). Any investment above this has to be approved by the government (chính phủ) before it 
can be effected. 
Land in every category apart from protected forests and rice fields can be requisitioned and 
reallocated for any investment project that is deemed useful to the local population, and therefore 
considered allowable whether or not the plan has to be modified. In such cases the projects have 
to engage directly with households in the affected area (that possess LURs) to seek an agreement. 
This should lead to financial compensation in straightforward cases of expropriation, or 
compensation through employment if the households are direct participants in the project. 
The Department of Finance used to be responsible for setting both the price of land and the 
amount of compensation due for expropriations, although this was due to change in March 2008, 
when all aspects of price setting were to be transferred to the DNRE as part of efforts to make a 
single authority responsible for land matters (ND 25/2008/ND-CP of 4th March 2008). 
In addition to these departments, there are also various  offices and management committees with 
competences relating to specific spaces and/or assigned rights that enable them to organise the 
rental of land to investors. In Lao Cai, these include the Management committee for industrial 
52 
groups (Ban quản lý các cụm công nghiệp, whose overall objective is to facilitate industrial 
settlements), which organises land rentals in these zones but has no decision-making powers. 
Similarly, in Binh Duong, there is a bureau for the management of industrial zones and a bureau 
responsible for managing the Vietnam-Singapore industrial zone. The most important of these 
centres in terms of land matters is the Land development fund (Trung tâm phát triển quỹ đất).  
§  The evolution of the Land development fund in Binh Duong 
While the Land Law of 1993 was rather vague about changes in land use and makes no mention 
of compensation, the law of 2003 makes provisions for entities that will manage funds and 
facilitate the conversion of land for development purposes (industrial zones, advanced technology 
areas, economic zones). These arrangements are part of the explicitly titled ‘gateway’ policy 
initiated in 2003 (Prime Ministerial Order n°181/2003/QĐ-TTg) in order to rationalise the process 
and provide investors with a single interface during the legal operations involved in the allocation 
of land use rights.  
These land development funds were defined in 2004 and 2006 by Orders NĐ 181/CP and 43/CP. 
According to Article 10 of the first order, the MoNRE and Ministry of the Interior are responsible 
for organising Land development fund activities (this fund goes by several names: Tổ chực phát 
triẻn quỹ đất, Trung tâm phát triển quỹ đất and Trung tâm hỗ trợ đâu tư), which are then decided 
by the provincial People’s Committee.  
In simple terms, the State sets the framework for this process and the provinces decide what 
institutional form these funds may take. This means that the provinces have some room to 
manoeuvre in the sense of having the opportunity to create this fund and deciding how it will 
function administratively. Thus, while it is administered at the neighbourhood level in 
metropolises like Hanoi, in other localities it functions at the provincial level, supposedly 
according to the complexity of the problems associated with funding land transactions. In theory it 
is autonomous, with a legal status defined by Order 43/CP, which determines the powers, 
autonomy, operational responsibilities, staff and financial management of entitities established by 
the State (Quy định quyền tự chủ, tự chịu trách nhiệm về thực hiện nhiệm vụ, tổ chức bộ máy, biên 
chế và tài chính đối với đơn vị sự nghiệp công lập). 
It is interesting to compare the funds that have been set up in various provinces – in Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hanoi in 2005, and in Duong Thap, Thanh Hoa, Quang Nam, Vinh Long and Duong Nai 
– to deal with predominantly local problems. For example, one of the functions of the fund in 
Thanh Hoa is to manage urban land that is covered by plans and has been requisitioned by the 
State. It is not involved in allocating or renting land; the goal is to optimise the resources for 
national finances. In terms of administrative structuring, the fund in Long An (created in June 
2007) only exists in one district (Can Duroc). It was specifically set up for two communes on the 
advice of the Centre for the promotion of investments and expertise (Trung tâm xúc tiến và tu vấn 
dầu tư), in order to manage about 20 hectares of land targeted for foreign investment.  
This centre, which was planned at the national level, represents one of the provincial 
accommodations envisaged by the legislature to deal with diverse situations across the country. 
Thus, in Binh Duong, this fund was created by Directive 01/2007/QĐ-UBND of 2nd January 2007, 
but has only functioned since early 2008 under the joint auspices of the Department for Natural 
Resources and the Environment and the Department of Internal Affairs. Its relations with the 
People’s Committee are clearly defined: it is responsible for managing its own affairs, but has to 
report to the People’s Committee on its activities (Article 9). Although it was very difficult to 
interview officials in Binh Duong, we know that the fund is run by an official from the provincial 
Department of Finance.  
The Centre’s missions are to organise, prepare and make land available for investors. More 
generally, this involves facilitating land application procedures and authorising investments with 
the different provincial and communal services. One of its functions is to centralise the money to 
be used as compensation for expropriations when start-up industrial or other activities are 
authorised. It is also responsible for overseeing changes in land use and users: making and 
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covering expenditure, and recovering land through compensation and/or resettlement (Article 42) 
in accordance with plans that have been approved but not executed. 
The Land development fund plays a key role as an interface between land users, investors and the 
authorities, supervising the transition between State and commercial land activities. It is a public 
service, but is distinct from the administration proper, and constitutes the general provincial 
framework for these transactions. Although there is another structure, the committee for the 
distribution of compensation (Ban giải tỏa đền bù), whose task is to manage virtually the same 
things but within a shorter time frame and in the context of a particular project, this ad hoc 
structure does not seem to have the same logistical or human resources as the Fund. The 
coexistence of these two structures is a matter that needs to be addressed at the national level, but 
these types of structure would need to coexist with private companies if the trial phase described 
below was rolled out at the national level.  
In theory, the official process for installing foreign investors is as follows: authorisation is sought 
at the national level, and compensation for the current land users is set in accordance with prices 
determined at the provincial level within the national-level framework. Once the allocation has 
been authorised by the government, detailed plans are drawn up at the provincial, district and 
communal levels. Serious investors are then invited to come forward, and the money is paid 
(investments and infrastructure-related expenses). At the end of this process, the land may be 
rented to other enterprises. 
The Fund’s mission is to centralise demand, follow procedures with all the relevant services and 
then deliver the response. In theory, the reform simplified the procedure while retaining the 
multiplicity of interlocuteurs, but certain aspects of the administrative process are still very 
unclear, including the amount of compensation that users whose land is expropriated will receive. 
In light of the dificulties associated with compensation and preparing the land for transfer in 
certain provinces like Binh Duong, the government recently authorised a private company to act 
on behalf of Ho Chi Minh City for a trial five-year period (Công ty cổ phần Đ ức Khải), 
recovering land and compensating current users (Theo H. Trâm, 2008). This prototype, which has 
been authorised in major agglomerations receiving substantial investments, should function in one 
of two ways:  
• After planning, the land is transferred to the company, which then compensates its former 
users. This ‘clean’ land (đất sạch) – in the sense that it is not associated with any conflict 
relating to compensation – is then returned to the authorities, which auction the rights to 
use it.35 The company keeps difference between the legal price and the bidding price; 
• The company transfers the land and compensates the current land users. It then auctions the 
land and gives the State a percentage of the revenue from the sale. 
This experimental model, whose mode of functioning is still under discussion, shows the 
limitations of the Land development funds and, more generally, the choices that the State has to 
make regarding its participation in the regulation of land matters. The main limitation is the 
Fund’s public service function, especially as the private sector plays an increasingly active role in 
land management. The State’s objective in this initiative is to formulate regulations that facilitate 
the creation of a new mechanism for commercial activities in domains that were previously the 
government’s preserve. This can either be seen as an attempt to harness complementary aspects of 
the two forces, or as evidence of the growing tension between the market and the State’s desire to 
remain a key player even though it lacks the resources to do so. 
                                                
35 As anticipated by the Land Law of 2003, Section VI, Article 58. 
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§ Formulating and revising development plans: Binh Duong as an example of ineffective 
planning 
Development plans are key land management tools, even though the previous section on the 
establishment of land institutions made very little mention of them. We can learn a lot from the 
way that the development plan for Binh Duong province was formulated and revised. 
Planning in Vietnam follows a retroactive principle set out in the Land Law of 2003. The process 
is as follows: the province formulates a plan for two five-year periods – hence the dual title quy 
hoạch (10-year plan or project) and kế hoạch (five-year plan),36 the first term denoting a general 
10-year development plan, and the second clarifying the fact that it is broken down into two five-
year periods.  
The plan for the province is prepared by actors at the national level. Some provinces use private 
firms to produce their plans, but Binh Duong does not do this on the grounds that they are not 
competent to do so. It prefers to use services like the MARD, MoNRE, General Cadastral Bureau 
(Tổng cục Địa chính), Institute for agricultural projects and planning (Viện quy hoạch thiết kế 
nông nghiệp) and one of the organs of the Ministry of Defence (Trắc địa bộ quốc phòng). 
Under central regulations, the provincial plan is approved by the Prime Minister (Article 26) and 
then becomes a government order. However, the provincial authorities often have a long wait 
before they actually receive their plans. In Binh Duong, the plan for 2000-2010 was approved at 
government level in 2005 – five years before the end of the period concerned. We were told that 
the district-level plan, which was formulated at the provincial level, was approved in 2007 (n° 
57/2007/NQ-CP), and that the communes only received their plans from the district in 2008. This 
is an important process because this type of plan is the only legal document that is authenticated 
and approved by the authorities; it becomes an official national document for the whole locality, 
and all other documents are derived from this initial 10-year plan, the quy hoạch.  
According to the process for establishing these plans, changes between the previous and the next 
plan are verified in such a way that if the envisaged changes relate to less than 10 per cent of the 
area concerned, the previous plan is extended and thus serves as the official plan (as prescribed in 
Order 181/CP).  
Halfway through the quy hoạch, the province produces a report that is evaluated by a national 
commission whose members represent various institutions and bodies associated with land use.37 
It should be noted that the provincial representatives play a technical role in this commission, not 
a political one.  
This report is presented to the provincial People’s Council and then to the government, which 
produces an order (n° 57/2007/NQ-CP) setting out the definitive plan for the province. In the plan 
for 2010, changes were made between the plan proposed by the province, the one in the 
ministerial report and the version that was finally enacted by the government.  
This shows the various margins that exist between the provincial People’s Committees, the 
ministerial authorities and the decisions made by the government. Although the differences are 
small, they reflect the choices made at the different administrative levels. For example, while 
Binh Duong had proposed reducing agricultural lands from 215,000 ha to 207,000 ha between 
2005 and 2010, the government decided to cut them further to 202,000 ha. 
                                                
36 The two terms quy hoạch and kế hoạch have very similar meanings in Vietnamese. In the translation of the 2003 
Land Law by the Maison du droit vietnamo-française, the first was translated as “development plan” and the second 
as “land use plan”. 
37 The deputy minister and head of cadastral services in the MoNRE, representatives from the government bureau, the 
Ministry of Construction, the MARD, the Minister for Industry, the Institute for Land Use Planning and 
Surveillance (Viện đi ều tra quy hoạch đ ất đai), the Sports Committee, the Ministry for Communications and 
Transport, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, the Ministry of Training and Education, the Party’s Central Economic 
Committee and representatives of the provincial People’s Committee (director, deputy director and civil servants 
from the DoNRE, deputy head of the Office for Planning and Investment). 
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The detailed plan for each district also reviews past and projected changes in land use by the 
State. Plans for the period between 2008 and 2010 confirm the major shift from agricultural land 
on the one hand (to the detriment of perennial crops) and on the other, the transformation of 
unused, largely non-agricultural lands. This plan also has to conform to another level of decision-
making, the Master Plan, which is simply a more general plan with a greater timespan, as it is 
supposed to cover socio-economic development up to 2002/2020 (81/2007/QD-TTg of 5th June 
2007). 
This bottom-up process of proposals and top-down validation/correction raises several questions. 
Firstly, the timing of the process means that plans are not validated until two or three years before 
they are due to end. The administrative process for the 2006-2010 plan was fairly long, and as the 
order for this plan was not approved until November 2007, this only left two years to enforce it. 
The districts deal with this problem by using the plan that has already been approved at a higher 
level, which leads to lack of clarity at the lower levels because the districts and department have 
to compose an informal transitional ‘plan’ in anticipation of the detailed plan being validated at 
some point in the future. The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development articulated the 
problem this raises: in the absence of a plan, how can productive activities be anticipated and/or 
encouraged? As there’s no point waiting five years to start planting fruit trees, lower-level 
administrative units and departments are given some degree of autonomy to structure their 
activities while awaiting official directives that are only valid as guidelines. 
The second question is linked with the first. In this process the administrative levels are 
interlinked and interdependent in two ways: since provincial planning already covers the districts 
and communes, what is the purpose of having plans validated at the provincial level, if not to 
endorse decisions that have already been taken? This point is being considered at the ministerial 
level, and the next land law of 2013 will eliminate planning at either the district or the communal 
level. The second point about the links between the different levels is that the same organs create 
and validate the plan for the province. The plan in Binh Duong is formulated by several 
institutions, which include Ho Chi Minh University of Agroforestry, an institute (viện quy hoạch 
thiết kế nông nghiệp) and the Ministry of the Environment at the national level. 
This set up leads to inertia, partly because of the numerous modifications made by each actor in 
the planning process. If we compare the proposed provincial plan with the government’s decision, 
we can see that the government did not follow Binh Duong’s proposals to substantially increase 
the amount of land set aside for forestry, urban housing, production and trade, and to maintain 
unused lands. It is difficult to assess the significance of these changes in the absence of any clear 
comments on the question, but it can probably be said that the State wished to influence land use 
in one of its provinces through the planning process – although its interest waned considerably as 
time elapsed.  
The third issue is the inability to verify retrospectively whether the plan has actually been 
executed. There is no guarantee that it will be possible to establish the difference between what 
was planned and what happened. The provincial authorities in Binh Duong say that they do not 
have the tools to verify that the plan for the previous period has been implemented, or at least that 
they cannot evaluate the difference between the previous plan and current reality. The other major 
problem raised by the Planning Department (Sở Quy hoạch kê hoạch) is that the province’s rapid 
development qickly renders plans obsolete. Given the combined absence of an assessment of the 
difference between the plans and the reality on the ground, and the speed at which plans are 
outstripped by change, it is not hard to see that these planning arrangements create various 
problems. In short, while the official reports may reflect a certain level of expertise, concrete 
action – following and monitoring the implementation of these plans (and thus having the 
willingness and/or resources to do so) – is clearly particularly problematic. 
Fourthly, in addition to the authorities’ difficulties in implementing and evaluating these plans, 
there is a major problem with the texts on planning, which provide the legal basis for the 
authorities’ action since they are signed by the Prime Minister. In theory, this makes it very 
difficult for the provinces to reverse decisions when the superior authorities have validated the 
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procedure. However, if all the spaces in a new industrial zones are occupied and an investor 
wishes to set up operations in the area, the province will not hesitate to change the plan 
retrospectively (or as it is under way) in order to accommodate them – thereby reducing the 
supposed authority of the plan and efficiency of the procedure. 
In conclusion, planning is beset by many problems, such as returns from inactive projects, critical 
equipment, crosscutting management and poor temporal organisation. All these elements combine 
to make planning a particularly ineffective element in the Vietnamese land system. 
3. The specific institutional treatment of forests and agricultural lands  
In order to get to the heart of our research question, this final section will focus on the specificities 
of agricultural and forested lands in the land legislation and land administration, in order to show 
their particular status and consider its consequences for rural households. 
These lands are treated differently in several respects: 
• Use rights are allocated to rural households free of charge, and taxes on their income were 
abolished in 2004 with the enforcement of the National Assembly’s Resolution n° 
15/2003/QH11 regarding the removal or reduction of taxes on agricultural land use; 
• Rights to use land for perennial crops are allocated for a specific, very short, period  (20 
years). The initial 50-year period for forests was abolished in 2007, and these lands are 
now allocated for unlimited periods; 
• The amount of land for which rural households may be assigned use rights free of charge is 
still regulated: 3 hectares for annual crops and 10 hectares for perennial crops on plains (30 
ha for perennial crops in mountain areas), and 30 hectares for forest lands. Those wishing 
to acquire more land can rent it, paying annual rent equivalent to 0.5 per cent of the land’s 
value; 
• The State makes special arrangements to protect the use of agricultural and forest lands. 
Thus, Article 36 of the 2003 Land Law stipulates that prior authorisation is required for 
changes in the allocation of land set aside for crops (irrigated rice, multi-annual 
plantations, forestry or aquaculture), special and protected forests, and the reallocation of 
agricultural land for non-agricultural use. The reallocation of other types of land does not 
require prior authorisation, but should still be registered with People’s Committee in the 
commune. The arrangements in the law of 2003 offer households much more flexibility 
and freedom than that of 1993, but do not change Article 6 of this law, which stipulates 
that land can only be used for the purpose specified at the time of allocation. And while it 
theoretically authorises changes in allocation, the legislation of 2003 seriously restricts 
rural households’ room to manoeuvre, even with regard to possible changes in the crops 
they grow on their agricultural land. Any changes entail fairly lengthy formalities, and 
must comply with planning. Within agricultural lands (including forests), rice fields are 
subject to special ‘surveillance’, as set out in Article 74: 
 
“The State makes all useful arrangements to ensure the protection of land set aside exclusively 
for irrigated rice, and limits the reallocation of such land for non-agricultural use. When it is 
necessary to reallocate some of this land, the State will take the necessary measures to increase 
the area under irrigated rice or improve the effectiveness of this type of land use”. 
 
Recent measures have reduced the constraints and spatial and temporal restrictions on issuing land 
use rights. For example, the article in the law of 1998 stipulates that at the end of the initial 
allocation, the State should reallocate land to users who express an interest in it provided they 
have used the land productively and complied with current regulations. This article is repeated in 
Article 67 of the law of 2003 (with an additional specification that the land use should comply 
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with the land use plan), which guarantees households continued use rights beyond the duration of 
the initial allocation. 
As already noted, there are also arrangements favouring the establishment of large-scale farms, or 
tran trai. The easing of restrictions on land transactions means that large farms that exceed the 
areas defined by the law can be created under rental regimes, which are subject to land tax and 
taxes on the revenues generated by production. There are also opportunities to make large 
investments in agricultural and forestry enterprises, and profit from measures to expropriate land 
and create vast estates dedicated to industrial production.  
We should also mention the case of forests, which became a sub-category of agricultural lands 
with the law of 2003. This classification raises the specific nature of forests, and indicates a 
functional approach to this type of land. There is nothing particularly new in this approach, which 
first emerged in 1993 with the affirmation of willingness to allocate forests to individuals. It was 
reinforced by this arrangement and corroborated by the progressive but discreet recognition of the 
need to make room for local populations and their activities in these spaces, including the most 
protected areas. Article 77 of the 2003 Land Law stipulates that “From now on, the body charged 
with managing forest lands set aside for special use may allocate such lands within strictly 
protected areas to family households and individuals that do not have the opportunity to leave 
these areas, so that they may use these lands for a short period, and in order to protect the 
forests”. 
However, forests are still covered by protective arrangements, and remain under a very specific 
regime that is partly defined outside the framework of land tenure (in particular the 2004 ‘Law on 
the protection and development of forests’), which is very restrictive for households. 
In simple terms (Mellac, 2002), rural households supposedly have three possible levels of access 
to the ‘forest lands’ they have traditionally used:  
• Almost total lack of access when forests are classified:38 as in national parks and reserves 
where land is not allocated to individuals (except in the case of Article 77 below), and 
which the public may only access for recreational purposes; 
• Highly regulated access and use when they are allocated land: with productive forests 
(directly allocated) and protected forests (allocated to State management bodies and 
assigned to households through contracts), households decide on the location or amount of 
land they are allocated, how they can use it and how it may be shared between households; 
• Access and use is tolerated but highly restricted for all other lands, with the possibility of 
gathering non-protected plants and dead wood, but exclusively for domestic use. 
Although one would hope that the allocation of individual use rights would give households a 
greater margin of freedom (and enable them to become actors in forests), it actually creates 
considerable constraints. Households become criminally liable for their parcels and are often 
allocated parcels for purposes that are of little practical use to them (uncommercial plantations, 
protected woodlands). And use rights are even more restricted than before the allocation, insofar 
as it ends the previous vagueness regarding the classification of forests, and for the first time 
restricts land use according to types of forest that did not exist under customary forestry systems. 
Apart from the spatial restrictions on use, the land law offers far fewer derived rights to forests 
than to agricultural lands. While users of productive forests have the right to transfer, mortgage, 
                                                
38  Forests are divided into three cateogries, described since 1991 in the ‘Law on the protection and development of 
forests’ and again, with modifications to the sub-categories, in the law of 2004. According to Article 4 of this law, 
these are: ‘specific use forests’ [rung dac diêm] which broadly correspond to what are generally known as 
‘classified forests’, and usually include ‘national parks’ and ‘natural reserves’. Two other categories, ‘protected 
country areas’ and ‘experimental and scientific research forests’ are more specific to Vietnam; ‘productive 
forests’[rung san xuât] which are primarily set aside for the production and marketing of timber and non-timber 
forest products;  ‘protected forests’ [rung phong hô] where it is not so much the forest cover as the wider 
environment that is protected, along with water sources (95% of ‘protected forests’ in 2004), measures to combat 
erosion and desertification [sic], disaster prevention and climate regulation. 
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rent, bequeath, give away and use their land use certificates as a capital contribution up to the 
level of investment made on the parcels (mainly plantations), those allocated protected and natural 
protected forests have none of these rights, and are thus ‘captive’ users unable to choose either 
how they use their parcels or what becomes of their use rights. 
The existence of a specific legal framework for forests also poses certain problems with regard to 
land tenure. Tenure of this kind of land is covered by two regimes: one for forests and one for 
land. The question of forests is addressed in the 2003 Land Law, and the 2004 ‘Law on the 
protection and development of forests’ contains articles regarding the allocation of land use rights, 
provision of certificates, taxation and planning relating to forests. Therefore, any land-related 
activity involves reference to a large number of texts (for both regimes). However, while the two 
laws are full of arrangements that are supposed to prevent any major contradictions between them 
(the forestry law often refers to the land law), the specific treatment of forests is full of grey areas 
and even ‘contradictions’. The most obvious case is that of planning. In the interests of continuity, 
Chapter II of the forestry law indicates that the MARD is responsible for planning, for forest 
protection and development plans, and for submitting these to the Prime Minister for approval. 
But while it clearly states that this planning (and the plans) should be compatible at each level 
with “the overall socio-economic, defense and security development planning and plans; the 
forestry development strategies, the land-use plannings and plans” (Article 13), it is not clear 
whether it is the MARD or the MoNRE (which has overall responsibility for land use plans) that 
has the capacity to decide on land use planning. There is also the longstanding question 
(originating from the significant variations in the amount of forest lands declared by the bodies 
that provide data) of knowing how to define forest lands and distinguish them from agricultural 
lands. 
The final point that we would like to make regarding the specificity of agricultural lands and 
forests is the appearance of a new type of user: residential communities (Cộng đ ồng dân cứ), 
which are only recognised in the case of these lands, and which, as we have mentioned, are 
allocated unlimited amounts of such land for unspecified periods, free of charge. Like Article 77 
of the land law, which authorises the allocation of classified forests to households, the creation of 
this new category shows the State’s willingness to take better account of local populations’ needs 
and practices. More specifically, this arrangement contradicts the desire (affirmed since 1993) to 
individualise use rights. However, it seems to us that this arrangement is more of a temporary 
concession – aimed at satisfying the demand from certain foreign organisations and resolving 
temporary problems such as delayed allocations or non-compliance with allocations – than a 
sustainable alternative. This is particularly obvious in the lack of space given to this very specific 
category in various pieces of legislation: two articles in the forestry law and mere mentions in the 
land law. The lack of attention given to this category can even be seen in the way that it is 
defined, especially in the forestry law, which defines ‘residential village communities’ as 
communities “with the same customs, practices and traditions, and characterised by communal 
modes of production, living, culture and beliefs closely associated with the forests; and capable of 
managing forests”. Apart from the need to be able to demonstrate the existence of a common 
identity as defined in the land law, this implies a specific way of life and skills that the district 
(which has the power to allocate community use rights) needs to know how to assess. Lastly, the 
limitations imposed on communities that hold forest lands are such that they make the 
arrangement uninviting or even inoperable. Article 30 of the forestry law lists several fundamental 
prohibitions:  
 
Not to divide forests among their members; not to convert, transfer, donate, lease, mortgage, 
provide guarantee or contribute business capital with, the value of the use rights over the 
assigned forests (Article 30 of the 2004 forestry law). 
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4. Land categories and the nature of assigned land rights: a compromise 
resembling ‘market socialism’ 
Our analysis of the land legislation highlights two points that we believe to be of particular 
significance for projects in Vietnam. 
The first concerns the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural lands. Although the 
conditions for the allocation of use rights to agricultural lands (and forests) are more flexible in 
the law of 2003, the spatial and temporal constraints still attached to them give these lands a 
specific status that clearly distinguishes them from non-agricultural land.  The arrangements for 
non-agricultural lands are implemented in such a way as to accelerate their commodification and 
concentration, while in some ways agricultural lands and forests are treated as a common good 
that should benefit the largest number of people, and upon which the country’s stability partly 
depends. This can be seen in the State’s continued close involvement, which is aimed at ensuring 
that they are distributed equitably between rural households – raising the question of whether 
Vietnam is moving towards a two-tier land system where some land (the great mass of 
agricultural and forest lands allocated free of charge) still has to be managed by the central 
government in the common interest, while the rest is mobilised in order to contribute to the 
country’s economic enrichment.  
The second point concerns the nature of the rights assigned to households. Since the Constitution 
of 1992, the State has retained ownership of all lands in the name of the people as a whole. Over 
the course of time and through various pieces of legislation (especially that of 1993 and 2003), an 
ever-growing number of users have had their use rights recognised, and Vietnamese individuals 
and households have been granted very extensive sub-rights to these use rights (foreigners can 
only obtain use rights by renting land). Therefore, one might say that there are two levels of land 
ownership in Vietnam. The State has public ownership of all lands, which, although they are 
public, it allocates as an individual means of production to households and groups that then have 
what could be called (provided we do not limit ourselves to the definition of ownership rights 
under French law) ‘individual ownership’ rights. This is non-exclusive ownership, acquired by 
obtaining use rights that are directly allocated by the State or transferred with its approval. The 
texts say that the State allocates the right to use land that belongs to it (see section on the law of 
2003), although State ownership is defined as not being full since it has the duty to allocate land 
and can only resume its use under certain conditions and according to specific procedures. 
Therefore, one could say that no one has full ownership rights (and consquently that we should 
not talk about ownership rights) or, conversely, that everyone has limited ownership rights. In the 
case of agricultural lands, individual ownership is spatially and temporally limited (surplus land 
that is used productively should be rented, and use rights are of limited duration) and conditional, 
since the land use is defined according to the category to which it belongs. So this is still not 
private ownership, even if its looks like a form of ownership due to the variety of rights available 
to users and, since 2003, the stability of these rights.  
Therefore, agricultural land is a common good to which individual ownership rights are 
assigned.39 Is this a contradiction, or a compromise designed to make the ongoing liberal reforms 
more acceptable and take temporary control over them? 
Some of the tensions associated with land tenure exist more generally in Vietnam as a whole. The 
country is now being pulled between two types of demand. On the one hand, it has to maintain the 
appearance of living up to Marxist ideology that is still held up as the basis of major political 
choices, and keep a predominantly agricultural and rural grassroots happy. On the other hand, 
there are the demands associated with the decision to develop a market economy and the need to 
please the new entrepreneurs, foreign actors and, more generally, the more affluent middle classes 
who wish to invest in the country.  
                                                
39 This proposition needs to be verified (and possibly invalidated) by specialists in land law who have closely 
examined the nature of the rights held by different land actors. In order to avoid replicating any possible errors in 
the rest of this text, we decided to call rights allocated as use rights “land use rights” rather than “individual 
ownership rights”. 
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How do different land actors view the tension that can exist between these two types of demand? 
Is it taken into account, and is it seen in a positive or negative light?  
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IV. HOW LAND IS PERCEIVED BY THE ACTORS CONCERNED  
This paper only considers some of the actors that have had an impact on land in Vietnam. Our 
surveys focused on those who have been given or periodically assumed the task of ‘building’ 
institutions, that is to say, who have played a direct or indirect – but always open and official – 
role in the evolution of the legal texts and management structures relating to land. In other words, 
we decided to stay with the institutions and consider their emergence from the viewpoint of those 
who created and mostly work within them. 
In doing so, we do not take account of private economic actors such as industrialists and 
investors, who may nevertheless play a major role in land-related decisions because of their 
capacity to influence decision-makers in their favour. Nor do we take account of civil society, 
which has reacted in many ways and is now theoretically consulted on certain texts.  
This bias is justified by the huge array of actors that play a role in land, the impossibility of taking 
them all into account at the national level in the context of this project, and the hidden or diffuse 
nature of their impact. To our knowledge, economic actors are still not called upon to participate 
officially in the process of transforming institutions, which means that they tend to operate more 
through hidden lobbying or corruption that is difficult to identify. And while civil society has 
certainly been asked to express itself through official channels, its real impact is not felt at all in 
these channels, but through resistance at the local level (‘everyday resistances’) or, increasingly, 
demonstrations aimed at the national level that do not always lead to a process of open dialogue 
with the authorities. 
Therefore, the actors that feature in this study are mainly the national institutions most directly 
concerned with land (and their members), either because they are directly reponsible for its 
management and for proposing legislation (MoNRE, MARD, Ministry of Construction, etc.) or 
because they contribute to thinking related to this issue (research centres). Within these 
institutions, it should be noted that the Communist Party and the Central Committee play an 
extremely important but virtually invisible role. We found it impossible to question members of 
these bodies in their official capacity. Many of the people that we met are members of the Party, 
some operating at very high levels, but we never spoke to them on this basis, nor they us. It 
should also be noted that the members of Vietnamese institutions that we met made very few 
direct allusions to the role of the Party, which thus remains barely visible but ever-present, as is 
generally the case in Vietnamese society. 
There are also foreign, national and international institutions, private organisations (NGOs), semi-
private bodies (development banks) and public entities that have been called upon to participate in 
the transformation process by providing technical expertise and financial assistance, to pilot 
projects or even just to advise on the framework for the decision-making process in which they 
have participated. When all is said and done, it is these bodies that cooperate with the Vietnamese 
institutions in land matters. 
This section starts with a brief description of the actors that play an important role in building 
institutions. We then look at the mechanisms for creating and developing institutions as revealed 
in our interviews with these actors, and their roles in these mechanisms. The last two sections 
consider how these actors perceive and analyse the evolution of the land system from a functional 
and strategic viewpoint and, more specifically, the question of agricultural and forest lands. 
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1. Land actors  
This section aims to describe the actors identified as playing a role in the creation of institutions 
and to evaluate their relative weight in this process on the basis of their known activities.  
1.1 The hierarchical structure of institutional actors 
The diagram of the process used to formulate the Vietnamese legislative system, as it appears in 
the Constitution of 1992 (Annex A.1.2), shows that this is a hierarchical process, at least at the 
national level. 
• The first level, which is not shown on the diagram because it is not described in the 
Constitution, is the Party and its Central Committee, whose 113 members include 64 chiefs 
of provincial Party cells and members of the government, the National Assembly and 
representatives of mass organisations. The Party does not legislate, but publishes policy 
guidelines that have a major influence on the orientations of legal texts, and on defining 
legal priorities. The Party’s Central Committee meets in congress every five years, when 
the priorities for the next five and 10 years are set. These priorities are published and 
disseminated throughout the country. Much of the last congress (10th Congress), which was 
held in 2006, was devoted to economic questions. The Central Committee meets 
occasionally between congresses and takes resolutions (nghị quyết) that redefine current 
priorities. One recent resolution concerned the ‘three nông’ (nông nghiệp, nông thôn và 
nông dân), which were already under discussion. This helped add weight to and push 
through current projects to reform rural land. 
• The second level is the National Assembly, which holds constitutional and legislative 
powers. It adopts laws and can repeal acts passed by any other organ of power. Legal texts 
may be proposed by the government, or the National Assembly can ask the government to 
work on texts, ask for a new text to be produced or an existing one to be revised. In the 
case of important texts it can set up a working committee to supervise the whole process 
and thus oversee the work of the government. The Permanent Committee of the National 
Assembly also adopts orders or decisions (quyết định) proposed by the National Assembly, 
which means that decisions can be taken without the need for the National Assembly to 
meet. Orders generally relate to specific topical matters, and may subsequently be adopted 
during a session of the National Assembly.  
• The third level is the government, which proposes draft laws and orders, takes decisions 
(quyết định) and issues decrees (nghị định) allowing the law to be enforced. For example, 
the implementation of the land laws is decided, guided and can also be clarified by decrees. 
The 2003 Land Law states more than 10 times that “the Government – or the MoNRE – 
will regulate or organise the details…” of points that will then be covered by decrees. The 
Prime Minister has special powers within government in that he can repeal its decisions 
and any texts adopted at the provincial level and below. However, he can only interrupt 
and propose the cancellation of resolutions taken by the legislative power at the provincial 
level (the People’s Council), which gives him certain power to control it, but not to make 
decisions at this level. 
• The fourth level is another one that does not feature in the diagram. This is the ministry 
within the government that is responsible for preparing legal texts, which may be new laws 
or their enforcement orders. When a new text needs to be prepared, a working group is 
either set up by the government or proposed by the National Assembly, and managed by 
the ministry most directly concerned with the matters covered by the law. In the case of 
land, this is the MoNRE. One member of this ministry, drawn from the GDLA 
management (director or deputy director) is specifically responsible for the working group. 
Other members of the working group are chosen from the other ministries most concerned 
with the law. For the land law, this includes the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
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Development, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry 
of Planning and Investment and the Minsitry of Finance, plus another member of the 
MoNRE who is responsible for the environment. This group is responsible for organising 
every stage of preparing the text. 
• The fifth level is in some ways the ‘technical ‘level’. It is like a less formal version of the 
fourth level, as actors are periodically brought in to do more in-depth work on the text. 
This work will be decribed in more detail later in this paper. These actors include members 
of the aforementioned ministries and, on certain specific points, members of other 
ministries less directly concerned. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be 
brought in to determine whether the texts for the land law are in line with international 
agreements that have been signed. This group also includes lawyers, who are responsible 
for writing the text itself, and thus for its form. In the case of the land law, the lawyer was a 
university professor specialising in land matters. Because of their experience and 
knowledge of the history of Vietnam and the legislation of other countries, he and some of 
his colleagues were also consulted on the content of the text. 
Finally, it should be noted that like the national level, the provincial level (as described in the 
Constitution) is divided in two, with the People’s Council representing the legislature making 
resolutions on one side, and the executive People’s Committee on the other side making 
decisions, issuing decrees and enforcing resolutions passed by the People’s Council.  
1.2 Foreign cooperation: ‘enter the World Bank!’ 
As we can see from the table presented in Annex 1.7 (Foreign donors involved in the legal system 
in 2006), there is now very active international involvement in Vietnam’s legal domain. This 
table, which is based on incomplete data, shows that over 200 projects partly funded by foreign 
donors were under way in 2006. It also highlights the considerable fragmentation of aid in this 
arena, with 18 foreign countries and a dozen international organisations providing legislative 
support, and most donors intervening in several, sometimes very different, sectors. The original 
document (which was a 40-page table and is therefore only presented in part here) gives an even 
clearer picture of this fragmentation as it goes into far more detail than we do on the particular 
domains covered by these projects. It also shows (which our table does not) the large number of 
State bodies involved in projects, as 12 ministries appear in the matrix, along with 10 national-
level organs (such as the National Assembly and its bureau, the Peoples’ Supreme Court, the 
Government Bureau, the National Bank of Vietnam, universities and so on) and provincial bodies 
(such as provincial People’s Committees). 
This multiplicity of actors, which is justified by the significance of the issues at stake, the amount 
of work involved and the thematic scope of the legal system, led to questions about the actors 
operating in this domain, and prompted the authorities to formulate a Legal System Development 
Strategy (LSDS) for the period 2006-2020. This was adopted by the Politburo in 2005. 
Implementation of this strategy is supported by an international project funded by the UNDP, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and the Ministry of Justice, with the stated objective of 
assisting Vietnam in establishing the rule of law in order to ensure its transition to a market 
economy and entry into the international arena. It intervenes in four more specific domains: 
improving the process of producing legislation and the quality of this legislation, improving the 
capacity of State organs to enforce the law, the distribution and quality of human resources (at 
every level), and putting in place an information and dissemination system in the legal domain. 
Willingness to address the legal system as a whole can also be seen in the constitution of a 
working group on legal matters (Legal partnership Group) composed of nearly 50 Vietnamese 
and foreign experts, and monthly informal Donor Governance Forums held under the auspices of 
the UNDP to allow donors working on governance issues to exchange information (World Bank, 
2003).  
However, given the extreme complexity of the current process, these efforts are unlikely to be 
able to resolve all the problems posed by the rapid and intensive introduction of a very new legal 
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system in an institutional environment that is still being established, and a context of cooperation 
that is neither entirely free of competition nor entirely rational (project replication). All of these 
problems exist in the domain of land, albeit to a slightly lesser degree. 
It is interesting to note that land is barely mentioned in the matrix of donors involved in legal 
affairs. It only appears twice in the matrix for 2006, and then in the context of a single project, the 
Swedish Cooperation programme on Strengthening Capacity of Land and Environment 
Management (SEMLA), a bilateral Swedish and Vietnamese initiative that we will return to later 
in this paper. This is very little compared with the 17 actions relating to Vietnam’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and nine projects dealing with this specific question.  
Unsurprisingly, it turns out that land-related actions were not confined to one major project in 
2006: closer inspection reveals a web of actors and projects covering land matters, which becomes 
extremely complex when all the projects with a land component are taken into account. Many 
more or less localised rural development and/or environmental protection projects have a land 
dimension, and are involved in the allocation of use rights to agricultural and/or forestry land in 
villages, communes or, more rarely, districts or watersheds. This was the case with the FAO’s 
integrated rural development project, Participatory Watershed Management in Hoanh Bô District, 
Quang Ninh Province, GCP/VIE/019/BEL, in which we participated in 1996. Our task was to 
support the competent authorities in the province of Quang Ning and the Yen Lap Watershed 
Development Board in allocating use rights to protected forest lands, and help produce a 
computerised inventory of the forest and a computerised land register. The local impacts of such 
projects, which are legion in Vietnam, are not negligeable, and add to the prevailing confusion 
over land matters. It is also worth noting all the large-scale projects (institutional support for 
particular provinces, multi-sectoral poverty reduction projects, etc.) that incorporate a land 
component and are endeavouring to accelerate land titling. However, not all of these projects 
participate in the process of producing land institutions, or only do so fairly indirectly,40 and 
relatively few actors play a really important role in this process. 
§  Historical actors 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
In an interview that he granted us, M. Dang Hung Vo argued that the UNDP was probably the 
first foreign body to show an interest in land affairs in the early 1990s. His view was that all 
questions relating to the law were primarily political at that point, and that foreign actors in 
Vietnam were reluctant (and probably unable?) to venture into this domain. Having been in 
Vietnam for longer than most other development agencies (since reunification), the UNDP could 
use its legitimacy to venture into what was then one of the most sensitive of all arenas. It made a 
measured contribution, restricting itself to funding technical assistance between 1991 and 1994. 
After assisting the land administration with a feasibility study on putting in place a modern land 
management system (Dang and Palmkvist, 2001), it then paid little more direct attention to land 
matters, and any further association with land was given through projects dedicated to related 
issues (such as the UNDP Urban Environmental and Planning Project in Hanoi, VIE/97/007), 
which were also supported by the Swiss. On the UNDP website land now appears as a marginal 
aspect of its activities in Vietnam, featuring as element of very localised rural development 
projects. Most of it efforts are focused on institutional matters, with support for the legal and 
administrative system as a whole (for example, by participating in the Legal System Development 
Strategy support project). 
The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 
The Australian Agency for International Development is an equally longstanding land actor in 
Vietnam, having co-financed and implemented the technical assistance project to modernise the 
land management system with the UNDP. Since then, there has been very little significant activity 
                                                
40  See, for example, our oral presentation at the UNDP/FAO/GTZ National Workshop on Land Use Planning and 
Forest Land Allocation held in Hanoi in 1997, based on the results of this project 
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by AusAID in the land sector, as (according to its website http://www.ausaid.gov.au/vietnam/ 
projects.cfm) it has focused on poverty reduction, health (especially HIV), following up entry into 
the WTO, and the financial and commercial sectors in general. Nevertheless, AusAID is often 
referred to in reports thanks to the publication of a working paper on the land administration in 
2000. 
The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
The Swedish cooperation is the third organisation mentioned here because it started intervening in 
land a little later than UNDP and AusAID. However, it is a much more important actor in terms of 
both the amount it has invested in this domain and its sustained support. Sweden is also a historic 
partner of Vietnam, as the Swedish cooperation has had a presence in the country since the 1960s 
when, according to the Swedish ambassador in Vietnam (http://www.swedenabroad.com/), the 
Swedish public supported calls to stop the war in Vietnam. Sweden has also supported the 
ongoing reform process since the launch of Doi Moi at the end of the 1980s, with less political 
activities whose main focus has been timber production.  
Sweden is currently involved in land matters through a much bigger initiative, the huge five-year 
Strengthening Environmental Management and Land Administration programme (SEMLA) 
agreed between SIDA and the MoNRE to run from 2005 to 2009 (launched on 15th November 
2004). According to the official presentation, the objectives of this programme were to “improve 
Vietnam’s capacity at the national, provincial and local levels to prevent and control pollution 
and to provide equitable and effective services in the domains of land registration, land-related 
information and planning, and the evaluation of land prices” (ibid.). This programme is itself the 
descendant of two previous projects, Strengthening of the Environmental Management Authority 
in Vietnam (SEMA), and Sweden Cooperation Programme on Land Administration Reform 
(CPLAR), which were funded from 1997 to 2003.41 In the years before the CPLAR project was 
put in place, SIDA provided assistance to the GDLA through technical and methodological 
studies. This cooperation led to backing for the CPLAR project, a specific cooperation agreement 
between the two institutions originally signed for 10 years. The first phase of CPLAR included six 
projects: Land Legislation, Cadastral Mapping, Land Use Mapping & Planning, Land Valuation 
and Land Registration, Land Information System and Programme Management (Dang and 
Palmkvisk, 2001).  
In their article, Dang Hung Vo and Gösta Palmkvist, who was the technical advisor to CPLAR 
(ibid.), suggest that this project could be seen as the most important land-related project in 
Vietnam at the time. Although it has since been outstripped by investments made by the World 
Bank, the project still retains a powerful financial presence,42 and is distinguished by the number 
and scope of its actions in this domain. SIDA is also an actor that has invested heavily in land for 
many years. Over time it has developed a network of international experts extending way beyond 
Sweden that it mobilises in pursuit of its objectives (for example, it calls upon the company 
Infoterra Ltd, a member of the EADS group specialising in geomatic solutions). SIDA has also 
chosen to intervene directly in this domain at the national level through the MoNRE and, more 
                                                
41  The first phase of the CPLAR project received 88 million Swedish krona (SEK), with contributions of 65 million 
from Sweden and 23 million from Vietnam. Sweden initially contributed 200 million SEK to the SEMLA 
programme, while Vietnam provided 50 million SEK. At the time of writing (August 2008), 1 Swedish krona was 
worth US$ 0.156, which meant that Sweden had invested about US$3.12 million in the SEMLA project. 
42  “SEMLA promotes an integrated approach to natural resources, including land and environmental management. 
Two key processes linking land and environment are land use planning (LUP) and strategic and environmental 
impact assessments (SEA and EIA). The programme links national policy development, drafting of legislation and 
preparation of technical guidelines on the one hand and the application of policy and legislation at the local 
(province, district and commune) levels. This is done through the implementation of pilots and demonstration 
projects and feeding back the relevant experience to the policy level. The direct beneficiaries of SEMLA are the 
poor in rural and urban areas. The programme aims at strengthening the land use rights and the provisions of 
land related services to these households, as well as mitigating the hazards from pollution and degradation of 
natural resources. In addition, government officials and others directly involved in the programme at national, 
provincial, district and commune levels will benefit from the capacity building activities” 
(http://www.semla.org.vn/)  
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specifically the GDLA, which gives it numerous solid inside contacts and significant impact. 
However, it should also be noted that it publishes very little, and is not an easily accessible 
organisation.  
§  A new, dominant actor 
The World Bank  
Despite being a very new actor on the scene, the World Bank has been called upon to become a 
dominant player in Vietnamese land matters. The first of its projects to be directly – and solely – 
concerned with land was the US$100 million Land Administration Project that began in March 
2008 (http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=64624210& 
theSitePK=2748750&menuPK=2805043&Projectid=P096418). Vietnam contributed US$25 
million to this project, the International Development Association (IDA43) provided US$70 
million, and bilateral donors a further US$5 million. As this is a very recent project, there was no 
documentation describing its activities when this paper was written, and it is still too early to 
determine what impact it has had. However, its sheer size suggests that this will be considerable. 
It should also be noted that the implementation of this programme constitutes a kind of reversal of 
Vietnamese policy on land matters. Dang and Palmksvist (2001) indicate that in the period 
between 1994 and 1997 the World Bank approached the GDLA several times to discuss the 
pertinence of providing soft loans to finance the project to modernise the land management 
system (estimated at US$360 million).  In the end, however, the Vietnamese government decided 
to finance the project through the State budget.  
This project represents a kind of victory for the World Bank’s policy on land, and recognition of 
its actions in Vietnam. This is acknowledged in the project document, which also shows that it 
had previously been far from inactive in this domain: “The country program has a number of land 
related activities already. Land-policy issues represent a major theme in PRSCs I-V as well as the 
forthcoming PRSC cycle. The Bank has carried out a number of AAA work related to land--land 
consolidation review; poverty assessments, environment and poverty nexus, ethnic minority 
development, land markets and private sector development, and land policy synthesis. Various 
aspects of land administration are also addressed in on-going investment projects such as 
Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project (VUUP) and Information Communication Technology (ICT) 
(with a particular focus on the registration of property in urban areas) and Agriculture 
Diversification Project, Forest Protection & Rural Development Project, and Forest Sector 
Development Project (with a particular focus on land allocation and issuance of LURCs in rural 
areas)”.44 In its strategy document for Vietnam for the period 2003-2007 (World Bank, 2002), the 
World Bank also planned to step up its interventions in the reform of the land administration in 
the following years, in the context of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC).  
To give an idea of the structure and content of this project, an extract of the project document, 
which is available online, is presented in the box below (it partly retains the original structure but 
eliminates numerous points). 
 
                                                
43  “The IDA is a World Bank institution (created in 1960) that assists the poorest countries on the planet. IDA’s action 
complements that of the other World Bank lending mechanism – the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) – which provides middle-income countries with advisory services and capital to fund their 
expenditure on amenities. The IBRD and IDA share the same staff and the same headquarters, and evaluate 
projects according to the same rigorous standards. The IDA is one of the principal aid donors to 78 of the most 
deprived countries in the world, 39 of which are in Africa. It is the main source of donor funding for basic social 
services in the poorest countries. The Association lends money (known as credits) at low interest rates. In other 
words, IDA credits are interest-free, with repayments spread over a period of 35-40 years, including a 10-year 
grace period”. (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/). 
44  The document also states that “The World Bank has financed more than one hundred and seventy land 
administration and management projects throughout the world including more than a dozen land administration 
and management projects in EAP [East Asia and Pacific] since the early 1980s as well as land management 
components in projects in Vietnam”. 
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Land Administration Project 
Date of approval: 27th March 2008 
 Country and Sector Background 
Land reform represents a centrepiece of the doi moi process and is widely recognized as one 
of the most important drivers of Vietnam’s rapid growth and poverty reduction. The 
promulgation of the 2003 Land Law represents the recent landmark development that further 
enhances land users’ rights and lays out a comprehensive legal framework for developing a 
modern land administration and management. However, the existing land administration 
system has a number of weaknesses including:  
(a) incompleteness of granting land users with Land Use Right Certificates (LURCs), 
especially in urban and upland areas;  
(b) insufficient infrastructure for effective operation of the land administration system from 
cadastral mapping, land titling, registration of land transactions, record management to the 
provision of land administration services;  
(c) the lack of public awareness and limited capacity of land administration staff, especially 
at the commune and district levels. 
B. Objectives 
The development objective of this project is to increase land information access by all 
stakeholders through the development of an improved land administration system in selected 
provinces of Vietnam. This objective will be achieved through ensuring that land users 
including businesses and households have access to more efficient and reliable services from 
land administration. A transparent land administration system will contribute to good 
governance and further strengthen trust of local people in land related development activities 
in the country. 
 Description 
The project will finance, over a period of five years, the following main components and 
activities in nine provinces. 
• Modernization of the Land Registration System Component (US$ 85.76 million) would 
support the development of an accurate, current, and complete information system to support 
land registration. 
• Improvement of Land Registration Service Delivery Component (US$ 7.27 million) would 
support improvement of land registration office service delivery; provision of access to land 
registration and land use data through all land registration offices; and implementation of a 
program to promote awareness by the public of land information availability and enhance 
participation in the processes to complete and update land records and surveying. 
• Support to Project Management and M&E Component (US$ 6.97 million) would support 
overall implementation of the project through activities aimed to strengthen project 
management capacity and enhance monitoring and evaluation to provide timely feedback for 
management actions.  
 Implementation 
The project will be implemented at the central level by MONRE and at local levels by 
respective Provincial People’s Committees (PPCs). MONRE will be responsible for overall 
project implementation on behalf of the GOV and implement nation-wide project activities. 
A National Project Steering Committee (NPSC), chaired by MONRE Vice Minister, has 
already been established with the aim to ensure effective cross sector and vertical guidance 
and coordination.  
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A Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) would be established, headed by a Project 
Director, to assist MONRE in day-to-day supervision and implementation. In particular, 
CPMU will provide technical support, planning and monitoring, financial management and 
procurement, and administrative services. The Provincial People’s Committees (PPCs) will 
be responsible for overall coordination within their provinces, while district and commune 
people’s committees are accountable for coordinating project implementation within their 
districts and communes. Field implementation will be carried out by the Provincial Land 
Registration Office (PLRO) under the provincial Departments of Natural Resources and 
Environment (DONRE) and District Land Registration Offices (DLROs) under the district 
Sections of Natural Resources and Environment (SONREs), or SONREs themselves 
wherever DLROs do not exist.  
 Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector 
• Country’s Ownership and particularly government leadership and active participation of 
other stakeholders at each level, is vital. 
• Gradual approach and simple design is needed.  
• Strong project management is essential. 
§ Secondary actors 
As far as we know, these are the only four institutions that have put in place projects directly 
concerned with land – although this does not mean that other development organisations and 
donors are not interested in this domain. Several other donors, such as the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Netherlands Development Institute, the ADB and FAO have 
worked on land policies or provided technical support in establishing the land register or land 
planning, either at the national level with the GDLA, or with the provincial People’s Committees. 
As we have already noted, many organisations have considered the question of land in the context 
of multi-sectoral projects or projects in other domains. For example, projects developed by the 
ADB to combat corruption look closely at the issue of speculation and land transactions. In this 
group of so-called ‘secondary’ actors, there are two that seem to have been particularly 
significant. 
German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
Through its long and close involvement in forestry, we believe that GTZ has had a significant 
impact on the way that forest lands have developed in Vietnam. 
As noted above, forests are covered by a specific land tenure regime that is partly defined by the 
law of 2004 protecting and developing forests (which succeeded the law of the same name passed 
in 1999) and its enforcement orders and amendments. This law is mainly enforced by the forestry 
administration. Between 1997 and 2006, GTZ funded a 10-year project supporting the reform of 
the forestry administration (Support to the Reform of the Forestry Administration System, 
REFAS). Activities in the first phase (1997-2000) mainly focused on four provinces (Dak Lak, 
Thanh Hoa, Son La and Vinh Phuc), before linking up with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development at the national level and broadening out to relatively diverse actions 
(administration, forest management system, organisational analysis and development, sector 
policies and programmes, technical, managerial, education training). The REFAS project was 
innovative in using the results of local initatives to inform the reform of institutions at the central 
level, such as the drafting of the 2004 forest protection and development law.  
GTZ also funded a rural development project that was less directly linked with land in the 
provinces of Lai Chau and Son La, the Social Forestry Development Project (SFDP). This tested 
innovative participatory and collective methods of allocating land use rights in forested areas, 
some of which are reflected in the most recent land and forestry laws.  It should also be noted that 
GTZ took the lead in organising workshops and conferences on the distribution of forest lands in 
69 
Vietnam (such as the 1997 National Workshop on Land Use Planning and Forest Land 
Allocation, jointly organised with the UNDP and FAO), and has funded numerous publications, 
including scientific papers, by researchers invoved in these projects (such as Thomas Sikor).  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
The Asian Development Bank intervenes unobtrusively and indirectly in land matters. It has taken 
an active part in the reform of the public administration (PAR) since 1996, and provided early 
technical assistance to the government in 1995 through a study entitled Land Information System 
and Agricultural Taxation Study. Like many development organisations, it has also shown a 
longstanding concern for land matters in its strategic documents, especially with regard to 
tackling corruption and reducing poverty, and supporting rural development and greater economic 
openness. 
2. Land actors’ views on the mechanisms for building institutions 
We touched on the mechanisms for building institutions in the section on institutional actors, and 
will now describe these mechanisms in greater detail, give an idea of the way that land actors see 
this process, how they position themselves in relation to each other and how they see each other. 
This section describes and analyses the process over the long term and in the recent past. 
2.1 A history of experimentation 
During this study we spoke to various actors with a long involvement in establishing the nation’s 
land institutions (since the 1980s and/or Doi Moi).  Those best able to stand back from the process 
and demonstrate a reasonable understanding of its evolution came from Vietnamese institutions; 
most foreign actors could give key dates in the history of land matters after the late 1980s, but 
only tend to be aware of the key points in this process, such as the land law of 1993 recognising 
five derived rights for holders of LURs. Conversely, they often have detailed knowledge of the 
current situation, and less sectoral and limited knowledge about what happens in Hanoi than most 
Vietnamese actors. 
The main factor distinguishing foreign and Vietnamese actors over the long term is the relatively 
recent participation of external actors. As noted above, foreign interventions in the overall market 
and in the context of formulating the Land Law of 1993 did not begin until 1991 at the earliest. 
Development projects and institutions tend to have a high staff turnover, which impacts on their 
institutional memory (newcomers often only have written traces of their predecessors), and most 
personnel stay with projects for short periods, have fixed objectives and often pre-determined 
methodologies. This limits their capacity to take a longer-term view and mobilise knowledge of 
the past. What knowledge they do make use of is gleaned from previous reports (such as the 
often-cited AusAID report of 2000), and little effort is invested in generating new knowledge that 
could deepen understanding of the ongoing process. However, it should be noted that contact with 
their Vietnamese partners does provide increasingly detailed knowledge of the past in Vietnam … 
Among the Vietnamese actors, we need to differentiate between members of the GDLA and the 
MoNRE on the one hand, and those of other ministries on the other. Logically, the former should 
have extensive, in-depth knowledge of the process of establishing institutions over the long term. 
Several told us how they saw this process, providing details such as the dates and names of 
decrees, etc., as well as the chronology of participation by foreign actors and the roles that they 
played. 
Members of the GDLA and MoNRE describe the process that the Vietnamese government 
followed in producing texts for the land law as one of ‘trial and error’. According to these actors, 
the government would test new arrangements in the regions (at the provincial or communal level) 
and then promulgate texts, decrees and amendments to laws, or even new laws to facilitate their 
application. The results of enforcing these texts were then analysed and the same process used to 
propose amendments to them. The Land Law of 1993, for example, was presented as a ‘revisional 
land law’ by Dang Hung Vo (2007), and put in place after five years of testing the law of 1988. 
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This process of producing texts through trial and error explains why they are so numerous, 
incomplete, and often tardy … and also why they were tested at the provincial or district level 
(often by cooperation projects) with the authorities’ blessing, but not in accordance with current 
legislation.  
Analysis of the evolution of the legal texts confirms this view. For example, the Land Law of 
1993 draws up the new framework for land tenure, but is very quickly supplemented by a series of 
texts that modify certain points, clarify others and even contradict the original text. In the law of 
2003, which had taken much longer to prepare than the previous one, there are over a dozen 
points that the State had yet to settle, clearly denoted by the phrase “The government – or the 
MoNRE – will regulate or organise the details …” Even more interestingly, numerous decrees 
surrounding the law were published in order to correct contradictions between texts or their poor 
implementation, showing that this was not a well-managed process. 
It is also worth noting that the government was in the process of preparing to review the Land 
Law at the end of 2009 (probable date for implementation of the text), even though a new law was 
already scheduled for 2013. Therefore, certain aspects of this process of trial and error were 
planned, since the government could not wait until 2013 to revise all the legislation, and had to 
propose interim revisions.  
A similar observation can be made regarding the three-stage creation of the land administration, 
which started as a relatively independent entity at the highest level of the State and ended up 
being attached to a ministry. This suggests that, having ceased to exist over 20 years ago, it was 
seeking to position itself within the overall national administrative system. We have already noted 
the dysfunctionality of the land administration, and that the government felt the need to issue a 
decree (n° 181/2004/ND/CP of 2004) to ensure that the GDLA fulfilled its obligation to establish 
a standardised national system for issuing land use rights certificates. 
This experimental approach, which resulted in the production of successive and sometimes 
inconsistent texts, is usually described as detrimental to the enforcement of legal texts, partly 
because they were so short-lived that they were sometimes already superseded by the time they 
were enforced. 
However, not everyone saw this as evidence of the dysfunctional evolution of land institutions. 
Two actors suggested that it was a technique for dealing with the legal void in which Vietnam 
found it self after opting for market socialism. Although China had taken a similar route, Vietnam 
could not follow its example because the two countries had made very different choices with 
regard to land matters. Neithercountry has a clear way forward, and each has to constantly invent 
ways of reconciling socialist imperatives with greater economic openness. These interviewees 
pointed to the treatment of agricultural lands as an emblematic example of this. 
But this is a minority view. Many Vietnamese and foreigners think that the process of trial and 
error is due to technical and political deficiencies, the institutions’ inability to renew themselves 
and the lack of policies with clear, long-term vision.  
The usual reasons are cited at the ‘technical’ level: lack of staff, resources and expertise … Land 
legislation and land administration are often described as particularly problematic areas that 
require a wide range of skills, and whose problems are compounded by the relatively short time 
that land has been an issue in Vietnam. The foreign actors we spoke to maintain that this 
shortcoming is being corrected as experience is acquired over time, and also thanks to investment 
in training by both the government and development organisations. Nevertheless, this is a problem 
that has yet to be resolved, especially at the infra-national levels. 
Various explanations are offered at the political level. No one mentioned the lack of long-term 
vision among decision-makers preoccupied with more immediate concerns. This would explain 
why the law of 1993 focused on agricultural land without taking account of the changes under 
way in other domains, and why the law of 2003 failed to see the rural problems coming … Many 
people also noted the government’s nervousness on this subject. The history of land is linked with 
that of Vietnam, and land is a sensitive matter that cannot be treatly lightly. The external actors 
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we spoke to also note this this is a ‘closed’ sector. The fact that making land-related decisions is 
politically tricky and that advising on such decisions is difficult does not encourage clear 
positions or major changes, and explains the numerous experimental initiatives in this domain. 
One apparently anecdotal factor that cropped up several times was the imbalances and friction 
between various institutions and ministries. Tensions between the MARD and the MoNRE were 
mentioned on several occasions, as the MARD lost some of its decision-making powers over 
agricultural lands and forests to the GDLA following the redistribution of land and its 
incorporation into the MoNRE. Because the MoNRE is now responsible for land use planning, the 
MARD does not have the power to influence land allocations through its agricultural development 
strategies, and its members have to ‘lobby’ (sic) in order to get their views heard on certain 
questions that are considered important for rural areas. There is also friction between the MoNRE 
and the Ministry of Construction, as the former has overall responsibility for land matters, while 
the latter still has the power to issue the ‘pink booklets’ that guarantee property ownership rights 
in urban areas. Another highly contentious issue is the difference between the treatment of urban 
and rural areas.  
Looking at land-related texts over the long term, it does seem that increasing account has been 
taken of the specificities of the different categories of land, such as forests and residential areas. 
This can be seen in the larger number of categories (or sub-categories) of land that are recognised, 
and the way that each category is dealt with separately. However, everyone we spoke to 
mentioned the lack of consultation between institutions in the process of producing legislation, 
and the consequent proliferation of sectoral enforcement orders that supplement and clarify, but 
also contradict the land law in order to make it enforceable. This creates a certain amount of 
confusion around the land legislation, and can lead to contradictions with the texts produced in 
related sectors, as we will see later with the legislation on land and forestry. 
2.2 Writing the law today: an iterative and consultative processus 
While they have not been entirely remedied, these shortcomings in the process of producing land 
legislation do seem to have been reduced in recent years. The process of writing the law has 
changed in several ways. 
• More time and care is devoted to writing the texts, and fairly substantial human and 
material resources are mobilised for this task. For example, members of the GDLA claim 
that while the law of 1993 was prepared quite quickly, that of 2003 involved more in-depth 
work, and preparations for the law of 2013 are even more detailed. There are several 
reasons why more attention has been paid to preparing these texts. On the one hand, there 
was the ‘urgency’ of the land situation in Vietnam before 1993, with the need for stability 
driving the government to support pratices (like land sales) that were often already 
widespread (Kerkvielt, 1997). There was also the fact that Vietnamese State had only 
recently decided to follow the rule of law, and that it had to overcome both political 
reservations45 and the constraints associated with the absence of any legislative framework. 
One Vietnamese source told us – in jest, but certainly not without reason – that neither 
members of the Assembly nor the Prime Minister knew what to expect or how to proceed 
when they started the process of writing the first two laws. The same source also indicated 
that the unfinished nature of the law of 1993 had prompted legislators to look at existing 
foreign legislation, especially in neighbouring countries, and to obtain training and 
technical advice. This opening up to the outside world is obviously not unrelated to 
pressure from the international community and donors who prioritise the establishment of 
the rule of law based on comprehensive modern legislation – as can be seen from the 
rejection of advances by the World Bank in the early 1990s, and acceptance of those from 
the Swedish cooperation.  
                                                
45  A report by AusAID (2000) ascribed the fact that the 1993 Land Law took much longer to enforce in the North than 
in the South (up to two years in certain localities) to the conservatism of numerous political officials in the North. 
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• Another improvement in the process of producing legislation is the fact that it takes 
account of the provincial and local levels through consultations with institutions at these 
levels. This is part of the ongoing (but incomplete) process of decentralisation in Vietnam 
(Mellac, 2007). However, some sources felt that the time and resources set aside for these 
consultations are not commensurate with immensity of the task; and it should also be noted 
that this consultation was undertaken by the GDLA, was not made public, and that the 
decion-making process remains completely centralised. 
• The public is now consulted on important texts, and people can use various channels to 
express their views on the texts while they are being finalised. These include: 
– The National Assembly website (http://www.na.gov.vn/); 
–  A special postal service to ‘35 Ngo Quyen’ (the National Assembly’s address in 
Hanoi) ; 
– The services of representatives of the National Assembly in provincial People’s 
Councils.  
However, these are new procedures that few people know about and which receive 
little media coverage Furthermore, as with the consultations at infra-national levels, 
the information is collected by and sent directly to central organs that do not publicise 
it, which raises questions about the public’s capacity to exercise any real pressure. 
• One process that does seem to have had more impact is the horizontal consulation at the 
central level. This involves circulating notebooks (with one page of text and one page left 
blank for comment, or with the old and new texts shown next to each other) or electronic 
versions (possibly translated) of draft texts among the ministries and various national and 
international institutions concerned. Groups of experts have also been set up in the context 
of producing or amending texts, some of them permanent and some temporary (see below). 
According to members of the GDLA, this relatively open procedure enables certain bodies 
to join the discussion without having been invited to do so. 
Allowing more actors to participate in the administration should ensure that the land legislation 
sits better with the rest of the legislation, and that greater account is taken of problems and issues 
that the GDLA may not be able to manage. Opening up to external actors makes it possible to 
draw on experience acquired outside Vietnam and prepare legislation that is better adapted to the 
constraints associated with joining the international community (signing conventions or 
agreements such as the WTO agreement). However, it has to be said that the consultation process 
is not entirely problem-free. 
Internal problems: 
• A number of our sources mentioned the extreme rapidity of the process. Certain senior 
officials indicated that they had too little time to react to the texts, and that the 
reorganisation of the law, which they believe to be a useful exercise, is too big a task to be 
undertaken simultaneously in practical and political terms; 
• Certain members of ministries that had not been consulted criticised the fact that the 
consultation only involved senior civil servants and did not allow technicians and/or those 
dealing with the realities on the ground to express their opinions; 
• None of the people we interviewed mentioned the role of the Central Committee, although 
it doubtless gives its opinion both before and after the texts are produced. 
 
External problems:  
• The fact that the land reform is funded by a very small number of actors gives them huge 
weight. We will return to this point later in relation to agricultural lands and forests. 
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Description of the process of producing the law of 2003 (based on descriptions gathered 
during the surveys) 
1. The process begins with a decision by the National Assembly to revise the legal text or 
prepare a new law.  
2. The National Assembly creates a small working group to write the text and proposes this 
group to the government. It is managed by an official from the GDLA within the MoNRE. 
3. The MoNRE creates two larger new working groups: 
– a committee to prepare the new law, chaired by an official from the MoNRE and including 
an official from each of the ministries concerned (the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry 
of Finance, the MARD, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment); 
– a group of experts, also led by the MoNRE, bringing together experts from the different 
ministries and foreign specialists. This group works in close association with the preparatory 
committee, but has no official status and is strictly consultative. It includes lawyers, 
agronomists, forestry experts, notaries, etc.  
This was the group that was officially supported by the SIDA project (SEMLA) in 2003, and 
was working on the revision of the Land Law of 2009 during our study. As the funding 
agency, SIDA is the body that mobilises foreign experts on specific points (for example, the 
SEMLA project funded an Australian lawyer to assist his Vietnamese counterpart in writing 
the text amending the Land Law in July 2008), but foreign organisations can participate in 
the process by expressing their opinion of the draft texts. 
4. The preparatory committee prepares a first concrete draft. 
5. This text is submitted to experts and compared with the texts of similar (or related) laws 
produced in neighbouring countries (including China) and the West (France).  
6. After this comparison, a second, more substantial text is produced. 
7. This second text is submitted for comment to the People’s Committees in 64 provinces 
and various other localities (such as cities and districts), and to other competent bodies 
(Vietnamese and foreign). 
8. The third version of the text is written on the basis of their comments.  
9. This version is submitted to the small working group led by the MoNRE (which approves 
or rejects it). 
10. If approved, it is resubmitted to the provinces.  
11. It may be modified again (fourth version).  
12. This version is submitted to the small working group led by the MoNRE. 
13. Then to the legislative Committee and the economic and political Committee in the 
National Assembly. 
14. The text is revised again according to their comments. 
15. It goes through the same verification process again (the working group and the two 
committees). 
16. It is presented to the National Assembly, which studies it in detail and accepts all or part 
of it.  
17. The ‘final’ version is then written by a member of the national University of Law.  
18. In the case of important texts, such as the one relating to land, it is then presented to the 
public, who can submit their comments through various channels. 
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19. At this stage the national University of Law may give its advice – it is the only university 
that directly advises the National Assembly. 
20. The National Assembly meets a second time and examines the advice: if there is no 
major problem the text is amended in the margin; if there is a problem a new text will be 
required. The cycle resumes … a new text is written and the Assembly meets again … 
21. National or foreign groups have the opportunity to make an appeal and ask for the text to 
be rewritten, but this will only be heard if 50 per cent of members of the Assembly accept 
that it needs to be revised. 
22. The National Assembly votes on the text. 
Before 1993, the GDLA was solely responsible for writing the texts for land laws, as this was an 
internal affair. The decisions taken mainly depended on how members of the National Assembly 
and the most senior civil servants viewed land issues. The process of writing is much more open 
nowadays. The procedure described above resembles that in the analysis of the Constitution 
(Annex A.1.3), but is more complete in that there is much greater articulation between the 
different levels, and numerous actors are consulted. Despite all the aforementioned shortcomings, 
this is a consultative and iterative process that facilitates – as the texts themselves show – the 
production of a richer, more detailed body of legislation than in the past. However, there is now 
the question of the weight of external influences on the internal officials responsible for producing 
the legislation, and the way in which external pressure may be exercised. 
2.3 The ‘problematic’ articulation between the national and provincial levels 
Another particularly pressing problem nowadays is the articulation between institutions at 
different administrative levels, especially the national and provincial levels. We were told that the 
process of building institutions is consultative, and we have seen that the provinces have 
progressively established institutions that are capable of responding to the ever-increasing number 
of land transactions and actors. However, the case of Binh Duong clearly shows that land 
legislation has been slow to adapt to provincial settings and does not always do so in accordance 
with national recommendations. 
Several people that we spoke to maintain that these discrepancies are due to the fact that the texts 
are not adapted to local contexts, mainly because of the rigidity of the different classifications. 
The fact that provinces are classified according to their location (plains, watersheds, mountains) is 
a particular problem, since many provinces, such as Binh Duong, are located in intermediate 
zones. The variations within and between provinces are thus the result of these classifications and 
(partial or total) failure to respect them at the provincial level.  
The frequency and significance of the legislative changes was also often cited as the reason why 
they are poorly enforced or ignored at the provincial level, as the provincial administrations have 
neither the time nor the capacity to adapt each new arrangement to their locality. This is obvious 
in Binh Duong, where the province is slow to react to land arrangements, and often does so just 
before new arrangements made at the national level render their local adaptations obsolete or out 
of line. 
The land development funds are one of the elements that are seen as helpful in improving the 
functioning of the land administration in the provinces, because of its key role in the mechanism 
for compensating households whose land has been expropriated. However, several people we 
spoke to said that this can also cause difficulties, especially in establishing a clear financial 
system, as is the case in Binh Duong. Because it is not directly dependent on the People’s 
Committee (see flowchart of the executive and legislature in Binh Duong), this fund does not 
officially have its own resources, but requires the financial organisation and ability to mobilise 
funds in order to fulfil its mission of paying compensation and collecting investment funds. It 
seems that no directive has been issued clarifying its budgetary mechanisms. Provincial officials 
raised this issue on several occasions, suggesting that an unofficial mechanism where investors 
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pay compensation would be more ‘complex’ and possible entail going through other institutional 
actors involved in the process, which indicates that informal flows of money do exist. 
Binh Duong province recently tested new modes of requisitioning land and paying compensation 
involving a private company. The protoype has yet to be finalised, and it is still unclear whether 
the State or the company will bid for the rights. Either way, the thorny issue of compensation 
(conflicts/necessary funds) is transferred to the private sector, with the possible consequence of 
creating land speculation. Transferring the risks of transactions to the private sector could increase 
land values, simply because some of the land has to be set aside to resettle former users. This part 
of the land – which is earmarked for housing and thus has a significant value – could then serve as 
a cushion against any possible losses resulting from insufficient bids, or simply increase the 
revenues from land thanks to the part set aside for housing. In these conditions, property prices 
would increase significantly, as they already have in metropolitan areas. 
As we will see later, corruption is an ever-present issue in the provinces, either periodically when 
investment projects are set up, particularly when households are compensated for their 
expropriated land, or more generally when development and land use plans are put in place. To a 
certain extent, this reflects the actors’ inability to follow the complex process of building 
institutions at the provincial level. Despite conducting in-depth surveys in Binh Duong, we found 
it difficult to disentangle this process, whose complexity is partly due to the dual origins of land 
institutions at the national and provincial levels. It can only be described in a very full and 
complicated table (Annex A.2.4) whose main advantage is that it shows the discrepancies between 
the two levels. All actors, whether local, national or foreign, agree that situations vary greatly, that 
a lot happens at the interface between the provincial and the national levels, and that there is very 
little control or forward planning. This articulation fosters both innovation and anomaly: and is 
thus is the testing ground for national legislation. Foreign actors, including the World Bank, are 
not mistaken in anticipating a large number of interventions at the provincial level, partly to 
identify the points that need to be clarified most urgently, but also to determine how more 
effective institutions can be established, in a less restrictive framework than the national level. 
3. The evolution of land matters: discourses and descriptions 
3.1 Is land a marketable asset or a public good?  
The great majority of people that we spoke to said they felt that current legislation is better able to 
address the multiple issues associated with rural and urban lands. The Land Law of 1993 was a 
‘political law’ designed to respond to specific expectations that mainly related to agricultural land 
as a whole, and looked more like a vague programme than a law that would help deal with a wide 
range of land situations. The law of 2003 was naturally still ‘political’ and also considered land as 
a whole, but was also much more ‘technical’, incorporating legal, administrative and technical 
aspects that enabled it to respond to many more specific situations. Nevertheless, the current 
legislation still has many weaknesses, and not everyone is happy with the direction it has taken. 
As one of our Vietnamese sources said, “Vietnamese legislation is in transition, like the country”, 
and any future changes will be crucial for Vietnam. 
In this section we will return to the distinction between Vietnamese and foreign actors. Although 
opinions differ within each group, particularly among institutional actors, there are clear 
differences between the views held by the two groups as a whole, which differ on the points that 
are seen as most problematic or satisfactory. In both cases, we will identify the issues that were 
mentioned most often and/or best described by our sources.  
§ The liberal discourse of foreign actors 
Assessments of land matters and Vietnamese legislation in general repeatedly emphasize the 
imperfect nature of the land market, which is ascribed to the unfinished process of liberalisation 
and the State’s inability to properly exert the control that it wishes to maintain. This situation is 
seen as exacerbating corruption, mainly by creating tensions between public and private actors 
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(the land administration is frequently cited as an example of a corrupt administration; World 
Bank, 2007), and as delaying the economic development of the country by creating an unstable 
environment for would-be investors of both Vietnamese and foreign extraction. For example, a 
quick assessment of the legal environment of Vietnam by the Swiss Development Cooperation 
reports that “slow progress in reforming the public administration system and ambient corruption 
continue to negatively affect the country’s ability to attract both foreign and domestic investment, 
and create obstacles to business”.46  
Land is a particularly important issue for Vietnam as it makes the transition towards a market 
economy. Most actors now recognise that considerable progress has already been made in this 
domain. For example, the World Bank and ADB see the redistribution and registration of 
agricultural land use rights as one of Vietnam’s major achievements since the launch of Doi Moi 
(World Bank, 2002b). This process has resulted in substantial increases in agricultural 
productivity, supported growth in a context of equality, and helped reduce poverty considerably. 
Economic openness – seen as synonymous with economic development – and poverty reduction 
are two recurrent themes associated with land matters, and are clearly evident in the expectations 
of the SEMLA project piloted by SIDA: “The objective of the Land Administration Group is to 
support the continued development and implementation of land policy and legislation, and to 
strengthen and streamline a land administration system that supports the Government's objectives 
of sustainable development and poverty alleviation” (http://www.semla.org.vn/). The World Bank 
raises land issues in numerous projects aimed at supporting Vietnam in its evolution towards a 
market economy, but emphasises questions of governance and poverty reduction in its recent 
project to support the land administration (see box above). The World Bank and Bretton Woods 
institutions in general have made poverty reduction their primary raison d’être since the end of 
the Cold War, and this entry point allows them to raise a politically sensitive subject by stating 
intentions whose legitimacy is hard to challenge. However, the main expectations stay the same 
whatever the stated viewpoint: the liberalisation of the land market, privatisation of land and more 
secure rights offered by the State, since deregulation, privatisation and security of tenure are 
deemed to be more conducive to the increased investments required for growth and sustainable 
improvements in poor and marginal people’s living conditions (questions of gender and exclusion 
are also often raised). 
In this context, the most problematic issues in land legislation and its implementation are now 
seen as excessive State intervention in land management, and the land administration’s difficulties 
in establishing an effective and reliable system of land registration. 
§ Heavy-handed interventions  
In the questionnaire that we sent to members of several international institutions (Annex A.4.2), 
respondents were asked for their opinion of Article 1 of the 2003 Land Law (This Law prescribes 
the powers and responsibilities of the State which represents the entire-people owner of land and 
uniformly manages land; the regime of land management and use; the rights and obligations of 
land users). Most respondents did not seem to see land ownership as problematic. This article 
revisits a principle set out in the Constitution, and they did not feel that it needs to be challenged 
insofar as the use rights and derived rights assigned to land users make them resemble de facto 
landowners. Many maintain that, in practice, it makes little difference to land users whether they 
hold full and exclusive rights to land or the right to use it, provided these rights are not restricted. 
Thus, it is not the nature of the rights obtained (whether they relate to the land or its use) that 
matters. These actors are essentially pragmatic, and are not concerned with the ideological content 
of the public ownership of land held by the State. What matters to them is that these rights 
continue to be offered to all users, and that they are free to exercise them in a secure environment. 
The State seems to use the different categories of land and land user defined in the land legislation 
as a means of exerting temporal, territiorial and human control, by distributing more or less 
                                                
46  http://www.sdc.org.vn/en/Home/About_Swiss_International_Cooperation/ressources/resource_en_167727.pdf 
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extended and long-term rights according to the type of user and land concerned (reflecting 
planning as a whole). This dual categorisation makes the situation much more complex (Annexes 
A.1.5 and A.1.6) and is believed to distort the land market due to the restrictions imposed by too 
many administrative measures.  
The Land Law of 2003 is usually presented as being progressive with regard to categories of land 
use, in that it extends users’ rights and recognises a larger number of users. New categories such 
as ‘residential comunities’, ‘overseas Vietnamese’ (viêt kieu), ‘foreign organisations and 
individuals’ are seen as constituting a major step forward – although the limitations of the nature 
of the rights assigned to these users and the manner in which they are assigned soon became 
apparent 
The objective of the ‘residential communities’ category was to allow customary land regulations 
to secure local access to land and resources, especially in forested mountainous areas. However, 
the framework in which these rights can be exercised is too restrictive. On the one hand, 
communities have to conform to the definitions given in the legislation and be recognised by the 
upper echeleons. On the other hand, they have to set out their rules in writing (taking them out of 
the realm of the oral and into jurisprudence), distribute the rights recognised by the law (which 
disqualifies rights to resources rather than land), and do so in a way that is deemed to be 
equitable, not only by the group, but also by the officials responsible for approving the project. 
Therefore, while customary land tenure systems now have a recognised legal existence, it is 
somewhat illusory because the requirements that these groups have to meet render their systems 
meaningless and thus ineffective. 
The categories ‘overseas Vietnamese’ and ‘foreign organisations and individuals’ reflect a 
distinction between domestic and foreign that some see as irrelevant, and others as inequitable or 
even nationalistic. This distinction is seen as highly problematic because of the limited range of 
rights assigned to foreigners (who are essentially restricted to long-term rentals based on their 
investments; see table in Annex A.1.5), and as encouraging corruption because these restrictions 
encourage foreign investors to bypass the legal framework, by using front companies to purchase 
land, for example. It discourages good quality, sustainable investment and bolsters Vietnam’s 
poor image. Some say that it will also have to be scrapped, since it is not permitted under the rules 
of the WTO, which Vietnam joined in 2005. 
The different categories of land are also seen as problematic. While the fact that land is no longer 
defined by its location is viewed positively (it is now defined according to its use), the content of 
the categories – rather than their existence – still causes problems. Opinion is more divided on this 
than on the previous point: certain donors or project workers believe that it is necessary to retain, 
or even reinforce, the particular status of certain categories of land, especially residential land. 
Some even argue that this should constitute a fourth category of land (by subdividing the category 
of non-agricultural lands) because of its importance and the specificity of the regime for this kind 
of land. One difficulty that is often raised with regard to residential land is the distinction between 
property assets, which are covered by full ownership rights, and land that can only be held 
through temporary use rights (or ‘individual ownership rights’).  
The specific regime for agricultural lands is generally unpopular and widely regarded as over-
protective, while forests are seen as needing greater protection. For example, one argument put 
forward by the World Bank is that the specific status of these lands in terms of the duration of use 
rights (short), taxation (non-existent) and official prices (determined by the value of output) leads 
to corruption and is an important factor in market distortion. The problem with agricultural lands 
is also accentuated by the restrictions on their conversion and transfer, which, despite being been 
reduced, make land relatively scarce and increase the price of land whose status has been 
changed. This not only makes poor people who move to urban areas more vulnerable as they 
cannot access the peri-urban market, but also affects rural populations since their land is of very 
little value (WB, 2002b, p. 46). As a result, it is the poor who are the first to suffer from market 
distortions. 
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“Overall, the study's preliminary findings suggest that increased efficiency, greater 
transparency and reduced costs in the formal land market may benefit the poor more than 
traditional "protective" interventions aimed at restricting market transactions” (ADB, 2004). 
 
Few challenge the need for different categories of forest – in fact, the argument here is whether or 
not they need to be made more specific. Conservation organisations like WWF argue that old 
forested areas need to be protected, and that their classification (as special use forest land) 
distinguishes them from cultivable lands and allows certain uses to be banned. However, 
organisations that are more concerned with people than woodlands, such as the FAO (or, to a 
lesser extent, GTZ), believe that the distinction between forests and agricultural land is too rigid, 
that it hampers the development of agroforestry and destabilises populations that practice slash-
and-burn. As noted earlier in this paper, the land legislation of 2003 does take more account of 
local people in forested areas, largely by recognising customary land tenure systems or by 
authorising bodies responsible for forest management to allocate the use of strictly protected lands 
for short periods in certain conditions (Article 77). The writings and sayings of these 
organisations show that it is not so much a matter of challenging the forest categories, but of 
extending rights to this land and making it more like agricultural land, emphasising the need for 
greater recognition of customary rights and a framework that is more conducive to the exercise of 
these rights. 
It is easy to see why analysis of the discourse on land legislation among foreign actors shows 
almost unanimous support for liberalisation of the land market, which requires more rights, fewer 
restrictions and less State interference, except in rare and clearly defined cases where the 
protection of land or land users is deemed useful. The World Bank sees the development of the 
land market as a real miracle cure, even though it is recognised that it can accentuate rural poverty 
by concentrating land and increasing the number of landless farmers (World Bank, 2002b and 
2007). The rural land market needs to be liberalised in order to increase non-agricultural 
employment, which creates wealth in rural areas. Therefore, it is necessary to put in place 
measures that will help correct the market’s shortcomings and reduce people’s vulnerability: 
making credit available, developing insurance, programmes for the State to repurchase lands, and 
low taxation (World Bank, 2002b).  
§ Building an administration  
While the State needs to be a less obvious presence in the market, it should also ensure that the 
market functions by providing an efficient administration that safeguards users’ rights by issuing 
certificates that guarantee their use rights. Land use rights certificates are the World Bank’s 
second miracle cure (or rather, ‘speedy miracle cure’). 
 
“Establishing the framework for an efficient land market is an important part of the second-
generation reform program. Land titling is bound to increase efficiency. Land Use-right 
Certificates (LUCs) can be used as collateral to obtain credit and help improve the insufficient 
access to finance, which is arguably the main constraint to business development in Vietnam. 
Property titles should also provide a more sound foundation to develop a real estate market. 
From a social perspective, they could help formalize the status of urban migrants, who continue 
to be registered as “temporary residents” despite having lived in the cities for years, if not 
decades. However, land titling alone is not enough to ensure efficiency and equity. 
Strengthening land management and administration is a top priority to consolidate and 
safeguard user-rights already issued, to promote efficiency and equity through enhanced 
transparency in land records management as well as to strengthen the emerging rural and peri-
urban land markets” (WB, 2007, p10). 
 
The administration forms a dense network that is present at every level, even the very lowest. 
Although decentralisation has produced positive results by reorganising every level of the 
administration and better distributing tasks, the administration still has limited capacity to enforce 
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legislation and manage land. This is the main justification for two important land-related projects 
that are currently under way. It is also worth noting that donors are using primarily technical and 
organisational objectives requiring significant levels of funding and modern tools as an entry into 
land matters. 
There are two advantages to this technical entry point: 
• It improves the administration’s capacity to issue certificates and provide the land-related 
information needed for the market to function 
• It makes the donors’ presence acceptable. 
For example, (as already noted) the land administration is often accused of being very corrupt. 
While this is naturally not explicitly mentioned in proposals for projects to support the land 
administration, the terms ‘transparency’, ‘standardisation’ and ‘control’ clearly indicate that this is 
a major concern among donors. Having a presence in the GDLA and provincial centres allows 
them to observe practices on a daily basis, position themselves as closely as possible to the centres 
of decision-making, and indirectly influence the evolution of legislation. 
§  Institutional actors looking for solutions 
It is extremely difficult to provide a synthesis of institutional actors’ views because they vary so 
greatly. In fact, this divergence is one of their main characteristics. To our mind, it is evidence of 
the unease about land matters at the very highest levels of government, and is not surprising in a 
context of transition and generational and behavioural change. 
§ Unfinished land reform 
Unlike foreign actors, who are not especially concerned with the leaders’ ideological position, 
Vietnamese land actors frequently mention their own and the public’s discomfiture with the 
transitional state of the land system. Most clearly expect land management to follow the course 
prescribed by the World Bank in coming years: that all lands will be covered by a private 
ownership regime (or one that functions as such) in a deregulated market. But this kind of regime 
cannot suddenly be put in place without upsetting the public, especially the rural majority who 
welcomed the return to individual land access but are not prepared to put up with internal and 
external competition. Therefore, it is a matter of avoiding excessive tension in a domain that is 
crucial to the political legitimacy of Hanoi, by continuing to affirm collective land ownership, 
ensuring that there is a specific regime for agricultural lands, and emphasising the equity of the 
regime for these lands (by limiting the size and duration of land allocations) rather than its 
economic efficiency. Several sources also note that certain senior officials, especially in the 
National Assembly, are not ready to purge the legislation of principles that are seen as 
fundamental for the political regime. As a result, land-related choices may seem ideological rather 
than functional, and even appear to undermine the smooth running of the land system. This notion 
cropped up several times during our interviews, and also appears in the AusAID report published 
in 2000 summarising the land situation: 
 
“In Viet Nam, the state is acutely aware that decolonisation struggles and ultimately its own 
legitimacy revolved around the equitable distribution of land. People ownership and state 
management of land are central principles of Communist doctrine that underpin legal 
definitions of land ownership and use. Doctrinal issues are most evident in the regulation of 
rural and other income-producing land and less relevant to residential land. Finally, the land 
law regime in Viet Nam is exceedingly complex” (AusAID, 2000). 
 
Certain officials believe that the central State has gone too far towards liberalisation and 
decentralisation and is insufficiently prepared for these changes; while others think that it has not 
gone far enough and that its hesitancy is responsible for the dysfunctionalities of the system.  “The 
leaders say that they’re Communists, but they behave like capitalists, and it’s completely 
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unacceptable!” What both sides do agree on is that the reforms are incomplete and there is little 
control over land dynamics. 
We discussed a wide variety of topics with Vietnamese actors, ranging from the details of 
particular articles of the law to the ideology underpinning the collective ownership regime. The 
themes that cropped up most frequently were corruption caused by the dysfunctional land law, 
and the much more specific problem of land prices. 
§ Pervasive corruption  
The delicate issue of corruption often cropped up spontaneously during our interviews and 
conversations, usually in relation to questions about the effectiveness of the new legislation. As 
we conducted our interviews with civil officials in Hanoi, they were relatively distant from the 
supposed sources of corruption, which are mainly found at the provincial and local levels. 
The decision to give power to the provinces and districts was identified as one of the main causes 
of corruption, especially the power to decide on land attributions, rentals and changes of use. The 
provinces authorise changes in land allocation for groups, and the districts authorise changes in 
favour of family households and individuals (Article 37). In theory, this power is framed by land 
use plans, which determine the changes in land allocation that can be made over a five-year 
period. These plans should be approved by the next level up, which is the MoNRE for the 
provinces. However, this planning, whose role is to maintain central State control over land 
allocation and use, is described as being much more theoretical than real. The MoNRE does not 
have the capacity to make a detailed assessment of all these plans, and there are long delays in 
getting them approved. Decree 181 of 2004 was supposed to have regulated this, but it does not 
seem to have much effect, which means that there are long transitional periods. Furthermore, the 
fact that many districts and half of the communes have no plans of any kind makes it easy for 
officials in the districts and provinces to make decisions outside any planned or centralised 
framework. 
In the absence of any real control, the provinces and districts use various tactics to increase their 
room to manoeuvre: creating phased projects to install industrial or commercial enterprises on 
parcels of less than 200 hectares (any changes in land use exceeding this area have to be approved 
by the government), and manipulating the figures to camouflage changes in land allocations. 
Therefore, it is often said that the rate at which agricultural land is diminishing has stabilised, and 
that the amount of unused land (such as land outside dykes in the delta) is decreasing in parallel 
with an increase in non-agricultural lands. In reality, however, the rapid transformation of 
agricultural lands is camouflaged by that of unused lands, which are changing at a much slower 
rate. Some districts may also minimise their declarations of agricultural land so that their reserve 
of land that can be awarded to households exceeds the legal 5 per cent limit, and can be used to 
generate extra revenue.  
It is likely that genuine cases of corruption are due to situations where it is all too easy for local 
officials to cash in on their power to allocate land, change the status of land for investors, and use 
their knowledge of planning and projects in their jurisdiction to acquire: 
• Agricultural lands at low prices before a change of use is decided, giving them access to 
land whose value has increased, 
• Agricultural lands at low prices before an expropriation is decided, enabling them to 
benefit from compensation, 
• Forest lands before the start of environmental protection projects, providing funds to put in 
place forest plantations, etc. 
Another situation conducive to corruption is the expropriation of land from rural households and 
payment of compensation. Businesses pay households relatively little compensation when they 
have to give up their land, but they do not negotiate directly with these households, and have to 
pay very high transaction costs as each administrative level makes a charge for agreeing to a new 
installation and following the procedures for such initiatives. In addition to this, the communes do 
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not usually worry about getting the agreement of the households whose land will have to be 
expropriated, which means that they cannot negotiate the price of their resettlement. It is also 
necessary to go through three different departments to obtain all the athorisations (construction, 
finance and the DoNRE). Through its policy instituting the ‘single entry point’, and in order to 
simplify procedures in every administrative domain (Order 81/2003/QĐ-TTg),47 the government 
recently decided to create a single window for investors at the provincial level. However, as one 
source remarked, there may only be one entry but several locks need to be opened to get into it – 
rather than acting as tool to simplify the process, this the window makes space for another actor 
who may be susceptible to corruption. 
The power available to the provincial and district authorities is not only a source of corruption, 
but also of conflict between the authorities and individuals who belatedly realise that they have 
been swindled. According to one source, 70 per cent of the conflicts currently registered in 
Vietnam are related to land (this corroborates the previous figures given by the paper Tuoi Tre). 
The national and local press is full of such disputes, of which we were given many examples. It is 
hard to resolve them because there are numerous gaps in the land legislation with regard to 
conflict resolution, and it is unusual for disputes to go to court. The People’s Council at the next 
level up is responsible for resolving such matters, which means that the longer a dispute drags on, 
the further up the hierarchy it goes. 
Another area of concern was the increasing number of land prerogatives acquired by the 
provincial and local levels (setting official land prices, determining the maximum size of 
agricultural farms, etc.). Some of the people we spoke to think that tensions are now at such a 
level that the government will have to backtrack on this; some believe that the provinces will lose 
control of certain categories of land in coming years, such as protected forests and rice fields, that 
it will be the government that decides on changes of use or allocates such lands, and that 
provincial planning will be sufficient for the other categories of land; while others hope for still 
greater liberalisation that will remove power from the provinces by reducing their authority to 
make decisions. All agree that the current transitional situation is a source of tension and 
corruption, as there are no controls over provinces that are poorly prepared to deal with either the 
significant powers with which they are endowed, or the considerable pressure exerted on them by 
the private sector. 
§ The problem of setting land prices 
A good deal of concern was expressed in various quarters about land prices. Foreign donors find 
price-setting procedures opaque, over-administrative and dominated by public actors; and 
numerous institutional actors raised this issue too, perhaps because they are both land users and 
land administrators, but also because this topic was getting huge media coverage while we were 
conducting our research.  
Institutional actors mentioned two problems with particular frequency. Firstly, that there are two 
methods of setting prices during State interventions: one that mainly applies to non-agricultural 
lands and takes account of market prices, and the other that applies to different categories of 
agricultural land and takes account of annual agricultural incomes rather than the value of 
adjacent land. This means that agricultural lands have the same value regardless of changes in the 
use of adjacent land, road building, new enterprises or residential areas, etc., which disqualify 
rights holders from using this type of land but enable speculators to acquire agricultural land 
cheaply, change its status and rent it out (after investing in the construction of housing or 
servicing the land, for example).  
The second problem is the price range set by the State according to the category and location of 
the land. Although these different criteria are taken into consideration, many feel that the ranges 
set at the national level are unable to take account of the diversity of situations. For example, land 
                                                
47 The exact title of the  order is “Quyết định của Thủ tớng Chính Phủ Về việc ban hành quy chế thực hiện cơ chế “một 
cửa” tại cơ quan hành chính nhà nước ở địa phơng“. 
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under annual crops in deltas is supposed to fall within the price range of 4,000 to 90,000 VN 
dongs per m² (+/-20 % at either end of the range), but this is seen as much too low for the rich 
soils of the Mekong and Red River delta, which are harvested several times a year. Furthermore, 
price ranges are extremely unfavourable for agricultural lands valued at over 90,000 VN dongs 
per m². This price bears no relation to the price of residential land in rural areas, which can cost as 
much as 1,250,000 VN dongs (nearly 14 times more), and even less to non-agricultural productive 
rural land, which can go for as much as 67,500,000 VN dongs (750 times more!).  
Most institutional actors describe these methods of price setting as an open door for all kinds of 
corruption. Malpractice by officials (passing on information about new development plans before 
they have been published, or exploiting producers’ ignorance) is generating growing discontent 
among rural people as they discover that not only have they not been paid all their due 
compensation, but that the price of their parcel has increased by a factor of 10, 20 or even more in 
the space of a few months and a couple of visits from a mechanical digger. Farmers and 
agriculture are particularly adversely affected by the legislation because most rural people know 
little about land legislation, and local officials are not trained and are therefore easy to manipulate. 
There is less agreement about the best way of resolving this problem. Some believe that the sector 
should be better framed to make speculation impossible and maintain ways of protecting 
agricultural land, while others think that the market needs to be completely liberalised in order to 
avoid excessive distortion and speculation. Both sides see the State’s choice between the market 
economy and the planned economy, which has yet to be settled, as a problematic decision that 
affects vulnerable populations more than any other sector. 
§ What next? 
This description of the position that international institutions have taken on land issues in Vietnam 
will hold few surprises for those who are familiar with such matters, and especially with the 
World Bank. Poverty and corruption are recurrent themes and problems associated with – and 
even explained by – dysfunctional markets and excessive State intervention. From this 
perspective, the State is simply seen as an operator that needs to exert sufficient control to 
implement and guarantee consistently modelled reforms (allocation of individual use rights, 
certificates, etc.), as the functioning of the market will resolve these problems. Although we have 
seen that there are some differences between the foreign actors concerned, their position is 
relatively homogenous compared with the apparent ‘cacophony’ among the institutional actors 
involved in this sector. 
Land is a much-debated topic that links into fundamental questions about the nature of power and 
the future social and economic orientation of the country. Is the rice-growing peasant still the face 
of Vietnam? In what way is the country still socialist, and will it remain so on a profound or 
superficial level? What role should agriculture and rural areas play? There are many political 
sensitivities and interests at stake, and obvious tensions in the process of establishing institutions 
– both the land administration, which is a powerful and yet ineffectual State within the State, and 
the legislation, whose progress is jerky and apparently oblivious to contradiction. There is a good 
deal of uncertainty, and there will doubtless be other clashes in this rapid transition, but the 
overall evolution is now clear: Vietnam is progressively aligning itself with international land 
law.Many people that we spoke to see this as inevitable, given the economic choices that have 
been made and the constraints of joining the international community (the ASEAN and WTO, 
among others). With the World Bank’s entry into the land arena, Vietnam is clearly indicating at 
the highest level that this question is no longer a purely internal affair, and that it may open up to 
other views and external models. But is this increasing openness, which will involve the State 
giving up some of its powers, tenable in modern Vietnam? Is it a response to economic conditions 
intended to give the appearance of normalisation, or a determined long-term choice? Events such 
as the rocketing price of rice, the ‘food crisis’ and inflation have served to remind Vietnam in 
different ways that it is still a rural country; the constant peasant demonstrations that it is a 
country where the rural population matters and still believes in the State; and the uncertainty 
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among officials that they can still reflect on the way forward and question whether they are going 
in the right direction … 
3.2 The uncertain future for agricultural land  
§  External actors  
While the Vietnamese actors that we spoke to gave us long interviews, our external contacts went 
into much less detail about the specific issue of agricultural land and forests in the land 
legislation. This makes it difficult to add anything to their position on this topic beyond the 
foregoing presentation of their opinion of the legislation as a whole. Nevertheless, there are 
certain points that kept on cropping up in what they said and wrote, which are summarised below. 
• The question of insecurity: many noted the limited duration of rights to agricultural land. 
This is deemed to be unconducive to long-term investments, and of no practical use in 
terms of redistribution since people will find ways of keeping land that they have used 
productively. Another problem is the duration of rights acquired following the sale or 
transfer of land. Therefore, time limits are seen as a cause of tenure insecurity that has no 
social utility. 
• Another frequent observation was that the legislation places far too much value on 
measures that guarantee equitable tenure rather than economically effective agriculture. 
• The fragmentation of agricultural land was was also often mentioned. The extreme drive 
for equity in the early 1990s resulted in the proliferation of categories of parcels whose use 
is allocated to households. Those in the Red River delta can have up to 30 parcels, which 
poses significant problems for mechanisation, water supplies, the construction of 
infrastructures and so on. There have been efforts to consolidate land, particularly in the 
Red River delta, but more needs to be done. There is also a risk of that parcels will be 
voluntarily regrouped, and the World Bank believes that it would be more opportune to let 
market mechanisms run their course. 
 
“The government's response has been to promote the voluntary exchange of parcels among 
farmers, with the aim of consolidating land into larger blocks when several plots are held by a 
single household. Whether consolidation can substantially increase agricultural productivity 
remains an open question. Care needs to be taken to maintain the risk mitigating benefits of 
spatially dispersed plots in different agro-ecological areas. In any event, this measure is 
essentially a one-off intervention. There already exist bottom-up processes of consolidation and 
land accumulation through informal channels, including land exchange, and the rental and sale 
of land-use right certificates (Chung, 2000, and Kerkvliet, 2000). But these informal processes 
need to be complemented by market mechanisms that provide more adaptability and flexibility 
for households”. (World Bank, 2007) 
 
In short, the current management of agricultural lands is dominated by administrative measures 
that restrict economic dynamics; future legislation will need to remove all kinds of administrative 
constraints. 
 
“Numerous administrative constraints over land-use allocation and land use remain. There is 
administrative influence over crops to be grown, even if it is now being eased with the 2001 
revisions to the Land Law. There are constraints on land leasing as well. The family leasing 
land must be in poverty, have taken up another occupation, or lack the capacity to work its land. 
There are also ceilings on land holdings, on duration of land-use rights, and on land 
transactions. Ceilings on land holdings are set at levels below what is economically optimal, 
given experience in neighboring countries. The length of the period of land use is also low. It is 
currently set at 20 years and 50 years for agricultural land and forest land, respectively. 
Lengthening these periods would encourage long-term fixed investments in both agricultural 
land and upland”. (World Bank, 2002b) 
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We have already mentioned that the actors’ positions on forest lands depend on whether they 
consider their management from an environmental or a social point of view. Some want part of 
the forests to be more open, while others want to strengthen protective measures and close them 
off. However, the existence of multiple categories of forest has not been challenged, and all actors 
agree that there is a problem delimiting forests and enforcing these boundaries. For example, in a 
report on the reform of forest enterprises, the World Bank notes that delays in its implementation 
can be ascribed to the poorly defined boundaries of forest lands and parcels, and failure to clearly 
define the different categories of forest (World Bank, 2005a). This creates tensions between forest 
enterprises and households during efforts to get businesses to reallocate land use rights to 
households. These difficulties not only relate to the availability (or lack) of resources to catalogue 
and register forest lands, but also to the lack of clear categories of forest land in the legislation and 
procedures for allocating and cataloguing land. 
GTZ places particular emphasis on the need to involve the public in planning and allocation 
processes, and has developed participatory methodologies in the context of its Land Use Planning 
and Land Allocation projects. These methods relate to questions of governance, but also include 
technical solutions (mapping, MIS systems, remote sensing) designed to address the shortcomings 
identified in this domain. As we mentioned, GTZ has also initated community forestry projects, 
and criticised some of the social aspects of the legislation on the grounds that local people are 
insufficiently involved in forest management, and policies are poorly thought out. 
§  Institutional actors  
The last section considered several aspects of agricultural and forest lands, especially the specific 
way that the legislation deals with these lands. We also noted that Vietnamese officials respond to 
this situation in different ways; some believing that it is useful to further protect agricultural land, 
and others preferring to abandon any specific system and let the market take its course. As Dinh 
Huu Hoang and Dang Kim Son (2008) observed, there are two current trains of thought in 
Vietnam regarding the future management of agricultural land. One sees it as a key element of 
poverty reduction, believing that it is necessary to allocate land resources equitably between 
farming households. The other thinks that the future of rural areas lies in a large number of 
households migrating to urban and peri-urban areas, a radical modernisation of farms (and greater 
concentration of land) and greater focus on using land for tourism and ecological purposes. 
It is hard to explain why different Vietnamese officials support one or other thesis, as we do not 
have enough information about the hypotheses, the individuals or their institutions. However, the 
fact that there are such diverse views is interesting in itself, as it indicates that there are tensions 
between both officials and institutions regarding the future of agricultural lands. Although 
members of the MoNRE and MARD that we approached were by no means unanimous, we felt 
that there was much more sympathy for greater liberalisation of the land market within the 
MoNRE, and that the MARD was more in favour of strengthening the place of the State and 
recentralisation in order to protect agriculture and farmers, who are seen as ill-prepared for greater 
liberalisation. It is likely that members of the MARD, whose attributions have been considerably 
reduced by the land reforms, are partly seeking to protect their functions by advocating greater 
State intervention in agricultural affairs. Conversely, members of the land administration see their 
role valorised and their power strengthened by the introduction of modern registration systems. 
Their positions are therefore probably linked to the history of the institutions themselves, and 
should be seen in relation to the competition between them described earlier in this paper. 
The positioning of the different actors also needs to be understood in the political context of 
Vietnam, and the increasing priority given to the industrialisation of the nation since the mid-
1990s – its objective is to become an industrial country by 2020 – to the detriment of agriculture. 
This has led to differentiations between actors. In the province of Lao Cai, which is still very 
agricultural, certain officials think that the government has not gone far enough in promoting the 
processes of industrialisation and investment. One source in the province wanted to be able to 
intervene on the land use certificates allocated for forest lands, which he considers (in a very 
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classic way) to be under-utilised by households. In his view, allocating individual use rights to 
forest lands is of little benefit to the recipients and significantly hampers investment in agriculture 
and forestry, and thus the development of the province as a whole (including its exports, which 
are mainly agricultural). Therefore, this allocation should be reviewed and the province allowed to 
directly manage forest lands. This type of position is clearly driven by the desire to develop the 
province and the strong competition between provinces, which is mainly focused on industrial and 
commercial development, with provinces publicly ranked each year according to the amount of 
investment they have attracted.  
Unaffected by such pressures, actors at the national level have a different view of agricultural 
issues. Some think it is a shame that priority has been given to industrial investments, and believe 
that the little room that legislation has given to agricultural and forest lands since the 1993 Land 
Law is not only prejudicial to the modernisation of the agricultural sector, but also makes it 
vulnerable to other sectors of land-related activity. 
The differences between national actors also seem to be linked to the role that foreign institutions 
play in land matters. While MARD officials use rhetoric reminiscent of the socialist period to 
justify the specific treatment of agricultural land (essential means of production, equitable 
distribution, limited accumulation, need for planning, etc.), it is worth noting that MoNRE 
officials use very similar arguments to those of the institutions that currently dominate land 
matters. So it was interesting that two members of the MoNRE made references to the work of the 
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (favoured by the World Bank) in order to justify the 
consolidation of the land administration and strengthen private ownership. As one member of the 
MARD told us, “at the MoNRE, everyone talks about de Soto’s theory, but no one thinks about 
the specificities of Vietnamese agricrulture”. Is this a passing fashion? Perhaps. But there’s no 
mystery about where it originated. 
§ Problems with the legislation on agricultural affairs 
In addition to the problems created by the specific treatment of agricultural and forest lands, the 
legislation on these categories of land raises numerous other issues.  
• The absence of tax is sometimes seen as problematic, in that because producers aren’t 
taxed they are not encouraged to produce directly and may under-utilise or rent out their 
land. This limits land transactions and penalises households with little or no land (because 
the land is retained by people who don’t use it). The two phenomena are often presented as 
interlinked. 
• Another problem is the choice of an approach that focuses solely on the quantity of land 
and not its quality. It is not deemed sufficient to set spatial limits for such huge categories 
as rice fields, annual crops, perennial crops, etc., when a single parcel may produce three 
rice harvests, yields from perennial crops can vary greatly, and soil quality and farming 
practices also need to be taken into account. This is a common criticism among members 
of the MARD, who question the land classification proposed by the MoNRE on the 
grounds that it is too simplistic and shows a lack of knowledge about the realities of 
agriculture. The problem here is partly due to ‘incomplete’ and insufficiently detailed 
planning, and concern for the mechanism to deliver immediate – and visible – results rather 
than agricultural effectiveness. 
• Other officials – mostly from the MoNRE – who are critical of the land categories think 
the problem is not that the categories are inadequate, but that they have been imposed at 
all. Why compel some farmers to produce rice in a context where they get very little return 
for working hard throughout the year? Why should these farmers have to sacrifice 
themselves for national food security? The only way that producers can maintain their 
activity is by sidestepping the law. 
• Some officials go even further, arguing that there is no further use (apart from ideological) 
in maintaining temporal or spatial limits on agricultural holdings as the time limits are not 
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real, since the land will be reallocated to its users and the spatial limits can easily be 
circumvented by land acquisitions. The land categories and spatial and temporal limitations 
are archaisms that live on in the texts but no longer reflect the realities on the ground. 
• Another recurrent point was the producers’ lack of involvement in the allocation of 
agricultural land and decisions regarding land management. While certain land-related 
decisions taken in the early 1990s are deemed to have responded to the aspirations of the 
majority of producers, these producers are no more involved in formulating land legislation 
and development plans now than they were in the past, at any administrative level, which 
makes them subject to rather than actors in the land system. This situation is aggravated by 
their poor understanding of complex legislation, as no effort has been made to ‘translate’ it 
into a more accessible format. There has also been criticism of the lack of public 
information in the legal domain, which puts rural households in a vulnerable position and 
exacerbates problems of corruption at every level, as households usually only become 
aware of the abuse to which they have fallen victim well after it has taken place. 
§ Problems with the legislation on forestry 
Many of the problems that were raised with regard to forested lands are technical, as these lands 
are seen as being particularly difficult to manage.  
• One issue is the difficulty in determining the different categories of forest lands, given the 
extent of forested areas and the variety of natural and secondary forests – not to mention 
the distinction between agricultural and forest areas, which is a common stumbling block 
among forestry and agricultural experts. This is partly due to the lack of clear forest 
typologies and acute shortage of qualified staff to undertake this work (which result in 
fanciful interpretations that differ from one province to the next); and (despite more 
appropriate legal texts relating to land and forests) partly to the unresolved problem caused 
by the lack of correspondance between the various categories that the MARD uses to 
manage forests and the MoNRE to allocate forest use rights. 
• There is also a technical problem in allocating use rights and establishing land registers in 
hilly regions, which are often inaccessible. The registers that do exist are not very accurate, 
and households don’t always know the exact location or boundaries of their parcels. This 
makes it almost impossible to respect others’ land ‘ownership’ or for producers to control 
the ownership of their own parcels. “People go onto each other’s land and those who have 
got parcels can’t keep livestock (buffalo) off them, or stop other people from coming in 
and harvesting produce or even planting crops”. This situation also means that people who 
do have parcels don’t benefit from programmes to assist households (such as Programme 
61, which planned to provide assistance with plantations) because they only provide help 
for holders of clearly identified parcels. 
• The forestry administration also suffers from lack of staff and effective monitoring tools, 
and is powerless to respond to the need to monitor ownership or verify how land is actually 
used. 
• Another point that was frequently mentioned is the excessive fragmentation of farms due to 
the different categories of forest and sub-rights, as households have to receive parcels from 
each category. According to Dinh Huu Hoang and Dang Kim Son (2008), households 
receive two or three parcels averaging 2.87 ha each, and in extreme situations some have 
been allocated about 15 parcels, often located some distance from each other. 
And apart from purely technical questions, the State’s position on households and individuals is 
far from clear on several issues. 
• Households and individuals have received about 25 per cent of the available forest land 
that has been registered in Vietnam (currently 12 million hectares), but their derived rights 
are limited and they have very little say in how this land can be used, even down to the 
crop variety they can plant, as each province determines the priority species. 
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• The forestry legislation bans slash-and-burn in all classified forests – not that households 
have sufficient land to continue this practice anyway. They have not had any assistance in 
switching to a new production system, even though agro-forestry crops take a lot of time 
and money to establish, and farmers do not always see the benefit in growing them as they 
are not particularly profitable. Thus, the distribution of land rights is inefficient, ignored, or 
may put households in a difficult situation. One of our sources suggested that using land 
tenure to manage forested areas is an ineffective and dangerously easy solution regularly 
employed by the government in the uplands during riots. This is frequently blamed on 
proselytising by the United States, but the fact is that land is often a major problem. 
• Another problem that was mentioned is the disappearance of communal forest lands 
because of the allocation of individual use rights. This makes it difficult to rear large 
ruminants, especially buffalo, which now graze virtually anywhere in the forest, get lost 
and have high mortality rates. For, example, huge numbers of buffalo died in the very cold 
winter in the north of the country in 2007-2008, leaving many households in the mountains 
without animals for traction. Collections were organised to help them by sending livestock 
from the delta, reversing the normal flow as producers in the delta usually buy animals 
from mountainous areas. 
• It is also difficult to get money to establish plantations. Because credit is only available to 
better-off households, poorer people have no alternative but to carry on harvesting or using 
land illegally, which reinforces inequalities between households. Acording to two members 
of MARD (Dinh Huu Hoang and Dang Kim Son, 2008), the wealthiest households make a 
smaller proportion of their income from forests than the poor (7 per cent for the wealthiest 
households, compared with 19 per cent for the poorest), but much more in absolute terms 
(respectively 2.5 million dongs and 1.6 millions dongs per producer). In addition to this, 
the fact that aid programmes only help holders of clearly defined parcels is seen as creating 
inequalities between households, especially when local officials who are better informed 
about regulations and allocation procedures use their position to capture aid from 
programmes supporting agroforestry or plantations. 
Because of the difficulties in controlling forest land use, and because the proposed uses do not 
correspond to households’ needs, only 20 to 30 per cent of households use their parcels as they 
are supposed to (ibid.). Certain sources say that this has led the government to change the 
categories of forest lands, in order to open up some of these areas to agriculture and limit the 
amount of land that is completely closed off. No one that we spoke to questioned the need for 
classes of forest land that allow their use to be regulated in order to protect certain forests from 
human activity. 
It is not only individuals and households that are failed by land and forestry policies. As noted 
above, the main beneficiaries of use rights to forested areas are forest enterprises, which have 
been allocated two thirds of the land concerned. Yet timber production is not very well developed, 
and the small amount of forested land that does go on the market is transferred between 
individuals. Thus, land and forestry legislation have not had the expected effect of boosting the 
industrial forestry sector through private or State forestry companies. 
There are very few private forestry companies, even though the law of 2003 allows foreigners to 
rent forested land for long periods. Private foreign and national companies invest little in the 
forestry sector, partly because of the poor transport infrastructure and the fact that forestry 
activities are not very profitable (neighbouring countries like Laos and Cambodia have more 
abundant forests and lower production costs), and partly for reasons associated with the legal 
system: 
• The legislation is incomplete and subject to frequent changes; 
• Provincial plans may change, as the provinces can decide which species are essential and 
which may or may not be grown, such as bamboo, rubber, etc. Companies making long-
term investments want to know that there will be a market for what they have planted;  
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• The National Assembly has to approve any enterprise covering more than 200 hectares. 
This is a lengthy procedure because the Assembly doesn’t have time to attend to non-
urgent individual cases, and only meets four times a year, when it has to examine 
numerous draft laws 
• Forested lands are extremely fragmented, which makes it difficult to set up large 
enterprises as this involves negotiating with huge numbers of use rights holders. 
The majority of projects are backed by the State. However, this is not a very effective sector. In 
2007, there were 355 State enterprises (lâm truong) or NFEs (national forestry entreprises) 
managing 3.5 million hectares of forest (Dinh Huu Hoang and Dang Kim Son, 2008), but they had 
little known output.48 There are various reasons for this: 
• Their known output is not only small, but also inaccurate due to the opaque  management 
of NFEs, especially those that belong to the army. Little is known about their activity, and 
they probably produce much more than official statistics suggest; 
• Despite efforts to reform businesses, the focus on closing the  least profitable enterprises 
(Decree 200/CP) means that now, many  continue solely to benefit from State subsidies in 
the form of wages, management assistance and help from development projects; 
• This process is interfering with the allocation of use rights for productive forest lands to 
local communities (which is supposed to be implemented by these enterprises), depriving 
them of labour and the resources to manage plantations; 
• There is no coordination between enterprise and local government (Jong et al., 2006). 
NFEs may be directly managed at the central or provincial levels, which respectively 
managed 40 and 328 entreprises in 2006. Some enterprises allocate land themselves, and 
the very largest call upon the services of each of the districts in which they operate to do 
this, but purely as executing agencies with no decision-making powers. 
The final point raised by institutional actors is the failure of plantation programmes. This can be 
explained by their lack of monitoring, as the State decides the content of major programmes (as in 
the recent initiative to develop 200,000 hectares of rubber plantations) and provides the financial 
resources to set them up, but takes no interest in how they are implemented. This does not create a 
climate conducive to participation by local actors, and the lack of monitoring is also responsible 
for the failure of the plantations in the long term, as the trees die due to lack of care or are 
sometimes pulled up after plantation project staff have left the area. Another problem is that 
plantation programmes like the Five million hectares Reforestation Program cannot find 
sufficient deforested land to replant. Most of the land has been distributed between households 
that claim they are using parcels to which they have no established use rights, arguing that they 
have been cultivated recently and are therefore being used. 
                                                
48 NFEs were introduced in the North in the mid-1950s and then replicated in the South after 1975. They continued to 
increase until the mid-1980s and peaked at over 1,000 by the end of the 1980s, before falling to about 500 in 2004, 
370 in 2006 and 355 in 2007. 
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CONCLUSION 
This conclusion is an opportunity to revisit the original research questions, which operate on two 
levels. 
The first concerns the conditions that explain the diversity of situations observed at the local level. 
We believe that this diversity is evidence of the vitality of customary local land institutions (and 
thus social and spatial organisation), despite 30 years of collectivisation in the north of the 
country. This diversity has to be acceptable at other levels in order to flourish at the local level, 
raising the question of how is it handled by the political and administrative echelons that have real 
autonomy in Vietnam: the State and the provinces. Is this diversity endured, managed or even 
manipulated? Has it had an impact on the current reforms? One of the objectives of this research 
was to investigate the ‘spaces’ in the evolution and functioning of institutions at these two levels 
that make this diversity possible. Our first hypothesis was that one of these spaces lies in the 
articulation between the two levels. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to understand how the 
land system functions in the provinces – the level at which the most detailed decisions are taken 
within the framework of decentralisation – in order to determine how much of this diversity is due 
to the legal and administrative framework itself, whether or not this is intentional (or presented as 
such). 
The second level concerns the State and how the basis of its legitimacy has changed in the context 
of the land reform. What does this reform tell us about the broader reform of the Vietnamese 
State, about its practical and symbolic approach to the reform of its institutions, and how it comes 
to terms with its ‘historic’ ideological foundations? By redefining the links between the land, 
individuals and organisations, the land reform is at the heart of the new social contract proposed 
in the ‘market socialism’ project, and reveals a good deal about this initiative.  
The proposed procedure for answering these questions was based on analysis of the land reform 
process (which was itself based on a preliminary study describing this process in detail), and 
identifying the actors in this reform and analysing their discourses. While this was obviously not 
going to give us definitive answers to all of our questions, it does inform the analysis of our 
findings, indicate how they help answer our questions, and show which questions remain 
unanswered. 
The first two sections of this conclusion present a more technical viewpoint, synthesising what we 
learned about the process of reforming land institutions, while bearing in mind the fact that this 
reform is an ongoing – and constantly evolving – process, and that the diversity of local situations 
is partly explained by the shortcomings of the legal and administrative systems. 
The next two sections focus more on the discourse surrounding this reform, and how the various 
actors analyse its performance and dysfunctionalities. That leads us to the question of whether or 
not the shortcomings identified are genuinely technical. We also raise the specific issue of the 
place given to agriculture, farmers and agricultural and forested areas in the new Vietnam that is 
being built and, through the prism of land, reflect on the course it is taking in it efforts to 
modernise and change from a highly centralised agricultural country to a modern industrial and 
liberal nation. 
Land institutions ‘in transition’  
One of the peculiarities of the Vietnamese land system is the existence of a ‘zero state’ with 
regard to land institutions: all the country’s land institutions have been put in place in the last 25 
years or so. However, this does not mean that there is no history of institutions. Those that are 
now emerging carry the traces of the past, as can be seen in the multiplicity of customary 
institutions whose logic often continues to function at the local level, and which thus live on in 
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land management practices. Similarly, echoes of the French land system can be found in the 
decision to prioritise registered certificates of ownership (deed system) rather than the more 
Anglo-Saxon title system. Paradoxically, it seems that the collectivist period has had the strongest 
influence on current institutions, although this is becoming less marked. In the last 25 years, the 
process of creating institutions has shown that they were initially kept to the bare minimum, and 
were put in place in response to the high expectations of what was then a rural society, without 
making land an autonomous domain. It is only recently that the State has come to formulate a 
genuine land system that supersedes the last vestiges of the previous period. How have these 
institutions been put in place and what stage are they at now? 
The first stage (1979-1993) saw the dissolution of the cooperatives and a return to the question of 
land in rurual areas. Reversing the process of collectivisation, which had entailed the progressive 
dissolution of land institutions in the collectivist project, the Vietnamese government used land as 
a lever to undo the cooperatives – without initially acknowledging this. The State then proceeded 
in small stages, first recognising individuals and households as potential land users (Decree 100, 
Decree 10 and the Land Law of 1989), although use rights were limited and defined within the 
cooperatives through temporary contracts between the cooperatives, which still held delegated 
management rights, and these new users. The Land Law of 1993 marked the second phase of this 
period. Cooperatives were not openly challenged, but individuals and households now had 
fundamental derived management rights in addition to use rights (the right to exchange, assign, 
rent, bequeath and mortgage land), giving them significant control over land for relatively long 
fixed periods and divesting the cooperatives of their real capacity to manage land. These rights 
only apply to use rights, so it is not land that is transferred or mortgaged, but the right to use land 
and enjoy its produce. However, their very existence and the relatively long periods for which 
they were allocated meant that land rights increasingly resembled a form of limited private 
ownership, and that a land market could develop.   
The second stage was one of transition, allowing a ‘smooth’ (or ‘imperceptible’) shift from a land 
system designed to meet rural expectations to one intended to support efforts to transform 
Vietnam into a modern industrial and urban nation. This stage more or less coincided with the 10 
years separating the land laws of 1993 and 2003. During this period the State did very little to the 
rights accorded to individuals and households, simply reassuring users by indicating in the law of 
1998 (which amended that of 1993) that it would not undertake a large-scale redistribution of land 
use rights in 2013, when the use rights for rice fields assigned for 20 years in 1993 are due to 
expire. Land use planning was also made more flexible in 2001 (in an amendment to the 1993 
land law), making it easier to modify land categories at the lowest levels and better respond to 
producers’ aspirations. Land use was thus made more secure and more account was taken of local 
initiatives without modifying the length of allocations or questioning the categories of land. 
Meanwhile, the State was endeavouring to put the land administration in place, and in 1994 it 
created an independent body, the General Department of Land Administration (GDLA). This was 
the first time that the decision-making, operational and technical departments concerned with land 
were brought together in one department (which now included the the former General Department 
of Land Management created in 1979, and the former National Department of Surveys and 
Mapping), demonstrating the political will to make this an autonomous domain that carried some 
weight. The State also progressively (but haphazardly, by generating more and more texts) 
regulated modes of access to urban, industrial and commercial land and increased the rights 
assigned to private enterprises, thus paving the way for change in the next period. 
The third stage started with the reform of the land administration in 2002 and the publication of a 
new Land Law in 2003. In this new configuration, land became a tool for territorial development 
aimed at industrialisation and urbanisation, although this was not immediately apparent. The new 
administrative structure created to manage land was effectively incorporated into a new ministry, 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), which seemed more indicative of 
a desire to use land to share natural resources and serve the environment. This was not a neutral 
choice in a period when the environment was a ‘fashionable’ issue among the international 
authorities. There is almost certainly‘corporatist’ logic at work too, as land specialists were often 
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recruited among those trained in environmental sciences and/or associated technical domains such 
as cartography, topography or topometry.  In Vietnam, land is thus an environmental and a 
technical issue, before being a social, political or legal matter. But establishing the new structure 
within this ministry could also be interpreted in a different way: it is impossible not to think that 
being attached to the MoNRE, which then became the central office for land management and 
thus placed this new body under ministerial tutelage, is evidence of a political will to reduce the 
weight – and even the power – of the land administration by stripping it of its administrative and 
financial autonomy. 
This loss of autonomy came at a time when efforts were being made to modernise the land 
administration and increase efficiency, and it is possible that this new balance was established in 
order to avoid creating an over-powerful institution. Most efforts were focused on the technical 
aspects of land registries and land registration, with the stated aim of increasing transparency. 
This modernisation also reaffirmed the central role of the Land Office in land use planning at 
every level (and thus in territorial development) and, by giving it the new task of determining land 
prices, made it a key actor in the land market. Finally, the Land Office remained the principal 
legislator, giving it the power to guide modes of land management, especially those regulating 
access to land. The law of 2003 and ensuing arrangements made the land legislation a much more 
complete and effective land management tool. Few changes were made to the rules regulating 
access to agricultural and forest lands set in 1993, which did not become much more flexible for 
rural households. But other categories of land and users – some of which appear for the first time 
in the legislation – occupied a growing, and even dominant, place in the law. Thus, the new 
legislation was full of arrangements designed to facilitate industrial and commercial investments 
by private and foreign enterprises, and allowed markets for land and land use rights to develop. 
The new legislation also specified cataloguing and planning procedures. Land use planning 
remained a top-down procedure steered by the Land Office at different levels, but became much 
more flexible as the legislation extended the prerogatives of the provinces and provided 
opportunities for the administrative authorities at this level to modify the status of land. In a 
context of proliferating and increasingly complex issues associated with land and decentralisation, 
the Land Office became more powerful than ever as the sole body with responsibility for planning 
at every level. 
The history of land institutions in Vietnam since the opening up of the economy can be 
summarised as the ‘creation’ and progressive but chaotic ‘standardisation’ of these institutions. 
Over the long term, it seems to have been a relatively linear evolution, following Vietnam’s 
increasing openness to the outside world and growing understanding that it needs to be more like 
other countries in order to trade and do business with them. The legislation became increasingly 
complex, but also more complete, allowing land to emerge from virtual obscurity to become a 
self-contained domain. The vagueness of the initial texts (1988 and 1993), which were more 
political projects than real legislation, was replaced by detailed, unified and enforceable (in part) 
legislation that the forthcoming land code should further improve. The land system was becoming 
increasingly open: including new users and new categories of land, and proposing fundamental 
new and derived rights. It also gave the private sector an increasing role, even in the system for 
managing land issues (private bodies undertaking land use planning at the provincial or district 
levels and managing land funds during expropriations). The system was becoming ever more 
liberal.  
However, land institutions, and land legislation in particular, were also evolving chaotically. It is 
hard to find projects that were conceived and implemented for the long term, and while the land 
laws succeeded each other with relative (and commendable) regularity, this was driven by the 
need to catch up with the pressing problems of the day rather than a continuous process of 
resolving land issues. The law of 1998, for example, created land tenure at the legal level, but was 
perfectly pointless. That of 1993 ratified the regulation of the question of agricultural and forest 
lands for rural households, but did nothing to address the needs of other domains. Later on, the 
law of 2003 ignored rural areas whose needs had nevertheless evolved and whose future was 
increasingly linked with urban areas, and – belatedly as ever – supported endeavours to make 
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Vietnam an urban and industrial country by 2020. This lack of method raises the question of 
where the reforms were heading. While they had been moving towards greater liberalisation 
(decentralisation, creating a market, increasing numbers of users, giving more space to the private 
sector, etc.), the real nature of the Vietnamese project was not entirely clear – which may help 
explain this lack of method.  
The general move towards greater openness and liberalisation has not erased all traces of 
socialism from the Vietnamese project (hence the ‘market socialism’). Since the Constitution of 
1959, the State has retained ownership of the land (in the name of the entire people), and while 
land rights have been constantly extended, they are still derived rights of use and management 
since land ownership is limited to the State. Therefore, it is only the conditions of use and 
recognised users that have changed. Clearly interventionist mechanisms such as the principle of 
land classification and top-down land use planning remain in place. 
The chaotic and hesitant nature of the changes affecting land should not simply be seen as proof 
of incompetence at the highest levels of authority. Some of the people we spoke to see it as “a 
technique of trial and error”, proof of a pragmatic State (and Party) that authorises discrepancies, 
gaps and lack of precision in order to facilitate subsequent adjustments that can (possibly) be 
enshrined in laws. This idea of a loosely controlled process of trial and error is particularly 
pertinent to agricultural lands, which are covered by specific regulations that still bear the imprint 
of the philosophy behind the socialist period, and to the land administration with all its apparent 
shortcomings. 
The functioning and dysfunctionality of the land administration:  
reality testing 
The fairly large number of reports, project documents and institutional publications that express 
concern about the delays and lack of coherence in the Vietnamese land administration justify an 
intervention in this domain. However, these assessments are based on figures that are both 
unreliable and rarely available. Any assessment will necessarily be limited, given the lack of 
detailed qualitative studies. Even now, parts of the country are still not covered by land registers, 
many registers are still done manually, and households don’t always have certificates for the land 
that they use (use right certificates, which they have had the right to hold since 1993). Land 
administration is patchy, and there are significant variations between land categories and regions 
(two characteristics that may or may not be related to each other). However, these delays and lack 
of coherence should not be ascribed to an ineffective administration, since certificates have been 
allocated for nearly 80 per cent of agricultural land, and the land administration has also had to 
deal with the specific difficulty of establishing itself on the job in a constantly changing 
administrative and economic context; not only putting in place cohorts of civil servants at every 
level, but also defining complex technical procedures adapted to every situation. As in many other 
countries, there is also the question of the human and financial resources available to enable the 
land administration to do its job. It still has considerable human and financial needs, especially at 
the lowest levels (communes, districts) where staff usually have little or no training. But the 
technical and financial aspects are only part of the picture. Even a very rough analysis of the 
administration’s main achievements shows that, like the legislation, it primarily responds to the 
emergencies and priorities of the moment, and reflects political uncertainties. 
This was the case with the priority first given to rural areas at the end of the 1980s, (to a lesser 
extent) to agricultural lands and forests, and to the most densely populated areas with the highest 
demand for land allocations, such as the Red River delta – which largely explains the disparities 
we observed. Today, urbanisation and industrial development are concentrating efforts in new 
areas, and the realities of economic openness (such as membership of the WTO) have forced the 
focus to shift from large numbers of allocations to the quality and sustainability of the registration 
system. This is reflected in the objectives of the programme to modernise the administration 
launched in 2002; or, on a more modest scale, the decree of 2004 requiring land use rights 
certificates to be issued according to a uniform system across the country. 
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This arrangement calling for the standardisation of titling procedures highlights another difficulty 
for the central land administration: its articulation with the provincial powers. Our work in the 
province of Binh Duong shows that a lot happens between the central and the provincial levels. 
Planning is a telling example of the distortions associated with a shift between levels. The initial 
10-year plan (quy hoạch), which covers the entire province, is a document approved at the central 
level by the Prime Minister, and constitutes the only authentic legal document at that level. In 
practice, however, this plan has little meaning: the bottom-up process of proposals and top-down 
process of validation/correction is problematic in several respects, and raises questions about the 
application of the plan. Significant time lags mean that the provinces have to deal with current 
plans that have not been validated (in Binh Duong the 2000-2010 plan was approved by the 
government in 2005, five years before its expiry date), and administrative sub-divisions have to 
extend plans from previous periods that have been validated. The need to have plans validated at 
the national level before they can be adopted at the district or communal level, while the province 
already plans for the districts, makes planning inoperative at these levels and now raises questions 
about planning at the district level. Another problem with planning is the multiplicity of actors 
and interests at play. On the one hand, provincial planning is entirely led by the MoNRE, which is 
both project manager (this is not always the case, as in Lao Ci, for example) and decision-maker 
at this level. This raises problems regarding the objectivity of the procedure, and does not prevent 
disagreements between the different levels as the central level does not always approve 
provincial-level plans, thus demonstrating the limitations of decentralisation. 
Paradoxically, the problems with planning also highlight the limitations of centralism. As noted, 
plans are usually approved very tardily, and the provinces do not have the resources to control 
their application. However, this actually gives them considerable room to manouevre – room that 
a very dynamic province like Binh Duong desperately needs to alleviate the deficiencies of 
planning that is generally incapable of anticipating ongoing changes. The role that Hanoi seems to 
want to retain in land use planning raises the question of its capacity to deal with local issues in a 
context of rapid change. What should we think about a Land Office that has to prepare, monitor 
and put forward for validation detailed plans for 57 very diverse provinces? In the province of 
Binh Duong alone, land use management raises three fundamental and contradictory issues: 
accommodating foreign investors, extending residential areas, and maintaining rice- and rubber-
producing areas. Apart from the technical impossibility of doing this, does the Land Office have 
the capacity to take account of the social and economic dimensions of the decisions it will be 
required to make? 
Another pressing question in the provinces is the place given to the private sector. The rapidly 
changing balance between the public and private sectors is creating tensions between the different 
levels of administration and decision-making, which have an effect on land matters. One revealing 
example is the installation of private investment projects. Since the amendment of 2001 the 
provinces have been able to convert 1 to 200 hectares of agricultural land into industrial land, 
giving them the opportunity to develop much more substantial industrial projects than they could 
in the past, and with fewer formalities and less delay because they no longer have to go through 
the central level.  Decree N° 181 of 2004 allows projects (including totally foreign ones) to be 
established outside special zones or parks, but not in existing zones. This possibility, combined 
with delays in planning, gives the provinces considerable room to manoeuvre in meeting 
investors’ needs. 
The greater autonomy given to the provinces and private investors was heightened by the creation 
of ‘land fund development organisations’ in 2004. The recurrent problems with installations are 
largely due to the way that land is expropriated, and especially how holders of use rights are 
compensated for expropriated land. Recent attempts have been made to regulate this problem, 
which is dealt with on a case-by-case basis by the provinces or the Land Office. In the Law of 
2003, the State still seemed to be the main actor in land distribution, requisitioning land in order 
to immediately reallocate it to investors. Since 2004, the State has disengaged itself from land 
requisition transactions by creating a new body, the ‘land fund development organisations’ it has 
mandated to manage land transfers. Their main task is to simplify procedures for investors by 
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offering them a single interface, to manage the funds from land recovered by the State in 
accordance with decisions by the competent bodies, and to prepare these lands before they are 
handed over to investors. In reality, however, these organisations do not have much of a presence. 
They are not mandatory, and operate under the auspices of two ministries, the MoNRE and the 
Ministry of the Interior. Their form and level of competence are vaguely defined, as they can 
operate at the district or provincial level; they are neither commercial nor entirely public, and do 
not have their own financial capacity because they are not entirely dependent on the provincial 
People’s Committee. For all these reasons, it is hard for them to be independent of the structures 
whose actions they are supposed to harmonise, confirming the negative opinion held by certain 
civil servants in Hanoi, who view them as an additional obstacle to investment rather than an 
element that facilitates it. For the same reasons, people whose rights have been expropriated have 
not been better compensated since the ‘land funds’ and their management bodies were put in 
place. It is difficult for these organisations to mobilise funds for compensation because they do 
not have their own resources; and in their centralising role they do not question the decision-
making capacities of the different organisations involved in investment projects (and thus their 
potential financial requirements), to the cost of those whose land has been expropriated. 
The government’s response to the problem of expropriations in the province of Binh Duong has 
been to create a private company that will recover land and compensate current users over a 
probationary five-year period. The problematic aspect of installing investors is thus transferred to 
the private sector, leaving this institution to manage any problems that might arise. 
One of the likely consequences of these new modalities is land speculation. Transferring the risk 
of transactions to the private sector could increase land values due to the simple fact that some of 
this land has to be set aside for former users. This part of the land – which is slated for housing 
and is therefore of high value – could then be used as a cushion against possible losses if there are 
insufficient bids, or simply to increase land revenues thanks to the residential element. Property 
prices would increase significantly in these conditions, as they already have in metropolitan areas.  
Many of the people we spoke to in Hanoi (officials at the central level) are uneasy about the fact 
that the provinces have acquired an increasing number of prerogatives in land matters: changing 
land use, modes of compensation, setting official prices (as clearly seen in Binh Duong), 
determining the size of agricultural farms, etc. They see the current interim situation, where the 
provinces have relatively substantial powers but act as a buffer between the State and private 
investors, as a source of tension and corruption. 
There is often a close connection between land and corruption. Many Vietnamese officials, 
external actors and observers believe that corruption is linked with the role that the State plays in 
land matters, or more precisely, the way that public and private actors meet and/or hold their 
discussions. With land, this is a particularly pressing problem at the provincial level, which 
recently acquired important decision-making powers that allow it to capture (to the detriment of 
the State and other lower levels) revenues generated by new investment projects that provide local 
employment and potentially enrich the province in the longer term if the projects develop. Our 
surveys in Lao Cai province show that certain investments have been authorised without proper 
preliminary investigations, and that the stated objectives of a project may be hijacked or the land 
obtained sublet for projects other than those that were planned. The people we spoke to had 
different views on how this could be tackled: some proposed recentralisation, as the central level 
is supposedly better equipped to negotiate with powerful private actors; others advocated greater 
liberalisation in order to reduce the role of public actors. In the last five years, the State has given 
greater credence to the latter view, assigning certain delicate tasks to private actors and approving 
projects that should improve the transparency of land operations while the administration ensures 
that the market functions. But the principle of centralised planning has yet to be questioned, and 
the continued ring-fencing of certain domains means that they are both protected and weakened. 
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Agricultural land: protected area or sacrifical sector? 
For the last 15 years agricultural and forested areas (or agricultural land in the broad sense) have 
been kept in a relatively isolated and unchanging state. Although this is supposed to protect them 
(and their users), it is now making them vulnerable to the dynamics of urban and/or non-
agricultural lands (industrial and commercial, leisure, etc.). 
The current situation with agricultural land is largely the product of history. Since the communist 
revolution, land in Vietnam has been a primarily rural issue whose history is closely linked with 
various rural reforms: agrarian reform, collectivisation and then decollectivisation. This continued 
after Doi Moi until the early 1990s and culminated in the Land Law of 1993. Like the law of 
1988, this was a sectoral law in that it was almost exclusively concerned with rural, agricultural 
and forest lands, and paid scant attention to urban and non-agricultural lands. At this point it was a 
matter of legalising and organising individualised land tenure in the countryside, through a law 
that granted fundamental individual rights to agricultural land users under the auspices of the 
State, rather than the cooperatives as was previously the case. This law also organised the 
distribution of land between users and protected agricultural uses. Rights of use were secured by 
sub-rights, but these use rights were still assigned on a temporary basis for variable periods 
determined by the crop grown (rice, annual or perennial crops). The amount of land to which 
rights could be allocated was also regulated according to the type of land, which could not be 
modified outside the framework of plans produced in Hanoi. This law led to the last major 
redistribution of agricultural lands, relaunched the setting of forest boundaries, and marked the 
start of a nationwide titling process (individuals now had the right to certificates) and 10 years of 
intense activity for the different levels of the land administration. 
From then on it seemed as though legislation partly forgot about agricultural land, apparently 
considering the matter settled. There were several changes: the rights associated with use rights 
were extended (and increased from five to ten), ways of changing the status of land became more 
flexible, a new status for large-scale farms was introduced, and the time limits on rights to use 
forest lands were lifted. But access to agricultural land remains highly regulated, especially by 
maintaining the maximum limits on the size and duration of land allocations. This specific status 
makes it possible to limit land accumulation and ensure equitable access to land among the rural 
population. According to the same logic, the use rights allocated to households by the State are 
not taxed, and land prices are determined by the value of agricultural output rather than the price 
of adjacent land (market prices), which should mean that land remains accessible to even the 
poorest rural households.  But the specific status of agricultural land, and especially land used for 
rice, which is particularly protected, can work against rural households by confining them to small 
landholdings and forcing them to use their land for agricultural purposes. The fact that agricultural 
land is not taxed is one reason why the agricultural sector is stagnating, as there is no economic 
benefit in changing the status of land or selling it when changing to another activity. Using its 
output to determine the value of agricultural land also penalises households whose land has been 
expropriated and who have been obliged to transfer it. While land outside the agricultural sector is 
becoming increasingly valuable and more and more users can gain relatively easy access to 
agricultural land through long-term rental contracts, each expropriation shows that some rural 
households end up being more exposed than supported. In reality, are they – along with 
agriculture – actually being sacrificed to industrialisation and urbanisation, rather than being 
protected from it? 
The answer to this question is not as simple as it might seem. The situation for rural households 
varies considerably from one region to the next. The land market (and pressures on land) has not 
developed much outside the major deltas, and the conversion of agricultural land is not always an 
immediate issue, which makes land legislation more or less of a constraint for different 
households.  It does protect some rural households, such as those on forest land, whose rights are 
allocated for open-ended periods – although certain provincial officials would very much like to 
challenge this so that they can allocate (or rent) rights to vast areas to businesses without having 
to negotiate with the current users. More recent events, especially the food crisis, have reminded 
Vietnam that it has not done with agriculture and rural producers, and pushed the question of rural 
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land firmly back to centre stage. In response to the global food crisis (and a substantial increase in 
the price of rice), the government decided to freeze over a million hectares of rice fields in order 
to maintain rice production at levels that will keep the country self-sufficient until 2050. It has 
also launched a campaign (the ‘three nong’) whose objective is to revalorise rural areas in relation 
to urban areas, one of whose components reaffirms that agricultural land can be used free of 
charge. Without questioning its decision 15 years ago to prioritise urbanisation and 
industrialisation, the introductory text to its campaign to support rural areas indicates that the 
government recognises the possible danger of neglecting agriculture and hopes to remedy this 
mistake. 
It is too early to know whether the renewed focus on rural affairs that characterised 2008 will 
have a lasting impact on agricultural land, and exactly what this impact will be. But the land 
freeze and some of the arrangements made in the ‘three nong’ campaign show that this land is still 
a lever that the government will not hesitate to use if it feels the need to do so. As certain national 
officials observed, agricultural land is a symbol of socialism, and its regulation remains a crucial 
element of social peace in what is still a largely rural society with strong ties to the land. This 
leaves the government facing a tough choice. It may hope to retain its control over land by 
maintaining its special status, but how can it do this without penalising its users, and how can it 
become a modern, open State that relies on competitive agriculture? The question of agricultural 
land also raises the whole issue of the role of the State in the voice of ‘market socialism’, as well 
as the legitimacy of the Communist Party. The hesitations (or approximations) in land matters 
could be seen as the manifestation of a certain State pragmatism that can be traced back to the 
socialist period. However, recent developments in land matters have challenged the very 
foundations of the legitimacy of the Communist Party, which the Party, though the government, 
could seek to reinforce by maintaining the specific status of rural land. The question is whether 
Vietnam is heading towards a two-tier land system, with some land – the great mass of 
agricultural and forest lands – managed as a common good by the central authorities in the 
interests of the huge rural population and the entire nation beyond them (food), while other land is 
mobilised to help further the economic enrichment of the country. 
The interplay of actors concerned with land matters 
As one might think, different actors have different levels of concern about the legitimacy of the 
Party and the compromises to be made between socialist ideology and the market economy. Yet 
every actor, the history of their involvement in land matters, and the roles that they have assumed 
and been assigned, tells us something about the place that the government has given land in the 
exercise of its powers, and clarifies – by confirming it – the clearly liberal direction in which land 
has been evolving.  
The history of land actors can be read through that of the land institutions. When these institutions 
were first establishing themselves, land was seen as a vital element in meeting the growing 
demand to end the collectivist experience, making it a particularly sensitive political issue and an 
essentially internal affair. The first law of 1988 was drafted without looking outwards, and the 
little horizontal consultation that did take place was only at the very highest level of the legislative 
hierarchy – in other words, among the Council of Ministers in the National Assembly, which was 
itself very closely tied to the Party. Some 20 years later, we were still unable to gather the 
testimony of any of the actors that participated in or even simply observed this process. External 
cooperation on land matters began in the early 1990s, soon after the first Land Law; but the 
project put in place by the UNDP in 1991 was mainly technical and did not last for long. The law 
of 1993 was also written at the highest levels, making it difficult to know who was involved. 
While it is longer and more detailed than the preceding law (more than twice the length), the 1993 
Land Law was primarily a political programme, a framework law that left considerable room for 
manoeuvre and possible interpretation regarding its application. 
After 1993, the question of land was not entirely sidelined, but became routine and externalised. 
Enforcement orders proliferated, rapidly rendering the law of 1993 obsolete and requiring 
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significant adjustments in 1998 and 2001, before a new law clarifying the situation was produced 
in 2003. A single, autonomous land administration was put in place, and some important long-
term cooperation agreements concluded with the Swedish international development cooperation 
agency Sida (the signing of the CPLAR programme in 1997, which was initially due to last for 10 
years). This cooperation extended beyond the purely technical framework to the reform of the 
whole land administration and land-related legislation. This period also saw the development of a 
number of cooperation projects that were not directly concerned with land but touched on it at the 
local level through rural development and environmental management activities (allocation of 
agricultural and/or forest land use rights, creating land registers, cataloguing forests, etc.), with 
foreign actors intervening directly at different levels of the land system. At the same time, the 
process of writing the land law was opened up to Vietnamese officials, and draft texts were 
circulated for comment in the different ministries and provinces. Land gradually became a subject 
that it was possible to discuss and which foreigners could act on, partly losing its status as a 
highly sensitive matter of State.  
Nevertheless, the fact that Vietnam has still not completed its land reform is causing problems. 
The demonstrations of discontent provoked by multiple expropriations of rural land for 
urbanisation and private industrial or commercial interests pose a major problem for the regime in 
Hanoi, which usually resorts to the ‘good old’ government methods of appointing, silencing 
and/or banning official scapegoats. Foreign actors view the reform as unfinished, and are applying 
pressure to make the law even more liberal and rid it of ‘socialist archaisms’ like continued State 
ownership of land and the differentiated treatment of Vietnamese and foreign nationals. In March 
2008 the World Bank, which some see as the global symbol of liberalism, signed the highly 
ambitious cooperation Land Administration Project, making it the current leading external actor 
in this domain. As the World Bank had long been distanced from cooperation in this field, this 
project, which operates at the central level and in several provinces, marks a clear reversal in 
Vietnamese policy on the role of foreign partners in land matters. 
But this is not to say that there is a clear road map for land. The continued uncertainty about 
agricultural land is reflected in the divergent positions expressed by officials at the national and 
provincial levels who have participated more or less directly in the reform of land institutions. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make some sense out of the apparent jumble of ideas.  
Firstly, these officials tend to express themselves in ideological terms, unlike most of the actors 
whose views we gathered, who generally see things from an economic perspective, analysing 
society in terms of poverty and wealth, and seeing integration (through standardisation) as 
inescapable. These officials are concerned with allowing the spirit of socialism to live on through 
notions of equality, equity, sharing, redistribution, planning, etc.; and beyond that, although it is 
rarely expressed in this way, enabling the Communist Party to continue to govern, or at least 
making the ongoing changes socially acceptable. 
There seem to be two opposing positions among officials. On one, clearly demarcated side, are 
the officials in the land administration, who take a fairly technical approach to land matters, are 
mainly concerned with the effectiveness of both the administration and the legislation, and who 
would like to make land an autonomous domain. These officials are directly involved with foreign 
experts who take a ‘top-down’ approach and consider the development of the country as a whole, 
including the constraints associated with the processes of urbanisation, industrialisation and 
openness. In their view, it no longer makes sense to maintain State ownership or frameworks that 
restrict land dynamics and transactions, such as categories of land and users, temporary land 
allocations, price categories, etc. On the other side, there are those (mostly from the MARD in our 
study sample) who see land as an issue that cannot be separated from local and sectoral contexts. 
These actors believe that agricultural land should be able to meet the needs of agriculture and 
rural populations, while forested land should primarily respond to environmental protection 
objectives, etc. Unlike the other group, these officials want a stronger State and think that 
liberalisation and decentralisation have already gone too far. This view is tinged with a certain 
romanticism based on the idea of Vietnam as a strong country that has chosen to go its own way 
in pursuit of fundamental social principles like equality, rural values and so on. Nevertheless, it is 
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realistic in that this is an activity that accounts for nearly 25 per cent of annual GDP, in a country 
whose population is still predominantly rural (accounting for 75 per cent of the total population, 
with 65 per cent of the active population involved in agriculture) and is not afraid to stand up for 
itself. The questions raised in Vietnam regarding the market’s effectiveness in resolving social 
inequalities and the role that the State should play in correcting the functioning of the market take 
on a global resonance as land is increasingly liberalised around the world. What mechanisms can 
ensure equitable access to land? Can equity be achieved through the kind of equality practiced in 
Vietnam? 
At the moment the first group of actors have much more influence than the second because most 
of them occupy strategic positions in the land administration and are supported by international 
cooperation. It is they who manage land and are leading this domain towards greater 
liberalisation. But this liberalisation is constrained by the question of agriculture and rural 
populations and spaces, so even though the second category of actors are less closely involved in 
land matters, the role that they have recently been able to play in formulating and implementing 
the ‘three nong’ campaign, for example, shows that the authorities are sensitive to their 
arguments, at least in the current economic conditions. 
Where do customary land systems fit in? 
Recent developments in the price of foodstuffs (the global food crisis) seem to have triggered a 
sudden interest in the agricultural sector, although this had been building for while as a result of 
recurrent demonstrations over expropriation procedures and, more indirectly, the feelings of 
injustice that land-related corruption and astronomically increased land prices have generated 
among those who have not enjoyed the windfalls captured by certain actors. The government has 
recognised the all-too obvious neglect of the rural sector and taken measures to restore it to its 
important position and to satisfy agricultural producers. However, at the moment there is nothing 
to indicate that more account is being taken of the specificities of the rural world, especially its 
great diversity.  
The problems that the present land system poses for agriculture are not only linked to the 
secondary consequences of the specific status given to agricultural land, but with the fact that this 
status brings additional constraints (categories, temporal and spatial limits, etc.) rather than the 
capacity to address the difficulties that rural people already face in their practices and 
environment. Although agricultural land differs from non-agricultural land in several respects, 
both are based on individually allocated rights to administratively defined uses, and are thus 
restricted by the land legislation in numerous local contexts. 
The Land Law of 2003 introduced several innovations that mitigate these constraints. It officially 
created a new type of large-scale farm and a new category of user, ‘residential communities’, 
which allows groups to collectively hold use rights to unlimited amounts of agricultural and forest 
lands that they have been allocated free of charge for an unspecified period. These two measures 
have very different objectives: the first accentuates the individualisation of tenure, while the 
second challenges it, thus acknowledging that it is not suitable for every situation. This is 
immediately obvious for slash-and-burn systems, but also true for every community that manages 
resources in ways other than individual or land-based systems. This new category was introduced 
after several years of testing different ways of allocating land use rights, especially by GTZ in 
villages in mountainous areas. It may also be the result of repeated observations that legislation 
has not been enforced in certain localities, either because no land was allocated, or because 
allocations did not have an immediate effect on practices.  However, this new measure is itself 
highly restrictive, in terms of what constitutes a ‘community’, the procedures it requires and the 
framework it imposes on collective management. Consequently, few such communities exist 
(many officials are unaware of this arrangement), and most are associated with foreign 
development projects. 
So where do customary land systems fit in? Land institutions seem to have given little or no 
thought to their place in the overall system, and the continuing diversity of local situations seems 
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to be more the result of government indecision regarding agricultural land than any firm policy. 
Customary systems can subsist in the space created by give-and-take between actors with 
divergent positions on this issue and on the role of the State.  They also owe their continued 
existence to the fact that the rural world (especially remote areas) is largely overlooked, and that 
what goes on in it is not seen as important as long as it doesn’t interfere with the objectives of 
urbanisation and industrialisation. The recent resurgence of interest in this domain could also 
revive the subject of systems that are supposedly unsuited to establishing a modern State because 
of agricultural practices such as slash-and-burn or the functioning of longstanding local power 
systems. Customary systems will persist unless there is widespread and effective support for 
efforts to develop intensive industrial agriculture. Although it is not compatible with the great 
majority of customary land systems, the specific regime for agricultural lands does allow them to 
avoid excessive competition by developing activities in ways that local customary systems do not 
take into account (and to which they will therefore have to adapt) and by introducing and 
strengthening actors from outside the system. 
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Annex 1: Flow charts 
A.1.1.  The hierarchical land management system under the Land Law of 
2003  
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A.1.2. The process of formulating laws according to the amended Constitution of 1992  
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Source: taken from, S.D., La constitution de la République socialiste du Viêt Nam de 1992. Translated from the French translation by Maison du droit vietnamo-française. 
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A.1.3. Organisation of the Vietnamese political system according to the amended Constitution of 1992  
 
Source: Forde et al., 2003, Decentralisation in Vietnam. USAID. 
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A.1.4. Flow charts of the MoNRE  
As shown on the MoNRE website  
 
Source: MoNRE site:  http://www.monre.gov.vn/monreNet/Default.aspx?tabid=199, May 2008. 
 
According to the Vietnamese Agency for Environmental Protection (one of four MoNRE 
agencies) 
 
Source: http://www.nea.gov.vn/english/organization/MONRE/sodo_bo_eng.jpg, May 2008. 
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A.1.5. Categories of land user and modes of obtaining land use rights 
Categories of user Modes of obtaining 
LURs 
 
Land uses assigned 
free of charge* 
Land uses assigned 
for a fee 
Uses of rented land 
(in return for payment 
of rent) 
1. Groups: State 
organs, political 
organisations, 
economic groups, 
public services, units of 
the armed forces 
For all users: 
- new allocation  
- re-allocation of 
previous LURs 
- rental  
For economic 
groups:  
- transfer  
Agricultural and 
forestry research, 
experimentation, 
etc., 
Agricultural use 
(armed forces),  
Construction for 
resettlement, 
Public use 
(services, 
infrastructures, etc.) 
Economic groups:  
- agricultural 
investment projects, 
construction of 
housing,  
- non-agricultural 
production, trade 
Economic groups:  
- agricultural 
investment projects, 
construction of 
housing,  
- non-agricultural 
production, trade 
2. Vietnamese 
individuals and 
households  
New allocation  
Re-allocation of 
previous LURs 
Transfer  
Rental  
Direct agricultural 
use (according to 
legal quotas) 
Forest areas 
designated for 
special use or 
protection 
Housing 
Non-agricultural 
production 
Trade 
Construction of for-
profit public works  
Indirect agricultural 
use + areas allocated 
before 1999 
exceeding current 
quotas ** 
Non-agricultural 
production  
Trade 
Construction of for-
profit public works 
3. Residential 
communities: 
Communities of citizens 
living in the same 
hamlet, village or 
agglomeration with the 
same land uses and 
customs or belonging 
to the same family 
New allocation  
Re-allocation of 
previous LURs 
Rental  
 
Agricultural use None None 
4. Religious institutions, 
including pagodas, 
churches, convents, 
schools, etc. 
New allocation  
Re-allocation of 
previous LURs 
 
Religious 
constructions 
(pagodas, temples, 
schools…) 
None None 
5. Foreign 
organisations with a 
diplomatic function,  
UN bodies, inter-
governmental agencies 
and organisations 
Rental (annual or 
one-off payments) 
None None Construction of 
business premises 
6. Non-resident 
Vietnamese making 
regular investments in 
Vietnam or returning to 
live in Vietnam on a 
permanent basis 
New allocation  
Rental 
Transfer: possible 
purchase of housing 
attached to use 
rights to land for 
housing 
None Agricultural 
investment project, 
construction of 
housing 
Non-agricultural 
production, trade  
Agricultural 
investment project, 
construction of 
housing 
Non-agricultural 
production, trade 
7. Foreigners: foreign 
individuals and groups 
investing in Vietnam  
Rental (annual or 
one-off payments) 
None 
 
None Agricultural 
investment project, 
construction of 
housing 
Non-agricultural 
production, trade 
* The French translation of the law of 2003 gives the following definition of “redevance” (rental charge): “the 
expression ‘redevance foncière’ (land rent) refers to the sum of money that the land user has to pay to use a piece of 
land determined and allocated by the State in return for payment.” The original text is not much clearer:"Tiền sử dụng 
đất là số tiền mà người sử dụng dất phải trả trong trờng hợp đợc nhà nước dất có thu tiền sử dụng dất đối với một diện 
tích dất xác định”. 
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** More specifically: areas allocated before 1999 that exceed current quotas whose use rights have expired, areas 
allocated before 1999 that exceed current quotas, deducting land acquired through transfers. 
 
Source: Forestry Law of 2003, simplified presentation. 
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A.1.6. Categories of land, maximum duration of land allocations and 
amount of land likely to be allocated  
 Permanent LURs (1) Fixed duration LURs 
(user / maximum 
duration)(1) 
Area 
Agricultural land    
a) Land to be used for annual 
plantations 
Residential 
communities 
VIH: 20 years 
EG: 70 years 
VIH: 3 ha (total a+f+g = 
max 5 ha) 
 
b) Land to be used for multi-annual 
plantations 
Residential 
communities 
VIH: 50 years 
EG: 70 years 
VIH: 10 ha in plains 
(max 5 ha if a+f+g = 5 
ha),  
30 ha in mountains 
(max 25 ha if a+f+g = 5 
ha) 
c) Forest land to be used for 
productive purposes 
Residential 
communities 
VIH: 50 years 
EG: 70 years 
VIH: 30 ha (max 25 ha if 
a+f+g = 5 ha) 
d) Forest land to be used for 
protective purposes 
All rights holders  VIH: 30 ha 
e) Forest land to be used for special 
purposes 
All rights holders  Not specified 
f) Land to be used for aquaculture Residential 
communities 
VIH: 20 years 
EG: 70 years 
VIH: 3 ha (total a+f+g = 
max 5 ha) 
g) Land to be used for salt 
production 
Residential 
communities 
VIH: 20 years 
EG: 70 years 
VIH: 3 ha (total a+f+g = 
max 5 ha) 
h) Other agricultural land   Not specified 
Land for non-agricultural use    
a) Residential land in rural and 
urban areas  
All rights holders  Not specified 
b) Land for offices and buildings for 
non-agricultural production 
 EG, VIH: 70 years 
NRV and foreigners**: 50 
years 
Foreign diplomatic 
organisations: 99 years 
Not specified 
c) Land for defence and national 
security 
All rights holders  Not specified 
d) Land for non-agricultural 
production: industry, trade, mining 
Vientamese individuals 
and households 
EG, VIH: 70 years 
NRV and foreigners**: 50 
years 
Not specified 
e) Land to be used in the public 
interest: agriculture, infrastructures, 
education, health, historic remains, 
cultural sites, natural sites 
Communal, district and 
provincial People’s 
Committees, etc. 
If rented to third parties 
(VIH, EG): 5 years 
Agricultural land funds: 
max 5% of communes’ 
agricultural land  
f) Land used by religious institutions All rights holders  Not specified 
g) Land occupied by communal 
houses, temples, pagodas, places 
of ancestral worship 
All rights holders  Not specified 
h) Land used for cemetries All rights holders  Not specified 
i) Drainage systems All rights holders  Not specified 
j) Other areas   Not specified 
Land whose use has yet to be 
determined* 
 According to 
arrangements for 
agricultural land 
categories a, b, c, f and 
g. 
According to 
arrangements for 
agricultural land 
categories a, b, c, f and 
g. 
 (1) Permanent LURs are obtained by allocation; temporary LURs are obtained by allocation or rental. 
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* This land may be allocated to Vietnamese individuals and households to be used for categories a, b, 
c, f or g. It has the same characteristics but its area does not count towards the maximum area of land 
allocated in categories a, b, c, f and g. 
** This period is extended to 70 years if the investments require long-term management and if the 
land is in remote or difficult areas. 
VIH: Vietnamese individuals and households; EG: economic groups; NRV: Non-resident Vietnamese. 
 
Source: 2003 Land Law. 
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A.1.7. Foreign donors involved in the legal sector in October 2006 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Country/regi
on 
Main donors Main subjects Support for  
implemen    
tation of  
LSDS 
Legislative  
support 
Institutional  
building and  
law  
implementati 
on 
Access to  
justice 
TOTAL 
United 
States 
USAID/USVTC BTA, WTO, anti dumping,  
international treaties,  
Intellectual property rights 
10 8 7 25 
Japan JICA/LCP/DHRD WTO, Property rights,  
competition, nuclear 
8 4 12 
Swede
nn 
SIDA Land, environment, justice,  
childhood, HIV/AIDS 
1 3 7 1 12 
Australia AusAID anti dumping, international  
treaties, national boundaries 
6 3 2 11 
Denmark DANIDA National assembly, justice 1 3 3 1 8 
Canada  CIDA WTO, competition, justice 3 3 1 7 
France MAE justice, property rights  
registration (notariat), nuclear 
4 1 5 
Germany FES / GTZ 2 1 3 
Belgium 2 2 
Spain AECI 2 2 
Korea KOICA 2 2 
Norway NORAD/Norway 1 1 2 
Netherlan
ds 
SNV 1 1 2 
Switzer
land 
SDC  1 1 2 
Ireland Ireland embassy 1 1 
Italy 1 1 
New-Zealand 1 1 
United 
Kingomd 
DFID 1 1 
Asia ADB secured transactions 3 1 4 
Europe EC / EPO WTO, Intellectual property  
rights 
5 3 8 
International UNICEF gender, women, childhood  
and youth, trafficking 
30 39 69 
UNIFEM women, gender, girls 4 10 3 17 
UNDP State bodies, very diverse 1 7 3 3 14 
WHO violence, health 3 2 5 
UNODC 3 3 
WB 2 2 
UNAIDS 2 2 
IAEA 1 1 
UNWTO 1 1 
Total 1 50 56 7 114 
Total number of interventions 5 102 96 22 225 
Total number of 
‘projects’ 
1 96 92 24 213 
 
 
Abbreviations  
ADB:  Asian Development Bank 
AECI:  Agencia Española de Cooperacion Internaciónal (Spanish International Cooperation Agency) 
AusAID:  Agency for International Development of Australia 
CIDA:  Canadian International Development Agency 
DANIDA:  Danish International Development Agency 
DFID:  United Kingdom Department for International Development 
EC:  European Commission 
EPO: European Patent Office 
FES: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany)  
GTZ:  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Tecnical Co-operation) 
JICA/LCP:  Japan International Cooperation Agency / Legal Cooperation Project 
IAEA:  International Atomic Energy Agency 
KOICA:  Korean International Cooperation Agency 
NORAD:  Norway Agency for Development 
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SDC:  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
SECO:  State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland 
SIDA:  Swedish International Development Agency  
SNV:  Netherlands-based International Development Organisation  
UNDP:  United Nations Development Programme  
UNICEF:  United Nations Children's Fund 
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women 
UNODC:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
UNWTO: World Tourism Organisation 
USAID:  United States Agency for International Development 
WB:  World Bank 
WHO:  World Health Organisation 
WTO:  The World Trade Organisation 
 
Source: The matrix on ongoing donor-government cooperation in the legal sector, updated in October 2006; 
project VIE0201, vie02015.vn@undp.org. 
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A.1.8. Flow chart of the main structures in the provincial People’s Committee of Binh Duong 
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A.1.8. Flow chart of Binh Duong provincial People’s Committee: associated structures  
 
 
113 
Annex 2: Timelines 
A.2.1. Chronology of main texts relating to land since 1953 
 
i Year Date Name 
1953 04/12/53 Law establishing the Land Reform (Democratic Republic of Vietnam – DRV) 
 
1962 07/07/62 Prime Minister’s Circular No 73/TTg on the management of private lands that are 
rented, not owned or not used in the outskirts of urban areas and cities (DRV) 
 
1969 01/05/69 Status of high-level collectivisation  
1971 28/06/71 Council of Ministers Resolution No 125/CP on improved land management (DRV) 
 
1972 15/03/72 Council of Ministers Decree No 47/CP promulgating the temporary regulation  
of selected construction projects and projects to manage land for construction (DRV) 
 
1973 16/12/73 Council of Ministers Resolution No 28/CP on community resettlements 
when the banks of watercourses are being cleaned 
1974 25/05/74 Council of Ministers Decision No 129/CP promulgating policy decisions  
regarding the extension of agricultural areas and forestry development in cooperatives 
In mountainous and semi-mountainous regions (DRV)  
 
1975 05/03/75 Decree No 01/ND/75 on land policies issued by the provisional Revolutionary  
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam  
1976 20/08/76 Directive No 235 CT/TW of the central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party  
on executing the Political Bureau’s resolution regarding land in the South  
 
1976 25/09/76 Council of Ministers Decision No 188/CP on the policy to abolish every vestige of land   
ownership and all forms of colonial and feudal exploitation in the South (Socialist 
 Republic of Vietnam – SRV)  
 
1978 14/12/78 Council of Ministers Decision No 318/CP on the abolition of capitalist forms of  
land use, and promoting land adjustments in rural areas of the South (SRV) 
 
1980 01/07/80 Council of Ministers Decision No 201/CP on standardising and improving land 
management nationwide  (SRV) 
1987 Land Law 
1989 01/02/89 Council of Ministers Decree No 13/HDBT on the implementation of several urgent   
land-related questions  
1989 23/03/89 Order 30/HDBT guiding implementation of the Land Law 
1993 14/07/93 Land Law 
1993 27/09/93 Decree 64/CP – regulations regarding the allocation of land to households and 
individuals for stable, long-term agricultural production  
 
1994 05/07/94 Decree No 60/CP on the right to home ownership and use of residential land  
in urban areas 
1994 05/07/94 Decree No 61/CP on the purchase, sale and market for homes 
1994 17/08/94 Decree No 88/CP on the management and use of urban lands 
1994 Decree 02/CP confirming the 50-year duration of forest land allocations and  
specifying the modalities for this type of allocation 
1995 24/01/95 Decree No 11/Ct3 detailing implementation of the ordinance on the rights and  
responsibilities of foreign individuals and organisations renting land in Vietnam  
 
1996 02/02/96 Decree No 09/CP on the regimes for managing and using land set aside for 
defence and security  
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Year Date Name 
1996  Ordinance on domestic organisations’ rights and responsibilities with regard to land 
allocated or rented by the State  
1996  Decree No. 58/CP setting out detailed arrangements for implementation of the ordinance 
on the rights and responsibilities of domestic organisations on land allocated or rented by 
the State 
1997  Circular No. 293-TT-CD on the allocation, rental and sub-letting of land to domestic 
organisations in industrial areas and export production zones 
1998 02/12/98 Law No. 10/1998/QH amending several articles of the Land Law 
1998 18/02/98 Prime Ministerial Directive No. 08/1998/CT-TTg emphasising the importance of reviewing 
implementation of the Land Law at the local level, i.e. in provinces and cities 
1998 06/03/98 Decree No. 14/1998/ND6GP on the management of State property 
1998 20/08/98 Resolution 58/1998/NQ-UBTVQH10 on housing transactions between individuals 
effected before 1st July 1991 
1999 19/04/99 Decree No. 171/1999JND-CP on the procedures for exchanging, transferring, renting, 
sub-letting, bequeathing, mortgaging, payment of deposits for allocation and capital 
investment by an enterprise in land use rights  
1999 19/04/99 Decree No. 25/99/ND-CP on modes of returning housing, the price of renting homes 
when they have not yet been returned in order to establish the home ownership rights set 
out in Resolution 58/1998/NQ-UBTVQH10 
1999 28/08/99 Decree No. 85/1999/ND-CP amending several articles in Decree 64/P and adding 
arrangements for allocating land on salt marshes to households and individuals for 
stable, long-term use 
1999 16/11/99 Decree No. 163/1999/ND-CP on the allocation and rental of forest lands to organisations, 
households and individuals for stable, long-term forestry use 
2000 11/02/00 Decree No. 04/2000/ND-CP on the application of Law No.10/1998/QH10 
2000 10/03/00 Decree No. 08/2000/ND-CP on securing the registration of transactions 
2000  Inter-ministerial circular No. 62/2000/TTLT/BN-TCDC guiding implementation of the 
allocation, rental and delivery of LURs for forest lands 
2001 12/07/01 Order No. 06/2001/L-CTN promulgating Law No. 10/1998/QH10 amending several 
articles of the Land Law 
2001 28/09/01 Decree No. 66/2001/ND-CP amending several articles of Decree No. 04/2000/ND-CP 
2003  Law No. 13/2003/QH11 – Land Law 
2003 17/06/03 National Assembly Resolution No. 15/2003/QH11 on the exemption or lowering of 
agricultural land use taxes 
2003 03/11/03 Government Decree No. 129/2003/ND-CP organising details of the execution of National 
Assembly Resolution No. 5/2003/QH11 
2003 26/11/03 Order No. 23/2003/L-CTN promulgating Land Law No.13/2003/QH11 
2004 09/02/04 Directive No. 05/2004/CT-TTg organising the implementation of the Land Law of 2003 
2004 29/10/04 Decree No. 181/2004/ND-CP promulgating the implementation of the Land Law 
2004 29/10/04 Decree No. 182/2004/ND-CP on the sanctions for land-related administrative infringements  
2004 16/11/04 Decree No. 188/2004/ND-CP on methods for determining land prices and price ranges 
2004 03/12/04 Decree No. 197/2004/ND-CP on compensation, aid and relocation in the event of the 
State requisitioning land 
2004 03/12/04 Decree No. 198/2004/ND-CP on levying land taxes 
2004 07/12/04 Crcular No. 117/2004/TT-BTC guiding the implementation of Decree No. 198/2004/ND-
CP 
2004  Instruction No. 116/2004/TTC-BTC on implementing the execution of Order No. 
197/2004/ND-CP 
Year Date Name 
2005 08/11/05 Decree No. 135/2005/ND-CP regarding the incorporation of agricultural, forest land and 
fishing areas into State agricultural and forestry plantations 
2005 14/11/05 Decree No. 142/2005/ND-CP on the payment of land taxes 
2005 23/11/05 Decision No. 304/2005/QD-CP on testing the allocation of forest land and paying 
households and residential communities in Tay Nguyen region for forest protection 
2006 24/01/06 Decree No. 13/2006/ND-CP on determining land use and calculating property prices for 
all organisations to which the government has allocated land to be used free of charge 
2006 22/02/06 Prime Ministerial Directive No. 05/2006/CT-TTg to tackle errors and faults in the ongoing 
implementation of the land law 
2007 27/05/07 Decree No. 84/2007/ND-CP regarding certain arrangements for the issue and modes of 
exercising land use rights (LURs), government requisitioning of LURs, procedures for 
compensation, assistance and rehousing following these requisitions, and complaints 
regarding the exercise of LURs. 
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A.2.2. Spatial references in Vietnam’s Constitutions since 1946  
 
 references to a territorial unit references to territorial divisions  
date name content articles 
content relating to a territorial 
unit articles 
content relating to administrative 
divisions 
1946  Constitution of 
the Democratic 
Republic of 
Vietnam  
6 chapters,   
70 articles 
2 Vietnam is a monolithic and 
indivisible bloc that Includes the 
north (bac Bo), the centre (trung 
bo) and the south (nam bo) [art.2] 
57 and 58 .   Bo, provinces, districts, communes 
Bo and districts do not have a People’s 
Council (elected by universal suffrage), but 
do have an Administrative Committee 
elected by councils at lower levels 
1959 Constitution of 
the Democratic 
Republic of 
Vietnam 
10 chapters,  
112 articles 
1 and 3 Vietnamese territory is single and 
indivisible from the north to the 
south [art.1] – the DRV is a single 
multi-national State [art.3] 
3; 78; 79 
 Level 1 = autonomous zones (inalienable parts 
of the DRV), provinces and municipalities 
Level 2 = districts cities and towns; Level 3 = 
villages, townships, neighbourhoods, villages 
and hamlets. All these units have a People’s 
Council elected by universal suffrage 
1980 
Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam  
12 chapters,  
147 articles 
1; 5; 9; 13 
 The SRV is an independent 
and united country composed of 
continental lands, air space 
territorial waters and islands 
[art.1]. A single State formed by 
all nationalities living on the 
territory [art.5], sacred and 
inviolable territory [art.13] 
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Level 1 = provinces and cities under direct 
central authority Level 2 = rural Districts, cities 
under provincial authority provincial capital, 
urban districts level 3 = communes, boroughs, 
urban neighbourhoods. All these units have a 
People’s Council elected 
by universal suffrage and a People’s  Committee 
1992 Constitution of 
the Socialist 
Republic of 
Vietnam 
Resolution N°51/2001/QH10 
amending the Constitution of 
1992 is taken into account 
12 chapters,  
147 articles 
1; 5; 9; 13;  
45 
Idem 1980 118 idem 1980 
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 references to the nature of ownership references to land 
date articles content articles content 
1946 12 Citizens have guaranteed ownership rights  _ _ 
1959 11 to 20; 
40 
Ways of owning means of production: State 
ownership = ownership by all the people of 
Vietnam (sacred and inviolable); cooperative 
ownership = collective ownership by the 
mass of workers; ownership by individuals 
belonging to the mass of workers; ownership 
by Vietnamese capitalists [art.11] 
12 All mineral resources, bodies of water, 
forests and unused land belong to the State 
and are the property of the entire nation 
1980 17 to 28; 
35;  70 79 
The State ensures that workers control their 
collective right over the means of production 
and the workforce [art.17] – Land, forests, 
etc. belong to the State and are the property 
of the entire nation [art.19]* - Socialist 
ownership is sacred and inviolable [art.79] 
19 and 20 Land, forests, etc. belong to the State and 
are the property of the entire nation [art.19] 
– Land is managed by the State according 
to national plans to ensure rational and 
economic use – Agricultural and forest 
lands cannot be used for any other 
purpose without authorisation from 
competent bodies [art.20] 
1992 15; 17; 18;  
21 to 23;  
25; 58; 
60 
The economic structure […] is based on 
regimes of ownership by the entire people 
and collective ownership, also, to a lesser 
extent, on private ownership - [art.15] – idem 
art.19 of 1980 – Goods that legally belong to 
any individual or legal entity cannot be 
nationalised (except in special cases, when 
compensation should be paid at the market 
rate) [art.23] – Every citizen owns their 
income, goods, home, etc. ‘art 58] – The 
State protects copyright and the right to 
industrial ownership [art.60] 
17 and 18 idem art. 19 of 1980 – the State manages 
all land in accordance with the 
development plan and the law and 
ensures that land is used effectively and 
according to the planned objectives. It 
allocates land to groups and individuals for 
stable and sustainable use [art. 18] 
NB: the content of the preamble is not taken into account 
*  Article 17 of the Constitution of 1992 stipulates that: “The following belong to the nation as a whole: land, forests, 
mountains, rivers, lakes, water sources, underground resources, maritime resources, resources on the continental plateau, 
resources in airspace, State contributions in cash and kind to enterprises or works associated with different economic, 
cultural, social, scientific, technical and diplomatic sectors, in national defence and national security and any other goods 
belonging to the State in accordance with the law”. 
*Article 58 of the Constitution of 1992 stipulates that: “Every citizen owns their legally earned income, goods they have 
set aside, their home, the means they use to go about their daily lives, their means of production, their contributions in cash 
or kind to enterprises or economic organisations. Articles 17 and 18 apply to land that the State has allocated to them for 
their use. The State protects citizens’ legally acquired ownership rights and inheritance rights. 
*  Article 19 of the Constitution of 1980 stipulates that: “Land, forests, rivers, lakes, mines, underground natural resources 
in territorial waters and on the continental plateau; industrial, agricultural, forestry and commercial State enterprises, 
banking and insurance companies; amenities; rail, road, river, sea and air transport systems; dykes and major water works; 
defence installations; information and communications systems, radio, TV, cinema; scientific and technological research 
institutes; cultural and social establishments and any property defined by the law as belonging to the State belongs to the 
whole nation”. 
 
Source: 2003, The constitutions of Vietnam, The Gioi Publishers, Hanoi.  
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A.2.3. Evolution of agricultural LURs in key land-related texts since 1988  
year text categories of land recognised users duration of LURs area allocated associated rights associated 
responsibilities 
body responsible for 
allocation 
1988 Land Law five categories: agricultural 
land, forest land, land for 
housing, land for specific use, 
and unused land. Two sub-
categories of agricultural land: 
(i) land for families’ economic 
use; (ii) land for individual 
production 
 
seven categories: State farms, 
State enterprises, institutions, army 
units, cooperatives, producer 
groups, social organisations and 
individuals 
unspecified – the law 
authorises temporary 
allocation, or for a limited 
term whose length is 
decided by the 
competent authorities  
(1): from 300 m² to 
1,000m² according to the 
region; (2) for productive 
land, according to 
availability of land and 
number of households in 
the commune 
 
 
 
none 
 
 
 
use as directed, 
productive use 
(1) cooperatives, 
agricultural and 
forestry producer 
groups; (2) People’s 
Committees in the 
provinces and 
central-level cities 
1993 Land Law six categories: agricultural 
land, forest land, rural 
residential, urban land, land 
for specific use, unused land 
three types: (1) State organisations 
(economic, social and political 
organisations, army units and 
institutions); (2) households; (3) 
individuals 
20 years for annual crops 
and aquaculture; 50 
years for perennial crops 
(all users) 
3 ha, although Decree 64 
of 1993 specifies 2 ha in 
the north and 3 ha in the 
south for annual crops; 10 
ha in the plains and 30 ha 
in the mountains and hills 
for perennial crops (all 
users) 
five types of derived rights: to 
exchange, assign, rent, 
bequeath and mortgage. Use is 
free of charge. Right to receive a 
land use certificate 
 
 
 
idem + 
environmental 
protection 
(1) People’s 
Committees in the 
provinces and 
national-level cities; 
(2) and (3) People’s 
Committees in urban 
and rural districts and 
provincial-level cities 
1998 Law 
No.10/1998/QH10 
amending several 
articles of the Land 
Law 
 
 
 
no change 
 
 
 
no change 
no change + at the end of 
the legal period the State 
should reallocate the 
land if the user so wishes 
and has used it in 
accordance with current 
regulations 
 
 
 
no change 
Households and individuals can 
use areas specified by the law 
free of charge; charges are 
made for use of more than these 
amounts of land for half of the 
regulated time, in addition to the 
rental regime. Other users 
=rental 
 
 
 
no change 
 
2001 Order No.06/2001/L-
CTN promulgating 
Law 
No.10/1998/QH10 
amending several 
articles of the Land 
Law 
 
 
 
no change 
 
 
 
no change 
 
 
 
no change 
 
 
 
no change 
 
 
 
no change 
 
 
 
no change 
idem+ People’s 
Committees in 
communes and 
neighbourhoods may 
rent out land 
reserves in the public 
interest (communal 
lands) 
2003 Law No. 
13/2003/QH11- Land 
Law 
three main categories: 
agricultural land, non-
agricultural land, land whose 
use has yet to be determined. 
Eight sub-categories of 
agricultural land, including 
three sub-categories of forest 
land 
seven groups: (1) State 
organisations and economic 
groups, (2) Vietnamese individuals 
and households, (3) residential 
communities, (4) religious 
institutions, (5) foreign diplomatic 
organisations, (6) non-resident 
Vietnamese, (7)foreign individuals 
and groups 
annual crops = (2) 20 
years; (1) economic 
groups = 70 years; (3) 
permanent. Also 
reaffirms the principle of 
reallocation at the end of 
the initial allocation 
Only regulated for 
individuals and 
households (2): for annual 
crops, aquaculture and 
salt production; 3 ha (max 
ceiling of 5 ha for all 3 
categories); prerennial 
crops: 10 ha on plains, 30 
ha in mountains. All 3 
categories should not 
exceed 10 ha in plains 
and 30 ha in mountains. 
Ten: idem+ rights to sub-let, 
assign for a down payment, as 
capital for an enterprise, to 
receive compensation if land 
reallocated to the State; use free 
of charge for (1), (2) and (3). 
Other users =rental 
Idem + registration 
of use rights 
(1), (4), (6) and (7): 
People’s Committees 
in the provinces and 
national-level cities; 
(2) and (3) People’s 
Committees in 
districts, urban 
districts, main towns 
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A.2.4. Evolution of land legislation in Binh Duong province between 1993 and 2002 
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A.2.5. Texts regulating the setting of land prices in Binh Duong province from 1994 to 2007 
 
         Government 
 
               Ministry 
 
Provincial People’s             
Committee                                                                                                                         
                  District 
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Annex 3: Maps and data 
A.3.1. Map 1: Value of foreign investments and industrial exports from 
Vietnam, 2005  
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A.3.2. Tables 1 and 2 – Land distribution (according to categories of land 
defined in the 1993 Land Law) in each region of Vietnam (1994)  
 
Category of 
land 
Total area 
(ha) 
North 
Mountains  
 
Red River 
delta 
Central 
Northern 
coast 
Central 
coast 
Central 
uplands 
Southeas
t 
Mekong  
Delta  
Total  33,104,21
8 10,296,763 1,258,438 5,118,054 4,517,822 
5,618,48
3 2,339,108 3,955,550 
Agriculture  7,367,207 1,021,437 711,744 670,323 544,513 629,208 955,916 2,654,066 
Forestry  9,915,092 2,038,421 55,502 1,882,259 1,858,767 3,266,626 509,207 304,310 
Special use 
1,122,184 228,096 187,692 166,097 144,159 89,190 141,647 165,303 
Rural 
residential  654,205 182,823 81,362 64,340 46,307 49,649 76,784 152,940 
Urban  63,302 8,064 5,951 4,550 8,736 3,468 20,467 12,066 
Unused  13,982,22
8 6,637,922 216,187 2,330,485 1,915,340 
1,580,34
2 635,087 666,865 
 
Category of 
land 
Total area 
(%) 
North 
Mountains  
Red River 
delta 
Central 
Northern 
coast 
Central 
coast 
Central 
uplands 
Southeast Mekong  
Delta  
Total  100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
Agriculture  22,25 9,92 56,56 13,10 12,05 11,20 40,87 67,10 
Forestry  29,95 19,80 4,41 36,78 41,14 58,14 21,77 7,69 
Special use 
3,39 2,22 14,91 3,25 3,19 1,59 6,06 4,18 
Rural 
residential  1,98 1,78 6,47 1,26 1,02 0,88 3,28 3,87 
Urban  0,19 0,09 0,47 0,09 0,19 0,06 0,87 0,31 
Unused  42,24 64,47 17,18 45,53 42,40 28,13 27,15 16,86 
Source: Dang Hung Vo, 1997, Land Administration Reform in Vietnam. 
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A.3.3. Table 3 – Land registration: assessment and forecasts in 2000 
 
N° Land 
Category 
Cadastral Maps Cadastral Books LTC’s Issuance 
Status at 
the end of 
2000 
Year for 
completion 
Status at 
the end of 
2000 
Year for 
completion 
Status at 
the end of 
2000 
Year for 
completion 
1 Agriculture 40% 2005 70% 2003 85% 2001 
1 Forestry 20% 2003 20% 2003 15% 2002 
3 Rural 
residential 
25% 2005 35% 2003 60% 2003 
4 Urban 50% 2003 35% 2003 5% 2005 
Source: Dang and Palmkvist, 2001. 
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A.3. 4. Tables 4 to 10 - Statistics on LUCs issued and land allocated 
between 1994 and 2006 
 
Table 4 – Number of land use certificates issued since the Land Law of 1993 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Number of land use certificates issued in each region since the Land Law of 1993 
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Table 6 – Amount of land for which LUCs have been issued in each region since the Land Law of 1993 
 
 
Table 7 - Proportion (percentage) of land for which LUCs have been issued in each region since the Land 
Law of 1993 
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Table 8 – Number of LUCs issued to individuals for three categories of land since 1998 
 
Table 9 – Amount of land allocated for three categories of land since 1998 
 
Table 10 - Percentage of land allocated for three categories of land since 1998 
 
Source: Tran Nhu Trung et al., 2006. 
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A.3.5. Table 11 –Analysis of land use rights certificates issued for forest 
land in each region (2007) 
 
 Total Including 
 
Region Number of certificates 
issued 
Area Entreprises and organisations 
Households and 
individuals 
ha % (*) Number of certificates Area (ha) 
Number of 
certificates Area (ha) 
North Mountains 590,768 3,349 743 72.8 3,201 1,215,751 587,567 2,133,992 
Plains and 
deltas of the 
North 
8,502 17,741 15.3 53 4,016 8,449 13,725 
North Centre 223,499 1,541 648 69.4 585 890,512 222,914 651,136 
South Centre 191,272 1,085 887 59.1 564 862,821 190,708 223,066 
Central uplands 61,722 1,550 138 46.7 922 1,496,723 60,800 53,415 
Central southern 
plains 2,862 313,700 51.2 63 307,425 1,124 6,275 
South West 30,826 253,034 69.2 130 169,822 30,696 83,212 
Vietnam 1,109,451 8,111 891 62 5,518 4,947,070 1,102,258 3,164,821 
* Percentage of forest land. 
Source: Dinh Huu Hoand et al., 2008, according to MoNRE data from 2007. 
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A.3.6. Map 2 - Binh Duong province: location and district subdivisions  
 
 
 
 
Source: Vietnamese administrative boundaries, 2006. Drawn with: Philcarto…. 
       National        
highways 
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A.3.7. Table 12 – Provincial and national land use calculations and plans for 
Binh Duong province (2005-2010) 
 
Utilisation Area in 
2005 (ha) 
Provincial 
proposal for 
area in 
2010 (ha) 
+/- % Government order 
for area in 
2010 (ha) 
+/- % 
TOTAL 269,522 269,522 0 269,522 0 
Agricole 218 659 207 879 -5 202 189 -8 
Agricultural production 205,065 194,460 -5 188,612 -8 
- annual crops 30,859 27,859 -10 18,916 -39 
- rice 17,699 17,000 -4 11,744 -34 
- livestock rearing 179 10,859 5,966 7,172 3 906.704 
- perennial crops 174,206 166,600 -4 169,696 -3 
Forestry 12,650 12,579 -1 12,286 -3 
-  forestry production 11,190 11,119 -1 11,093 -1 
- natural forests 1,460 1,460 0 2,359 61.58 
Lakes, pools 512 407 -21 630 23.05 
Other 430 431 0 661 53.72 
Non-agricultural 49,751 61,635 24 67,285 35.24 
Housing 7,227 10,017 39 13,467 86.34 
- rural residential 5,257 6,298 20 9,141 73.88 
- urban residential 1,969 3,719 89 4,326 119.71 
Special use 30,034 41,074 37 41,100 36.84 
- offices, industry 411 569 38 476 15.82 
- military 3,572 3,572 0 3,609 1.04 
- commercial production  15,362 22,920 49 21,042 36.97 
- industrial areas 10,069 11,000 9 11,230 11.53 
- public 10,687 14,011 31 15,973 49.46 
- religious 232 232 0 235 1.29 
- cemeteries 1,048 1,225 17 1,170 11.64 
- rivers 11,193 8,419 -25 11,302 0.97 
- other non-agricultural  14 665 4 650 11 -21.43 
Unused 1,111 8 -99 48 -96 
Plains 1,063 0 -100 45 -96 
Montains 40 0 -100 0 -100 
Deforested mountains 7 8 14 3 -57 
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A.3.8. Tables 13 to 16 – Statistical data on Lao Cai province 
 
Table 13 – General data on Lao Cai province 
 
Area 6,357 km² 
Population (2005) 576,800 inhabitants 
Density (2005) 91  
Administrative subdivisions  
(8 districts) 
Bảo Thắng, Bảo Yên, Bắc Hà, Si Ma Cai, Mường 
Khương, Sa Pa, Bát Xát, Văn Bàn 
Capital TP. Lào Cai  
Kinh 35 % of the population 
Ethnic minorities 
including: 
23 groups, 65 % of the population  
Tai (Thai and Tay) 23 % 
Hmong 22 % 
Yao 13 % 
Source: http://laocai.gov.vn/ consulted in June 2008. 
 
Table 14 - Employment structure in 2004 
 
Total active population: 307,468 100% 
Active population of working age: 296,074  
Active population fit to work 291,028  
Active population unfit to work 5,046  
Active population working outside the legal age 
limits 
16,440  
Sectoral structure    
Agriculture and forestry  78.07 
Fisheries  0.04 
Mines and quarries  1.62 
Industry  2.37 
Électricity, gas, water supply  0.22 
Construction  3.29 
Wholesale and retail trade, after-sales service 
(repairs) 
 3.48 
Hotels and catering  0.90 
Transport and communications  1.31 
Financial services   0.21 
Scientific and technological research  0.05 
Asset and property management  0.13 
Public administration and defence  3.06 
Education, training  3.57 
Health and social services  0.69 
Cultural and sports activities  0.24 
Activities within the Party and national 
organisations  
 0.52 
Human and community service activities   0.24 
Source: http://laocai.gov.vn/ consulted in June 2008, figures for 2004. 
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Table 15 – Income structure in 2003 (millions of dongs) 
 
Total GNP  2,150 294 100 % 
Domestic sector  2,132,294 99.16 
State sector 875,000 40.69 
Private and collective sector  1,257,294 58.47 
Foreign sector 18,000 0.84 
Sectoral structure   
Agriculture and forestry 825,995 38.41 
Fisheries 10,575 0.49 
Mines and quarries 140,600 6.54 
Industry 58,923 2.74 
Électricity, gas, water supply 39,743 1.85 
Construction 240,222 11.17 
Wholesale and retail trade, after-sales service 
(repairs) 
74,440 3.46 
Hotels and catering 34,194 1.59 
Transport and communications 79,936 3.72 
Financial services  51,104 2.38 
Scientific and technological research 2,226 0.10 
Asset and property management 141,548 6.58 
Public administration and defence 86,640 4.03 
Éducation, training 218,650 10.17 
Health and social services 29,206 1.36 
Cultural and sports activities 13,740 0.64 
Activities within the Party and national 
organisations  
24,882 1.16 
Human and community service activities  6,990 0.33 
Source: Statistical handbook year 2003, Lao Cai Statistical Office. 
 
 
Table 16 – Land use (recognised use), probably for 2004-2005 
 
 Area (ha) Percentage of total area 
Total area 635,707 100 
Agricultural land: 76,254 12.00 
rice 17,304 2.72 
other annual crops 36,361 5.72 
perennial crops 10,512 1.65 
livestock rearing, grazing 3,841 0.60 
fisheries 1,241 0.20 
Forest land: 278,907 43.87 
natural forest 229,297 36.07 
planted forest 49,610 7.8 
Residential land: 2,998 0.47 
land for urban housing 497 0.08 
land for rural housing 2,501 0.39 
Land for special use 13,781 2.17 
Land with no designated use 263,767 41.49 
Source: http://laocai.gov.vn/ consulted in June 2008. 
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Annex 4: Surveys 
A.4.1. Framework for national surveys 
This framework was designed as a guide for interviews with national-level actors, who are mostly 
Vietnamese civil servants. 
A. The process of formulating the law  
Land Law of 2003 
Which actors/institutions were involved in drafting and writing the Land Law of 2003? 
What is the process for formulating a new land law: 
• Are there working groups, consultations, etc. If so, what are they? Who puts them in place? 
Who steers them? Who is involved? 
• Stages in the process 
• Length of the process 
• Are there mechanisms for lower-level and public consultations? 
 
Which Vietnamese institutions influence decisions relating to (legal) land matters? What is their 
role? 
Which foreign institutions (NGOs, donors, cooperation agencies, etc.) influence decisions relating 
to (legal) land matters? What is their role? 
Current legislation  
What are the main legal texts, decrees and decisions that are currently in force? 
• current: name, date, content 
• previous: name, date, content 
• main changes in terms of content 
Next stages 
What are the next stages in land legislation? Which laws, decrees and amendments are currently 
being worked on? 
Ask the same question with regard to the formulation process. How does the current process differ 
from the process followed for the 2003 Land Law? 
Previous stages 
What are the main changes in the process of formulating the law since 1987? New actors? Are 
some actors no longer involved? Does the public participate in the process? 
B. Characteristics of the 2003 Land Law 
Main characteristics 
What were the main reasons for revising/renewing the Land Law of 1993?  
Which topics and points were discussed the most? 
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What are the main improvements in the law of 2003 (compared with that of 1993)? 
What are the key characteristics of the current legal system? 
Which problematic areas were not resolved, and why? 
Which points (domains) of the law of 2003 are currently under discussion?  
What are the main shortcomings or defects of the law of 2003? Which areas do they relate to? 
Why (taxation/duties; land prices; inventories and census; planning; land register and issuing land 
rights; land categories; categories of user; other)? 
Which points (areas) will be changed soon or are being modified? How is this being done? 
Detailed characteristics 
What is the main purpose of Article 1 of the law (This Law prescribes the powers and 
responsibilities of the State which represents the entire people as owners of the land and 
uniformly manages land; the regime of land management and use; the rights and obligations of 
land users)? 
What is the logic behind dividing land into three categories (agricultural, non-agricultural and 
unused land)? 
Why is agricultural land (which includes forest land) a distinct category?  
Why has the length of agricultural land allocations been reduced (20 years for annual crops and 
50 years for perennial crops)? What are the advantages and drawbacks of this? Will it be 
changed? 
What is the basis for the current divison of users into seven categories (1. Domestic organisations; 
2. Households and individuals; 3. Residential communities; 4. Religious establishments; 5. 
Foreign diplomatic organisations; 6. Non-resident Vietnamese nationals; 7. Foreign organisations 
and individuals)? 
What needs are met by the ‘residential community’ category of user? Is this category widespread? 
Where? Can you give examples? 
Regarding the allocation of agricultural and forest land 
• What stage is the process at and why? 
• Will agricultural land be redistributed in 2013? Why? 
• What is the reason for allocating forest land to rural households? 
• Statistics? Where? Who? 
Develop the following questions (legal level) according to the interviewee: 
• land prices, 
• taxation, 
• inventories and census, 
• land use planning, 
• land register and issuing LURs. 
 
133 
C. The land administration  
Overall flow chart of the land administration 
Which administrations play a direct role in land management? 
• which administrations are involved 
• what is their role  
• what has changed recently (since 2000-2003)  
• what are the main changes in terms of functioning  
• what changes are under way  
Who are the non-institutional actors that play a direct role in land management alongside 
institutions (NGOs, donors, private enterprises) involved in: 
• finance 
• advice 
• technical and logistical assistance 
• Who? When? To whom? How? 
Three specific areas of investigation 
• land use planning (according to legal terminology: land use projects and plans – quy hoạch 
kế hoạch sử dụng đất) theoretically undertaken every 10 years. 
• land registration and allocation 
• annual surveys (kiểm kê đất đai) and five-yearly land use inventories (bản đồ hiện trạng sử 
dụng đất) 
For each component: 
• detailed operational flow chart (who actually does what?)  
• what room to manoeuvre do the provinces have in relation to the State? 
• what competences are delegated at this level? 
• what works and what doesn’t work? 
• statistics 
For all components:  
• show the relationship between components  (links between land allocation, planning, land 
use surveys)  
• what is the specific role of planning? How has this role changed over time? 
D - The place of the provinces in institutions (administration and legislation) 
Where do the provinces have room to manoeuvre with regard to land management and 
legislation? In which areas do the provinces have significant decision-making powers (prices, land 
categories, land use plans)? 
What are the advantages/disadvantages of giving the provinces more weight in this domain? 
Is the considerable differentiation that exists at this level due to the fact that the provinces have 
room to manoeuvre? If so, in which domains? 
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E – Current land issues at the national level (focusing on agriculture and forestry) 
What is the main problem posed by land in Vietnam at the moment? 
Is land a major problem in Vietnam today?  
In which areas (agriculture, forestry, urban, industrial, commercial) are land issues most pressing 
(pressure on land, land-related problems)? 
• agricultural land (rice fields, other)  
• forest land  
• urban land (land for housing)  
• industrial, commercial, leisure… 
What are these issues? How do they manifest themselves? Are they covered by the media?  
In which regions of the country are these issues most pressing? What are these issues? How do 
they manifest themselves? Are they covered by the media? Can you give examples? Are there 
differences between the north, the centre and the south of the country? 
Which categories of user are most affected by these issues? Which issues are they? How do they 
manifest themselves? Are they covered by the media? Can you give examples? 
Apart from institutions, which actors/bodies carry most weight in current changes in land matters 
(such as private enterprise)? How do they do this? What are their relations with institutions? 
Does Vietnam have an innovative land system? In what way is it innovative? Are there any 
similarities with other countries?  
What kind of land system is Vietnam moving towards? Greater liberalisation? More State control? 
More or less decentralisation? 
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A.4.2. Electronic surveys 
These electronic surveys were sent to foreign organisations.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Duration. The interview was designed to be completed in 10 to 15 minutes. Please feel free to 
answer a part of it only when you do not feel concerned with the questions. We are specifically 
thinking of the boxes number 3 and 4. We still remain interested by your opinion in boxes 5 and 
6.  
 
Confidentiality. Your identity is of interest for our project because we would like to have a 
precise view of the actors participating in building the land system. But there will be no individual 
results published and the confidentiality of the information will be strictly guaranteed.  
 
How to fill the form. The cursor will automatically move from one question to another by using 
the left and right arrows. Please type the answer in the grey text fields - txt ....... The field will 
expand as much as necessary when you type. For “yes or no” answers, please tick in the correct 
tick field. For numbers and years, please choose the right answer in the menu - year 2008 
 
1 - WHO ARE YOU? 
 
W1 – Name : txt 
 
 
 
W2 – First Name: txt  
W3 – Nationality: txt  
 
W4 – Institution: txt  
W5 – Position:  txt  
 
W6 – Special field: txt  
 
 W7 – Date of first entry in Vietnam: year 2008 
 
 
 
2 - YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAND SYSTEM 
 
P1 – Did you participate – or are you now participating – in the implementation and/or 
transformation of the Vietnamese land system (administration and regulation)? 
yes  / no  
 
If yes, in which part of the land system were (are) you involved?  
 P2 - land administration:    yes  / no  (if yes, please answer box 3) 
P3 - land regulations:         yes  /  no  (if yes, please answer box 4) 
 
If no, please answer the following questions and then go to box 5.  
 
P3 – Do you know someone in your institution who has participated in the process?  
yes  / no  
Who?  P4 – Name: txt      P5 – Position: txt  
P6 – e.mail address: txt  
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3 - LAND ADMINISTRATION 
 
A1 - Which area(s) were (are) you involved in? 
- land pricing:  
- land use statistics and land inventory:  
- cadastral works and land use titling:  
- land use planning in urban area:  
- land use planning in rural area:  
- another domain: Which one? txt 
 
 
 
What was (is) your involvement? 
A2 - You      A3 - Your institution  
consultancy:     consultancy:  
technical/logistical support:             technical/logistical support:  
control:                            control:  
evaluation:                          evaluation:  
decision making:                      decision making:    
financial assistance:  
 
A4 - Which Vietnamese institution was (is) your main partner? txt  
 
A5 - Did (does) you institution have a contractual relationship with it? yes  / no  
 
A6 -Which type of contract? txt  
 
A7 -Why do you think you have been contacted to participate in the process? txt  
 
A8 - Additional useful information concerning your work:  
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4 - LAND REGULATION 
 
R1 - Which piece(s) of legislation did you work on or around?  
 
1993 Land Law  2004 - Decree No. 181/2004/ND-CP on 
the implementation of the Land Law 
 
1993 - Regulations on allocation of land 
to households and individuals for stable 
and long-term use for agricultural 
production (issued with Decree no. 64-
cp).  
 2004 - Decree No. 197/2004/ND-CP on 
compensation, support and resettlement 
when land is recovered by the State 
 
 
1998 - Law amending and supplementing 
a number of articles of the Land Law 
(No. 10 of 1998) 
 2004 - Decree No. 198/2004/ND-CP on 
collection of land use levies 
 
2001 - Order No. 06/2001/L-CTN on the 
promulgation of the Law amending and 
supplementing a number of articles of 
the Land Law 
 2007- Decree No. 84/2007/ND-CP 
additionally stipulating the granting of 
land use right certificates, recovery of 
land, exercise of land use rights (etc.)  
 
2003 Land Law 
 
   
 
R2 - Other pieces of legislation (including forthcoming pieces): Which one: txt 
 
 
 
 
 
R3 - Which domain(s)/subject(s) were (are) you involved in? 
- legal aspect:   
- text writing:   
- taxation:  
- land pricing:  
- land use statistics and land inventory:  
- cadastral works and land use titling:  
- land use planning:  
- agricultural land:  
- forest land:  
- residential and urban land:   
- land for construction:  
- another domain: Which one ? txt  
 
What was (is) your involvement? 
R4 - You     R5 - Your institution 
consultancy:     consultancy:  
technical/logistical support:             technical/logistical support:  
control:                            control:  
evaluation:                          evaluation:  
decision making:                      decision making:    
 financial assistance:  
 
 
R6 - Which institution was (is) your main partner? txt  
 
R7 - Did (does) your institution have a contractual relationship with it? yes  / no  
 
R8 - Which type of contract? txt  
 
R9 - Why do you think you have been contacted to participate in the process? txt  
 
R10 - Additional useful information concerning your work: txt  
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5 – OTHER ACTORS IN THE LAND SYSTEM  
 
O1 - Do you know other people or institutions that are involved in building the land 
administration?    
yes  / no  
 
O2 - If yes, can you identify them and give a quick overview of the nature of their 
participation? If possible please list them in what you see as their descending order of importance  
Foreign institutions Vietnamese institutions 
1 
 
 1  
2  2  
3  3  
4  4  
5  5  
 
O3 - Do you know other people or institutions that are involved in improving land regulation?    
yes  / no  
 
O4 - If yes, can you identify them and give a quick overview of the nature of their 
participation? If possible please list them in what you see as their descending order of importance 
Vietnamese institutions Foreign institutions 
1  1  
2  2  
3  3  
4  4  
5  5  
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6 – YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAMESE LAND SYSTEM 
 
Y1 - What are the main improvements ensuing from the 2003 Land Law?  
txt 
 
 
 
Y2 -What do you see as the main qualities of Vietnamese land regulations?  
txt  
 
Y3 -What do you see as the main qualities of the Vietnamese land administration?  
txt  
 
Y4 -What do you think of “Article 1”? (Article 1: This Law prescribes the powers and 
responsibilities of the State which represents the entire people as owners of the land and 
uniformly manages land; the regime of land management and use; the rights and obligations of 
land users) 
txt  
 
Y5 –Which areas of the land legislation do you see as most problematic today?  
Please list them descending order of importance (7 for the most problematic to 1 for the least 
problematic) 
- land taxation: nbre 1 
- land pricing: nbre 1 
- land use statistics and inventory: nbre 1 
- cadastral works and land use titling: nbre 1 
- land use planning: nbre 1 
- land categories: nbre 1 
- land user categories: nbre 1 
- other problematic domains:  
          name   
          name   
          name   
 
 
Y6 -What do you think of the present land categories and why? (1 - agricultural land/ 2 – non-
agricultural land / 3 - unused land)  
txt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y7 -Which land categories do you think face the most acute problems nowadays?  
Please list them in what you see as the descending order of the importance of the problem  
- agricultural land: nber 1 
- forest land: nber 1 
- residential and urban land: nber 1 
- land for construction: nber 1 
- other problematic categories :  
          name   
          name   
          name   
 
Y8 -What do you think about the duration of agricultural land allocations (20 and 50 years)? Do 
you think these periods should be maintained, abrogated, reduced or lengthened? Why?  
txt  
 
Y9 -Why do you think the duration of land allocations for annual crops is limited to 20 years? 
txt  
 
Y10 -What do you think of the present categories of land users? Are there too many or too few 
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categories? Which categories could be merged/split? Why? (1. Domestic organisations; 2. 
Domestic households and individuals; 3. Residential communities; 4. Religious establishments; 5. 
Foreign organisations with diplomatic functions; 6. Overseas Vietnamese; 7. Foreign organisations 
and individuals) 
txt 
 
 
 
Y11 – In your opinion, which are the first three categories of land user whose rights and duties 
should be revised? 
1 –  
2 –  
3 -  
 
Y12 – In your opinion, what is the reason for having the category ‘residential community’ 
(céng ®ång d©n c-)?  
txt  
 
Y13 -What do you think of the land pricing procedures?  
txt  
 
Y14 -What do you think of the land taxation procedures?  
txt  
 
Y15 -What do you think of the land use statistics and inventory procedures?  
txt  
 
Y16 -What do you think of the cadastral works and land use titling procedures?  
txt  
 
Y 17 - What do you think of the land use planning procedures?  
txt  
 
Y18 – What do you see as the most important land issues of today?  
txt  
Y19 – Any other comments?  
txt   
 
 
Thank you very much for filling in this form. 
 
 
  
A.4.2. Electronic surveys 
These electronic surveys were sent to foreign organisations.  
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A.4.3. Framework for provincial surveys 
Identification of land institutions at the provincial level 
Main objectives 
• What role do the provinces play in the (vertical) structure of land institutions in Vietnam 
(administration and legislation)?  
• More specifically, what room to manoeuvre do the provinces have in relation to the State, 
and how do they use it? 
• What are the land institutions at the provincial level, and how do they function? 
• What are the specificities of the rural/forestry dimension in land issues? 
A – Legal aspects: survey of texts (decisions, decrees, etc.) relating to the implementation of 
land legislation at the provincial level 
Rather than a detailed inventory, the idea is to use the texts to determine: 
• what room there is to manoeuvre at the provincial level 
• what choices the provinces make, and the domains in which they choose to legislate 
• are the provinces in or out of step with reforms at the national level? 
Do texts exist at lower levels? Directives to enforce planning and/or development? 
B – Flow chart of the overall administration of land management at the provincial level 
(focusing on articulation with higher and lower levels)  
Assesment conducted in 2008. 
Evolution: main changes before/after the law of 2003 and preceding periods if possible. 
C – Three specific areas of investigation  
Land use planning (according to the legal terminology: land use projects and plans – quy hoạch kế 
hoạch sử dụng đất). Theoretically undertaken every 10 years. 
Land registration and allocation. 
Annual surveys (kiÓm kª ®Êt ®ai) and five-yearly land use inventories (bản đồ hiện trạng sử 
dụng đất).  
For each component  
• Detailed operational flow chart (who actually does what) 
• Links with upper and lower levels: what role does the province play in the flow chart as a 
whole? What room to manoeuvre do the provinces  have in relation to the State? Which 
competences are delegated to lower levels? 
• Statistics. 
For all components  
• Show the relationship between components (links between land allocation, planning, land 
use surveys). 
• What is the specific role of planning? How has this role changed over time? 
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For planning 
• Identify the administrative channels according to scalar and crosscutting levels (flow chart 
in one entity and administrative report in another). 
• Identify/ask detailed questions about the statistics: what does the planning and land use 
show? 
• Key questions on how the provinces/districts take account of the relationship between 
allocation and planning. 
• Identify who actually designs the plans: who prepares plans at the provincial level, is 
planning dealt with by private companies or civil servants in the provinces?  
• If so, how are they trained? Is this done by national-level administrations?  
• What room to manoeuvre do the provinces have in planning? 
• Questions about the benefits, advantages and/or disadvantages of planning/lack of planning 
at the national and/or local levels. 
For land use surveys and inventories  
• Identify their role/place in land use planning (stakeholder?) and (ensuing?) allocation. 
• Benefits of statistics: diachronic, comparison with synchronic planning.  
For allocation and registration 
• Time lag between the workings of different levels of the land system. 
• Between provincial and national directives.  
• Benefits of statistics: synchronic and diachronic comparison of the relationship between 
land allocation and use on the one hand, and planning on the other. 
• Who manages land allocations? How? What are the relationships involved? What are the 
issues at stake?  
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        Settings 
   Actors 
Organisations                                                                     
      Surveys (annual) 
 
 
    Surveys (every 5 years) 
 
 
 
 
               
    Levels 
    Land use plans         
 (every 10 years)  Actors      
               
    Organisations         
  
 
     Levels 
               
 Actors 
               
 Organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning 
(Ministry & its 
representatives) 
Allocation 
(land registry & its 
representatives) 
Land use 
(Certificates) 
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The actors and their views 
Main objectives 
• Who are the main actors that play a direct and indirect role in land matters? 
• What actors know and think about land institutions. The questions we would like to ask the 
various actors can be summarised as follows: 
– role: what do they do in land management? 
– knowledge: what do they know about land institutions at the provincial and national levels? 
And about other actors involved in land management at the provincial level? 
– opinion: what do they think about land management at the national and provincial levels? 
A – Identification of actors involved in land-related decisions at the provincial level 
Who are the actors that intervene directly (visibly/officially)? 
– this is mainly institutional actors who participate in land management (see flow chart), 
– but also actors who play an advisory role and/or provide services. They may be 
institutional actors (civil servants in related services: forestry, agriculture, etc., who have 
advised land administration officials), international NGOs or donors that have supported 
land institutions at the provincial level in the context of cooperation agreements, businesses 
that have provided technical services (such as drawing up development plans), etc. 
Who are the actors that intervene indirectly? These actors influence the evolution and progress 
of land institutions, affecting the way that they function by exerting pressure through demands 
and actions. Their actions may be legal or illegal: 
– private actors who invest in land or whose demands impact on land matters (constructing 
leisure parks, housing, setting up industrial areas, forestry and agricultural activities, agri-
food enterprises, etc.), 
– institutional actors (corruption, insider dealing, etc.), 
– State enterprises, 
– civil society pressure groups (demonstrations/organisations by expropriated rural 
landholders, etc.). 
B – What do actors know and think about land institutions and the land situation in the 
provinces? 
Role 
• Specify the identity of the person, institution or enterprise. 
• Their relative position in the land management flow chart. 
• Interests in land matters. 
Knowledge 
About institutions 
Institutions at the national level (quick overview – especially civil servants involved in land 
management) 
What are the main legal texts, decrees and decisions in force at the moment? 
– currently: name, date, content 
– previously: name, date, content 
– main changes in terms of content 
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Which administrations play a direct role in land administration? 
– currently 
– previously 
– main changes in terms of functioning 
Which actors play an indirect role in land administration at the national level (NGOs, donors, 
enterprises, etc.)? 
Institutions at the provincial level (all – including actors who are not directly involved, to get an 
idea of what they know and don’t know … These questions need to be put to land officials in order 
to create the land management flow chart)  
What are the main land-related enforcement orders in the province? 
– current 
– previous 
– main changes in terms of content 
Which administrations play a direct role in land management? 
– which administrations are they? 
– what is their role? 
– what has changed recently (since 2000-2003)? 
– what are the main changes in terms of functioning? 
– what changes are under way now? 
Who are the non-institutional actors that play a direct role in land management alongside 
institutions (NGOs, donors, private service providers) in terms of: 
– finance 
– advice 
– technical and logistical assistance 
– who? when? to whom? how? 
What room to manoeuvre do the provinces have in relation to what is decided and put in place in 
Hanoi? In which areas are provinces able to make their own decisions? In which areas do 
provinces have no decision-making powers? 
Which actors or institutions do you know in this flow chart?  
– which of them have you already worked with? Which of them are you involved with? On 
what? Why? In what circumstances? When? 
Other actors (apart from land institutions) 
Which actors play an ‘indirect’ role in land management?  
Actors who provide advice, exert pressure: NGOs, donors, political leaders … 
– who?  
– when?  
– to whom?  
– how? 
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Actors with significant interests in land matters 
– economic interests: large private and public enterprises in every area, including agriculture 
and forestry; public institutions, etc. 
– political and administrative interests: institutions other than land institutions that intervene 
or have interests in land matters (such as construction, town planning, agricultural and 
forestry services, etc.) 
Which of these actors or institutions do you know? 
With whom – or with which institution – have you already worked? Or had discussions?  Why? In 
what circumstances? When? 
Opinions 
On institutions and their functioning  
Are the changes of the last 10 years moving in the right direction? 
Which land mechanisms have improved and why? 
Which mechanisms don’t work, and why? Did they not work before? 
What needs to be improved and how can this be done? 
On current land issues in the province (focusing on agriculture and forestry) 
What are the main land dynamics in the province? 
What are the most striking land-related achievements in the province? 
In which areas (agriculture, forestry, urban, industrial, commercial) are land-related problems 
most pressing (pressure on land, land-related problems, etc.)? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of these domains (what has been done, what still 
needs to be done, what has been done well, what has been done badly…)? 
– agricultural land (rice fields, other types of agricultural land)  
– forest land 
– urban land (for housing)  
– industrial, commercial, leisure areas … 
Which regions face the most crucial issues? Why? 
Has the province had more or fewer land-related problems than other provinces/regions in 
Vietnam? 
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Annex 5: Essay on the history of land institutions in Vietnam 
(by Marie Mellac) 
According to Nguyen and Leroy (2005) “Vietnamese law is standing […] at the crossroads of 
several influences, which naturally makes it harder to understand: the political foundations of the 
colonial enterprise, Marxist-Leninist ideology, social order and religious belief”. This 
observation holds true for the land law and, more generally, for all land institutions. As Vietnam’s 
territory has not existed in its current form for very long (1975), we cannot talk of a single history 
of Vietnamese institutions. There are several, all of which have combined to produce the 
institutions that are in place today. 
The land law and institutions we now see are clearly evolving as a result of very modern 
dynamics, which are largely driven by the processes of globalisation and liberalisation. They have 
also been shaped by land systems from previous periods (temporal strata) and, albeit less visibly, 
the multi-culturalism characteristic of Vietnamese society. 
For N. Rouland (1998, cited by Nguyen and Leroy, ibid.), “The observation of diversity is only 
useful insofar as it serves to prepare the ground for reflection on the possible existence of an 
underlying order to this diversity”. We aim to help find this order, by sketching out the possible 
early history of Vietnamese land institutions and identifying what we believe to be its strengths.  
The classic approach distinguishes four main periods in the history of land in Vietnam: the pre-
colonial period, which lasted from the second half of the 19th century when France progressively 
took charge of the administration of its colonies and protectorates, first in the South and then in 
the North; the colonial period, which ended in 1954 in the North and 1975 in the South; the 
collectivist period, which began soon after decolonisation and officially ended in 1986 with the 
launch of the Doi Moi (Renewal) policy; and the post-collectivist period, which is treated 
independently as it constitutes the heart of this report. This presentation mainly focuses on North 
Vietnam, since this is where most of our sources came from, and because political power was 
based in Hanoi during the colonial period and following the ‘reunification’ of Vietnam in 1975. 
A.5.1. The pre-colonial period: land at the heart of inter-ethnic relations 
Although present-day Vietnam bears very little relation to its pre-colonial form, it is worth 
considering its earlier composition to get some idea of the diversity of land situations that the 
French encountered in their efforts to colonise and unify the the territory. 
The mountainous areas are the most diverse in terms of culture and policy. These areas were (and 
are) home to a large number of particularly varied ethnic groups, whose differing socio-political 
systems were generally more limited than those of the groups living on the plains (such as the 
Kinh, Lao, Khmer). The degree of cooperation/dependence within and between groups varied at 
different periods. Socio-political configurations were very fluid, and the very diverse customary 
land institutions, which reflected this fluidity, were a key element in long-term relations between 
the different ethnic groups. Over time they helped shape the groups’ spatial distribution over vast 
areas (altitudinal logics), and social relations within and between groups at more local levels (both 
as an element of social distinctiveness and, for example, through the process of integrating non-
Tai groups into Tai society). It is extremely difficult to impose some kind of order on such 
diversity, and the usual distinctions that can be made between groups (ethno-linguistic categories; 
rice-growers/slash-and-burners; small/large social groups; dominant/dominated, etc.) do little to 
clarify the situation when there are so many variations within these categories themselves. To get 
a clearer picture of the situation, we will start with the Herculean task of looking at the land 
institutions. 
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Ngo Duc Tinh (2006) distinguishes what he calls two types of codes (bodies of codified rules, of 
which a varying number relate to land), such as the numerous oral codes found in the central 
uplands, and the written codes of the Tai and Chams groups. It is also possible to identify 
characteristics shared by most groups, like the principle of collective ownership of land and 
resources, with use rights differentiated according to the individual’s ‘standing’. Groups also used 
markers to delimit land and resources that they had appropriated on a temporary basis, and there 
were common rules regulating the co-existence of neighbouring groups. 
The land systems in certain mountainous areas probably changed considerably as a result of 
prolonged contact with the Kinh from the Red River delta – as with the Tay, a Tai group that 
occupied vast areas north east of the Red River. Their system was characterised by individual 
appropriation of rice fields that is highly reminiscent of the Kinh (with the possibility of selling 
and purchasing land, and patrilineal transfers), but which also bears traces of a land system similar 
to that of the Muong Tai (in toponymy and cultural aspects). 
After freeing themselves from the Chinese in the 10th century, the Kinh established a power base 
in the plains of the North and the Red River delta, progressively spreading south and taking over 
from the Chams and then the Khmers. Our knowledge of the Kinh land institutions is based on the 
formalisation of land rules within the imperial codes (the Lê in the 15th century, and the Gia Long 
the 19th century) and numerous studies written over the years describing their main elements 
(Philastre, 1876 and 1909; Bienvenue, 1911; Boudillon, 1915; Ngo Kim Chung and Nguyen Duc 
Nghinh, 1987; Papin, 1997; Phan Huy Lê, 1997, Ngo Duc Thinh, 2006, etc.).   
We learn from the more recent imperial code of the Gia Long (1815) that “From our special 
viewpoint, the Emperor, father and mother of his people according to the Annamite expression, 
[was] the owner of all property, of which the occupants, simple tenants, [acquired] possession by 
different means, but always originating from concession granted by the Sovereign, who [retained] 
over them the right of eminent domain” (Bienvenue, 1911, cited by Tessier, 2003). Through the 
Emperor, the State in some way owned all property, including land. Individuals only held 
extended use rights and certain derived rights to land (including that of patrilineal transfer) 
provided they worked the land and paid land tax. Relations between the State and peasants were 
largely based on a ‘land contract’, whereby the State ensured that peasants had a certain degree of 
tenure security in return for using the land productively and filling its coffers. This kind of 
contract (which is fairly similar to the code of the Lê, which provided much of the basis of the Gia 
Long code) could not function properly without a system for registering people and land. The 
Kinh sovereigns put in place several registration systems, first the Ly dynasty between the 11th 
and 13th centuries, then the Le dynasty at the end of the 15th century, and finally the Nguyen at the 
beginning of the 19th century. 
 
“The first cadastral system in Vietnam was established by the Le dynasty in 1490. It is a DEED 
system in service for the nationwide land administration focusing on the utmost collection of 
agricultural tax. Meanwhile Hong Duc Law, the first Vietnamese law, was promulgated, of 
which 60 articles were about the land. The second cadastral system established in Vietnam took 
31 years between 1805 and 1836 by the Nguyen dynasty. It is a DEED system also containing 
10,044 volumes of cadastral books that covered 18 thousand communes across the country. 
Meanwhile Gia Long Law, the second Vietnamese law, was promulgated, of which 14 articles 
were to regulate the civil and administrative relation on housing, land and rice tax (Dang Hung 
Vo et Palmkvisk, 2001)” 
 
This is what O. Tessier (2003) has to say about the land registration system established during the 
Nguyen dynasty (Gia Long).  
 
“The first document that gives us some idea of the conditions for production in villages is the 
điền bạ, or register of rice fields for the commune of Ninh Dân [the commune studied by the 
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author]. This document is written in hán (pictograms), and is part of the body of land registers 
(điền bạ and điạ bạ) systematically established in every commune Bắc Bộ (North) between 1803 
and 1805 under the reign of the Gia Long, in order to enumerate all the agricultural and 
populated lands in the North. This was not the first time that the country’s sovereigns had 
attempted to catalogue their landholdings, but it was the first time that this operation was 
completed across the whole country, even though it was not finished in the South (Nam Kú) until 
1836 (Phan Huy Lê, 1995: 36). This desire for centralisation in the newly reconstituted imperial 
State explains the structural unity of each of these documents, which are composed of four 
distinct descriptive parts (Phan Huy Lê, 1998: 231-233): 
1 - The location of the commune and its subsequent inclusion in broader territorial and 
administrative units (tæng ‘canton’, huyÖn ‘district’, and possibly phñ ‘prefecture’ and tØnh 
‘province’); 
2 – The different types of land (rice fields, land for housing, cemeteries, ponds, etc.), their 
respective status or allocation (private, public, communal, allocation for a pagoda or temple, 
etc.), and their use when a register was established (cultivated, abandoned, fallow, etc.); 
3 – The list of owners, whether private or public, the location of each of their parcels or group 
of parcels, and the amount of land owned; 
4 – The official declaration summarising the information previously provided, signed with the 
offical mark (seal or signature) of the dignitaries and communal, cantonal, district and 
provincial officials. 
These are the most valuable documentary sources because they tell us about the size of the 
landholdings, the nature of the different land regimes, certain modes of individual tenure (such 
as ‘phu canh’ lands) and the number of registered landholders. However, they cannot be likened 
to a cadastral survey, as is sometimes the case, because they lack one essential element: a map 
of the territory divided into holdings and showing the name of each parcel’s owner - public or 
private, real or fictitious” (p. 40 and 41). 
 
Apart from this shortcoming (which meant that the records were not particularly accurate), the 
Kinh land system was highly formalised in the early 19th century, with tools facilitating very tight 
State controls over land. In addition to the rule of law, several authors (Ngo Duc Tinh, 2006; 
Nguyen and Leroy, 2005) note that codified rules also existed at the communal (or village, lang) 
level. Nguyen and Leroy (ibid.) maintain that the rule of (State) law did not take precedence at the 
local level, regardless of whether it was codified or not, and it seems that communes were 
primarily regulated according to customs that varied from one commune to the next (Le Thanh 
Khoi, 1981). Dery notes (1999) that “the community was solidly organised to ensure that it had 
sufficient men and food. Its political organisation was clearly integrated and its territory clearly 
demarcated (Brocheux and Hemery, 1995). However, this affirmation should be qualified in the 
case of southern territories; in what then constituted Cochinchine, the “commune [was] much less 
powerful, and [villagers] were much less concerned with tradition than their counterparts in 
Tonkin” (Robequain, 1948)”. 
Thus, certain aspects of the land system in this region, which was later colonised by the Kinh 
(who did not reach the Mekong delta until the end of the 17th century and the shores of the gulf of 
Thailand until 1870) were similar to those of land systems in the North, although it was 
characterised by more individualised family tenure and less emphasis on village structures. 
A.5.2. The colonial period: the creation of a land problem  
“The French colonial land tenure system can be characterised by the introduction of the concept 
of State property and the attempt to promote private property amongst the local population, via 
land registration programmes. While the French sought to promote conversion of public land to 
private ownership, and made legal provision for indigenous people to register land, this made 
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little impact, and customary systems persisted to a high degree with little direct intervention by 
the authorities”. This observation by Leonard and Longbottom (2000) with regard to West Africa 
only holds true in the mountainous regions of Vietnam, where State ownership did not exist and 
where the French were generally unable to enforce the land system laid down in Hanoi. Therefore, 
the French were often content to let local systems function at the communal and village levels, 
provided they could raise taxes and duties – when they had the capacity to do so. While the 
French did not have a huge effect on land matters, their influence should not be entirely 
discounted as they restructured and partially unified socio-political structures at the highest levels 
and imposed a local system of private ownership. For example, in the province of Bắc Kạn, 
which was geographically close to Hanoi, a cadastral service was not put in place until the early 
1940s, and was only withdrawn, before the French departed, in several villages surrounding the 
city of Bắc Kạn. Many rice fields in this province were allocated to former soldiers (sometimes 
in remote areas) and the French appropriated large swathes of land (in mining or forested areas, 
for example). It should also be noted that the French did not hesitate to intervene in ‘indigenous 
affairs’ when they had the opportunity to do so, as shown by the piece on this province published 
in 1931, Coutumier à l’usage des Mans (Yao), describing the social rules of this group, which 
differ from those of the Tày with regard to land.  
The French influence in the whole mountain region can be summarised in four main points: 
• they had little impact on local customary rules, 
• slash-and-burn was forbidden, and cleared lands were not recognised as land that had been 
appropriated by groups, 
• the number of taxes and duties increased, 
• an ‘inequitable’ titling process began, benefiting indigenous and French administrators 
and, more generally those who asked for titles, 
• ‘vacant’ lands were gradually appropriated. 
The colonial authorities had a much greater impact on land tenure in the two large deltas and 
coastal plains of the North and South, scaling up processes that were starting to emerge in the 
mountains. For example, the French quickly resumed the process of land registration, which 
enabled them to raise land taxes and establish a status of ‘vacant and ownerless lands’, which the 
colonial authority incorporated into its private landholdings and then allocated to French settlers 
as concessions of varying sizes.  
However, the impact of colonialisation was not homogenous. An order issued in 1898 allowed for 
a dual legal system in which the ‘indigenous’ customary regime coexisted with the metropolitan 
land law (Ta Thi Thuy, 1993). In simple terms, this resulted in a system where the State agreed 
land contracts with peasants in rural areas (which were published by the communal authorities) 
and real land ownership titles were issued in urban areas (Dang Hung Vo, 1997).  
The Atlas de la province de Hanoï (Rossi et al., 2002) tells us that at the end of the 1950s, the 
characteristic social structure of the Red River delta included large landowners, a class of small- 
and medium-scale farmers who controlled land and production, and landless farmers who lived as 
labourers and worked as sharecroppers for the large landowners. Their numbers varied according 
to the regions of the delta, rising to as much as 80 per cent of the population in certain communes 
close to Hanoi. Nevertheless, the old community-based land structure remained important, with 
land collectively owned by the commune and redistributed to households every five years in 
exchange for a tax based on the quality of the land. The authors argue that the phenomenon of 
land grabbing by large landowners developed in parallel with urban growth: at the end of the 19th 
century urban lands were private property while agricultural lands in peri-urban villages were 
collectively owned. As this slowed urban growth, the colonial authorities privatised a lot of rural 
land so that they could develop the cities, assuming its ownership at the expense of village 
communities.  
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The growing privatisation of land ownership by the French administration progressively 
accentuated the differentiation between landowners, small farmers and landless farmers, which 
was more pronounced in the south than the north of the country. Dao The Tuan (1998) notes that 
farms were smaller and there was less land differentiation and few very big landowners in the 
North and Centre, where more of the communal land system was retained due to greater 
demographic pressure. In the South, where land was more abundant, there was less communal 
land and greater differentiation, with large agricultural holdings and more landless farmers. 
Quoting Y. Henri (1932), he reports that 21 per cent of land in the North was communal in 1930, 
compared with 25 per cent of land in the Centre and 3 per cent in the South. 
The land inequalities that flourished in Vietnam’s great plains and delta in the first half of the 20th 
century provoked numerous land conflicts and fostered deep feelings of injustice and resentment 
among a large section of the rural population towards the colonialists and those that had profited 
from colonisation. While these inequalities were certainly not the only conditions that allowed the 
‘socialist revolution’ to take place, land played a fundamental role in legitimising the socialist 
project. Hence the incorporation of the agrarian reform into the PCI programme from its inception 
in 1930: “ the abolition of any vestiges of feudalism, distribution of land to peasants, reversal of 
imperialism” (Le Thanh Khôi, 1978, cited by Tessier, 2003). The battles for access to land were 
also an inextricable element of the wars that were fought to expel the French and reunify the 
country (Kerkvliet, 1997). 
A.5.3. The collectivist period: the ‘disappearance’ of land tenure 
The collectivist period is characterised by the progressive establishment of a system that 
responded to a non-market socialist conception of land, where land management and ownership 
were the sole preserve of the public authorities. However, the collectivisation of land did not 
begin until the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) was put in place, and was 
preceded, as the PCI planned, by a process of agrarian reform (1953-1956) under the famous 
slogan ‘the land belongs to he who works it’. 
The objectives of this reform were partly political and partly designed to address the economic 
conditions of the time (weaken opponents of the new regime and give power to the peasants) by 
confiscating land from large landowners and redistributing this and communal lands among 
small-scale and landless farmers. The reform was pushed through in the plains and delta of the 
North before over-zealous attempts to establish order in the countryside led to its abandonment in 
a climate of terror in 1956. Implementation in mountainous areas was more discreet, and very 
little land was redistributed in some places, although it is unclear whether this was due to political 
pragmatism (desire to conciliate the local population) or realism (lack of major land inequalities). 
However, the societal reform that was an integral part of the whole project continued, 
revolutionising the functioning of local societies and transforming political structures at the higher 
levels. 
The collectivisation of the nation was neither a linear nor a homogenous process. It was 
undertaken in phases, which were themselves preceded by periods of experimentation in various 
parts of the country. Florence Yvon (1994) identifies four main periods: (i) the ‘launch of 
collectivisation’ between 1959 and 1961, (ii) the ‘consolidation of agricultural cooperatives’, 
which corresponds to the first five-year plan, and whose objective was to put in place high-level 
cooperatives, (iii) the war years from 1961 to 1975, when the government disengaged from the 
agricultural sector and dispensed with the process of collectivisation, and (iv) the period of ‘large-
scale socialist agriculture’ that began in 1975 and marked a temporary return to the collectivist 
ideal. This period saw a radical restructuring of the cooperatives and was particularly painful for 
the rural population, prompting the end of the collectivist movement and dismantling of the 
cooperatives as the pendulum swung back to other forms of tenure. 
The Constitution of 1946 guaranteed citizens rights of ownership but made no mention of forms 
of ownership, while the Constitution of 1959 recognised four forms of ownership, two of which 
were completely new. One of these new forms was State ownership, which was sacred and 
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inviolable ownership by the entire population; the other was cooperative ownership, or mass 
collective ownership by the workers, ownership by individuals belonging to the mass of workers, 
and ownership by Vietnamese capitalists.49 
Our forthcoming article (Mellac, forthcoming) describes how, “In the domain of land 
administration and tenure, the socialist model had the following characteristics. Land was the 
property of the entire people, uniformly managed by the State, which is theoretically the case until 
today. This means that the State held definitively the rights of exclusion and inclusion and 
delegated land use management rights only. Land use management was organized in a pyramidal 
and hierarchical manner following a top-down model. Each administrative circumscription was 
allocated land use rights by the upper level and devoted part of the received rights to the lower 
level. Following this organization, each administrative unit had a restricted access to the land 
and was dependent on the decisions taken at the higher level. It was the case, for instance, when 
the State (or a province) created a new State Forest Enterprise and allocated the land to the new 
unit”. 
Having become the owner of a good deal of private land and buildings, the State played a major 
role in the distribution of housing – although transactions in the cities were by no means 
exclusively confined to the official channels (Pandolfi, 2001). The process of collectivisation was 
never fully completed in the countryside either. Quang Canh estimates that 70 per cent of rural 
households had joined agricultural cooperatives in 1961, and we can probably assume that an 
average of 10 to 15 per cent of households remained outside them. Within the cooperatives 
themselves, not all the land was worked collectively. Five per cent of the land used by 
cooperatives could be allocated to households as small individual plots where they were allowed 
to grow and harvest any crop, feeding what was left of the free market. D. Pillot (1995) estimates 
that these small plots generated over one third of production during this period. We also noted the 
existence of small individual plots in the mountains in the Bac Kan region (including small areas 
of cleared land) amounting to well over the authorised 5 per cent, which were transferred 
according to longstanding rules set by the paternal lineage group, rather than being controlled by 
the cooperatives.   
Despite the theoretical lack of local latitude in this reform, the collectivist process followed a very 
different course in the mountains and the delta. The reforms seemed to be implemented 
everywhere, even affecting groups that Quang Canh (1968) classified as the most ‘backward’, but 
decisions were enforced with varying degrees of rapidity and accuracy, depending on the region 
and its proximity to Hanoi. The cooperatives in the mountains remained smaller than those in the 
delta, were weaker and subject to fewer checks than the cooperatives in the delta, and many went 
under when the going got tough (Dreyfus, 1993; Yvon-Tran, 1994). These cooperatives also had 
to deal with the specific problem of applying a model of production designed for low-lying 
regions, which was most evident in the very different treatment accorded to rice fields and other 
cultivated areas. The rice fields were immediately collectivised and, as with the plans for the 
delta, remained the cornerstone of the cooperatives until their disappearance, while most of the 
slopes and gardens were still managed and cultivated individually in accordance with the previous 
rules. 
It is worth noting that the decision to opt for a planned and centralised economy led to the 
disappearance of specific land institutions. Under this system, the question of land use was dealt 
                                                
49 “Socialist economic theory distinguished income and non-income producing land. Income-producing land was 
treated as a special means of production (tu lieu san xuat dac biet), and along with state-owned enterprises was 
managed according to state production plans. Although, non-income producing residential land was also allocated 
and managed according to state needs, it was not as tightly controlled as productive land. The State owned large 
tracts of urban land confiscated (tich tu) from the colonialists, traitors and reactionaries. Those considered 
wealthy, but non-exploitative, were permitted to retain technical ownership of commercial properties, which were 
leased to the state for nominal rents. Residents of large villas were encouraged to exchange their houses for 
smaller premises or accommodate other families. For the majority, socialist land management did not (until 1980) 
affect house ownership or occupancy rights” (AusAID, 2000: 15). 
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with in the overall framework of territorial planning, and land distribution and access considered 
in the overall framework of collectivisation. Despite the multiple phases of collectivisation, the 
status of land remained unchanged until the ‘Doi Moi’ economic reform. What did change was the 
way that individuals came together to work (the size of cooperatives, working groups and gangs) 
and then how they gained physical access to land (or not). These changes also affected the way 
that produce from the land was redistributed among workers in cooperatives and State enterprises. 
But despite being central to the beginnings of the socialist revolution, the question of land 
‘dissolved’ within the collectivist project. 
Although the current re-emergence of land as an issue is a reflection of contemporary impulses 
and logics, the institutions that are appearing now are derived from those that were put in place in 
previous periods, even when land institutions as such did not exist. The tradition of planned 
management described above raises the question of how previous management structures can be 
adapted to the new land system that is progressively being put in place. How has this system been 
defined and applied over time? Which structures have been put in place, and how have the former 
structures been redefined? 
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Annex 6: Illustrations 
 
 
An industrial development interrupts the network of rice fields north of Hanoi (Google Earth 
image). 
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Sign on the Hanoi ring road: Pay your taxes to ensure a bright future for your family and society 
(photo: Mellac, 2007). 
 
 
The city of Hanoi encroaching on rice fields (photo: Mellac, 2007). 
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Vertical buildings, horizontal rice fields, Hanoi (photo: Mellac, 2007). 
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Developing the capital: Thoi Bao Kinh Tê Viêt Nam 11th February 2008), copy of the article 
kindly provided by Sylvie Fanchette (IRD) 
A lynchpin in the West (referring to the province of Ha Tây) 
 
An ‘intelligent’ city
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